Follow-Up 1: Where in the World is "Aleksandr Nevskiy"?

Since "Aleksandr Nevskiy" departed Gadzhiyevo in mid-August for its interfleet transfer, Russia's three main news outlets have all taken a stab at reporting when the submarine will arrive in Rybachiy. Below is a summary of their reports.

Note: In Russia, a calendar month can be broken into three 10-day periods, known as a dekada. Thus, the first dekada equates to the first 10 days of the month, and so on.

Interfax, September 2

• Source: "source familiar with the situation"
• Comment 1: "arrival in Vilyuchinsk is expected in the early part of the third dekada in September" -- This would roughly equate to September 21-24.
• Comment 2: "[source] linked the submarine's interfleet transfer to the actions of a number of Northern Fleet ships currently operating along the Northern Sea Route" -- This seems unlikely, as the Northern Fleet ships, as in previous years, are likely hugging Russia's northern coastline to avoid frequent interaction with ice, while the submarine should be operating under the ice.

 

TASS, September 7

• Source: "fleet headquarters source"
• Comment 1: "departed Gadzhiyevo on August 15" -- That seems to be incorrect based on the previous blog entry showing crew members updating their social media accounts through August 18.
• Comment 2: "expected in [Rybachiy] in the second dekada of the month" -- This would equate to September 11-20.

RIA Novosti, September 7

• Source: "highly placed Pacific Fleet HQ source"
• Comment 1: "will arrive in Kamchatka, as planned, in the third dekada of September" -- This would equate to September 21-30.
• Comment 2: "Vladimir Monomakh" will arrive in Kamchatka either in late 2015 or in 2016 -- This is a strange statement for two reasons. First, under-ice transfers appear to be timed to coincide with the period when the ice edge has receded to its farthest northern point in a given year. Thus, an under-ice transfer later than October seems unreasonable. Second, all previous statements (albeit unofficial) on the transfer of "Vladimir Monomakh" indicated the submarine will transfer in the fall of 2016. That being said, there have been a few instances of submarines transferring between the two fleets via a southern route: Atlantic Ocean > Drake Passage > Pacific Ocean. This route was used in February-March 1966 for the transfer of two nuclear-powered boats, an Echo II and a November. It was also used for the transfer of two Delta III-class ballistic missile submarines in January-April 1979.

As the above shows, all of the sources had incorrect or highly implausible information that suggests the dates they provided are speculative and may or may not be backed up by any substantive knowledge of the transfer. The fact that the Interfax and RIA Novosti sources both stated the submarine will arrive in Rybachiy in the third dekada is probably just a coincidence. And if "Aleksandr Nevskiy" arrives during the second dekada, it doesn't necessarily mean TASS' source actually knew that time frame to be true when he (or she) provided the information to TASS.

When it comes to any media outlet anywhere in the world... beware of anonymous sources, despite any official-sounding job title attributed to them.

Where in the World is "Aleksandr Nevskiy"?

"Aleksandr Nevskiy" and her crew -- December 2010

On August 27, Russian media outlets ran two competing stories about the transfer of Dolgorukiy-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine "Aleksandr Nevskiy" from the Northern Fleet to the Pacific Fleet. TASS, citing an unnamed General Staff source, reported that the submarine departed port in mid-August and will arrive "in Kamchatka" [presumably its new homeport of Rybachiy] in the first week of September. Later that day, Interfax, citing its own unnamed shipbuilding industry source, reported that the submarine remains in the Northern Fleet base of Gadzhiyevo and won't depart for the under-ice transfer until mid-September. The Russian Ministry of Defense has made no statement to support or refute either claim.

So, who's right? Since the Interfax article was aimed at refuting the TASS article, we'll start with the TASS article.

• The submarine departed in mid-August. This is true if you believe in coincidences. A survey of the submarine's crew members' social media accounts shows many of them were active up until 18 August, but none of them have been active since. And with comments like "I'll be gone until October" and "I'm planning to head to sea (with several bags of candy bars, cookies, and other snacks)," one might conclude that the submarine did, in fact, depart port on August 18 or a few days later.


• The submarine will arrive in Rybachiy during the first week of September. The distance from Gadzhiyevo to Rybachiy is approximately 4,000 nautical miles. In order to travel that distance in 21 days (using August 18 as the departure date and September 7 as the arrival date), the submarine would have to travel 190.5 nautical miles per day at an average speed of ~7.9 knots. Of the eight Delta I/III SSBN under-ice transfers conducted between 1980 and 2008, four completed the transit in 24-32 days. The other four conducted patrols after transferring to the Pacific Fleet area (but before arriving in Rybachiy), extending the total length of their transfers  to 78-84 days. If TASS's source is correct, then "Aleksandr Nevskiy" will make a direct transit and may even break the SSBN transfer record.

As for the Interfax report, all that can be said is that the source's claims are in direct contradiction to those of the TASS source. Moreover, it should be noted that all eight Delta I/III SSBN transfers mentioned above began in mid- to late-August -- never in September.

Thus, based on previous SSBN transfers and on clues provided by the submarine's own crew, it appears more likely that "Aleksandr Nevskiy" commenced its under-ice transit in mid-August and is no longer in Gadzhiyevo. If true, then Interfax's source is clearly uninformed, or someone may be intentionally trying to confuse those who read the TASS story.

The below image depicts the most recent ice-edge reporting and the locations of Russian icebreakers and ice-capable research vessels in the Arctic region. While they may not be tasked with directly supporting the under-ice transfer, they could be called upon to respond in the event of an emergency involving the submarine.

Ice-edge reporting and locations of select vessels in the Arctic region -- August 30, 2015

“Aleksandr Nevskiy” to Launch Bulava SLBM This Week

Flight bans (red) and flight route restrictions (green) - November 28-29, 2014

Several flight bans and flight restrictions have been announced for Barents Sea missile activity scheduled for November 28-29, 2014:

Flight bans
G2530/14 - TEMPO DANGER AREA ACT WI COORD:
  1. 693800N 0341000E-694700N 0341000E-702200N 0350000E-700400N 0362600E-692700N 0353500E-692700N 0351800E-693800N 0341000E-693800N 0341000E.
  2. 770300N 0530200E-755800N 0563300E-750500N 0521300E-760400N 0485300E-770300N 0530200E-770300N 0530200E.
SFC - UNL, DAILY 0900-2030, 28 NOV 09:00 2014 UNTIL 29 NOV 20:30 2014.

G2540/14 - FLT PROHIBITED WI AREA BOUNDED BY COORD:
693800N 0341000E-692700N 0351800E-692700N 0341000E-693800N 0341000E.
SFC - 1500M AMSL, DAILY 0900-2030, 28 NOV 09:00 2014 UNTIL 29 NOV 20:30 2014.

Flight route closure
G2525/14 - FLW ATS RTE SEGMENTS CLSD: B483 PIBOL - ANODI, B488 TILGA - ANODI. SFC - UNL, DAILY 0900-2030, 28 NOV 09:00 2014 UNTIL 29 NOV 20:30 2014.

Additionally, a flight route closure over the Kamchatka Peninsula near the Kura Test Range also goes into effect on the same dates:

P8284/14 - ATS RTE SEGMENT CLSD: B240 TILICHIKI NDB (TK) - OKLED. SFC - UNL, DAILY 0900-2030, 28 NOV 09:00 2014 UNTIL 29 NOV 20:30 2014.

"Aleksandr Nevskiy" arrived in Severodvinsk on November 7 to onload at least one SS-N-32 Bulava SLBM. The submarine departed Severodvinsk on November 15 for a two-day return transit to Sayda Guba. A week later, it transferred to the Severomorsk area.

Despite some confusion created by Interfax on November 10, military officials confirmed the next day that "Aleksandr Nevskiy", indeed, would launch a Bulava SLBM sometime during the last 10 days of November.

New SSBNs Will Not Transfer to Pacific Fleet in 2014

Dolgorukiy SSBN "Aleksandr Nevskiy" and crew - December 2010 (Photo courtesy of SevMash)

Despite multiple claims of the transfer of one or more Dolgorukiy-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to the Russian Navy Pacific Fleet this year, there are serious issues preventing this from happening.

"Aleksandr Nevskiy"
The submarine was accepted into the Navy on December 23, 2013, and it arrived at its new homeport of Gadzhiyevo a week later. The day after its arrival, SevMash (which builds the Dolgorukiy SSBN) reported plans to repair a "damaged shaft" on the submarine sometime in 2014. The estimated repair cost was stated at just under RUB 1.8 million, considerably less than a new shaft. The scope of damage is not known, but it appears it was damaged sometime during the transfer from Severodvinsk to Gadzhiyevo. If it was known that the shaft was damaged before leaving the White Sea, the submarine would have returned to SevMash.

To date there has been no mention of the shaft being repaired. More importantly, there has been no reporting of "Aleksandr Nevskiy" conducting even one day of underway training since arriving at Gadzhiyevo. All news articles mentioning the submarine this year have focused on speculation of an inter-fleet transfer or possible SS-N-32 Bulava SLBM launches.

"Aleksandr Nevskiy" Crew 1, until recently commanded by Captain 1st Rank Vasiliy Tankovid, underwent submarine training at the 270th Training Center (Sosnovyy Bor) in January-April 2014. Following a brief vacation period, Tankovid apparently was replaced by Captain 2nd Rank Aleksandr Nadezhdin, who was the commanding officer of "Vladimir Monomakh". Reporting this year continues to show Nadezhdin on board "Vladimir Monomakh", which could suggest he will not transfer to "Aleksandr Nevskiy" until its repairs are completed.

The window for conducting an under-ice inter-fleet transfer is quickly closing. A review of prior under-ice transfers shows August-September as the optimal period for such an operation. Before such an operation can be undertaken, however, you need to have a fully functional submarine and a highly trained crew, neither of which appears to exist today.

Finally, an anonymous "source in the Navy Main Staff" told ITAR-TASS in late March that, in fact, "Aleksandr Nevskiy" and "Vladimir Monomakh" would conduct under-ice transfers to the Pacific Fleet in the fall of 2015.

Base infrastructure
Waterfront infrastructure upgrades at Rybachiy Submarine base (Russian Far East - Kamchatka Peninsula) to support Dolgorukiy SSBN basing have been underway for at least two years. In 2013, construction of a new weapons handling pier at Mys Kazak (near Rybachiy Submarine Base) was underway. Contracts related to the pier covered the delivery of Japanese-manufactured sheet piling, 5,000 cubic meters of concrete, and multiple electrical connections to the local power grid, to name a few.

The infrastructure upgrades have been plagued by at least two significant worker accidents. On October 28, 2013, a 28-year-old bulldozer operator from the Monolit construction company was killed when 50 tons of dry cement fell on a shed where he was taking a break. And the source of that cement, which is being used for the Rybachiy Submarine Base infrastructure upgrades, may be imported through shady dealings (business as usual in the Far East) via ITA, according to a Kamchatka local newspaper.

On February 11, 2014, a sling operator was seriously injured after the sling of a wheeled crane broke during the removal of sheet piling. The accident occurred 22 meters from the end of a new deep-water pier under construction at the 3002nd Missile Handling Facility (Mys Kazak).

Complicating the situation was a court case in July of this year in which Mikhail Lunyakov (Chief of Special Construction-Engineering - Federal Special Construction Agency (SpetsStroy)) received an administrative fine of RUB 20,000 by the 289th State Architecture and Construction Oversight Office (headed by Vadim Lapushkin) for failing to receive permission before beginning construction work related to Pier 1 of the missile handling facility. It's never a good thing when government agencies sue each other.

Despite these minor setbacks, SpetsStroy continues to report progress in the infrastructure upgrade project. In June 2014, the agency claimed construction of the "pier zone" was on schedule. In July, SpetsStroy reported renovation of a 400psi high-pressure air compressor station and a personal rescue equipment inspection station also were on schedule.

In late August, General Surovikin, head of the Eastern Military District, stated "Aleksandr Nevskiy" should transfer to the Pacific Fleet by the end of 2014. But reporting during Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Viktor Chirkov's visit to the submarine base in early September is strikingly different. Instead of the submarine arriving this year, defense ministry reporters stated Dolgorukiy SSBNs would join the Pacific Fleet "in the future."

So, regardless of claims you have already heard and others you may hear later this year, no Dolgorukiy SSBN will be transferring to the Pacific Fleet in 2014.

Liar, Liar… Pants on Fire

As if Russia didn’t have enough end-of-year excitement, two nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines were involved in separate mishaps during the last week of December.  On December 28, a floating drydock was pushed by very high winds into the stern section of Aleksandr Nevskiy, the second hull of the new Dolgorukiy class of SSBNs.  The submarine, launched in 2011, is still undergoing pre-acceptance testing.  The incident occurred at the Northern Machine-building Enterprise (shortened in Russian to Sevmash), located in the White Sea port of Severodvinsk.   It is unclear how serious the damage is, but one report indicates the submarine now has a hole measuring 0.7 by 0.2 meters in its outer hull.  This incident has not been officially acknowledged yet.

The very next day, a fire broke out aboard Yekaterinburg, the second hull of the Delta IV class of SSBNs – the backbone of the Russian naval strategic nuclear forces.  The fire began at about 4PM local time as the submarine was undergoing dock repairs in a floating drydock at the 82nd Ship Repair Facility in the port of Roslyakovo (near Murmansk).  Sparks from ongoing hull-cutting operations apparently ignited either oily residue or trash lubricants floating in the free-flood space between the outer and inner (pressure) hulls.  This space, which contains the submarine's cylindrical sonar array, is flooded when the submarine is afloat, but it is supposed to be drained when placed in drydock.  In this instance, openings located under the sonar dome were welded shut, thus preventing the space from being fully drained.  The presence of water in the space should have been obvious to shipyard workers, especially given that the submarine was placed in the drydock three weeks earlier on December 8.  Contributing to the incident was a series of safety violations, to include the absence of a safety observer during the hull-cutting operation and the failure to draft a written order for the operation in the first place (apparently only a verbal order was given).

About thirty minutes after the fire ignited, the rubber material within the free-flood space began to burn.  The flames then spread outside the space and onto the outer hull.  Subsequently the submarine’s anechoic tiles, which are made of rubber and used to reduce the amount of noise emanating from inside the submarine, began to burn, as did the adjacent wooden scaffolding.  The Russian media erroneously reported – and continue to report – the fire was initiated when sparks created during welding work ignited the scaffolding.  While investigators now know the truth, officials apparently have decided the original false reporting serves their purposes for the time being.

Adding to the seriousness of the accident is the fact that at least ten SS-N-23 Skiff ballistic missiles and four combat torpedoes were loaded aboard the submarine.  As this repair period was “unscheduled,” naval officials decided not to fully offload the submarine’s weapons.  For “scheduled” repairs, all weapons are offloaded before repair work begins.  The immediate danger of the fire was to the four torpedoes, which were amazingly still loaded into torpedo tubes that are located in a separate, confined space above the free-flood space containing the cylindrical sonar array.  Crewmembers were able to pull three torpedoes from their tubes, but the fourth torpedo was wedged inside the torpedo tube.  News video from December 30 clearly shows water being sprayed directly into at least one of the starboard torpedo tubes.

By 3PM local on December 30, shipyard workers had flooded the drydock in order to lower the submarine into the water.  This allowed seawater to flood the free-flood space between the outer and inner hulls, thereby dousing all flames and rapidly lowering the temperature within the space.  Shortly afterwards, the fire was reported to be completely extinguished.

Another indication of the gravity of the situation was the number of high-level government and military officials who flew from Moscow to Roslyakovo:  General Nikolay Makarov (Chief of the General Staff), Admirals Vladimir Vysotskiy and Aleksandr Tatarinov (Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff, respectively), Denis Manturov (acting Minister of Industry and Trade), and Roman Trotsenko (head of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, the parent company of the 82nd Ship Repair Facility).

Now that most of Russia is enjoying a week-long New Year’s holiday break, investigators and military officials will be able to better craft a story for the public while simultaneously trying to figure out who’s to blame.  The more things change, the more they stay the same.