Simultaneous Exercises by Black Sea Fleet, Caspian Flotilla Kalibr Ships

Patrol combatants "Zelenyy Dol" (left) and "Serpukhov" (right)

On August 9, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that three Kalibr-capable Caspian Flotilla combatants will take part in an exercise in the southwestern portion of the Caspian Sea on August 15-20. The frigates "Tatarstan" (not Kalibr-capable) and "Dagestan", along with the patrol combatants "Grad Sviyazhsk" and "Velikiy Ustyug" will conduct gunnery and missile drills during the exercise.

On August 11, defense officials announced that the Black Sea Fleet's two Kalibr-capable patrol combatants, "Serpukhov" and "Zelenyy Dol", had departed Sevastopol en route to the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Those two ships, together with other ships assigned to Russia's Standing Mediterranean Sea Task Group, are scheduled to begin a "graded tactical exercise" on August 15. As with the Caspian Sea exercise, this exercise will include gunnery and missile drills.

Flight bans for Russian Navy exercises -- August 15-20, 2016

Flight bans have been announced for the eastern Mediterranean Sea exercise:

A0837/16 - RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE (ROCKET TEST FIRINGS) WILL TAKE PLACE IN AREA BOUNDED BY: 344400N0345800E, 351300N0345800E, 351300N0353300E, 344400N0353300E. SFC - FL660, 0500-1700, 15 AUG 05:00 2016 UNTIL 20 AUG 17:00 2016.

A0838/16 - RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE (ROCKET TEST FIRINGS) WILL TAKE PLACE IN AREA BOUNDED BY: 351900N0300000E, 350500N0302500E, 350900N0304400E, 354300N0300000E. SFC - FL660, 0500-1700, 15 AUG 05:00 2016 UNTIL 20 AUG 17:00 2016.

These two exercises are likely linked to next month's scheduled "Kavkaz-2016" operational-strategic exercise.

Kalibr Missile Shooter Heading to Mediterranean Sea

"Zelenyy Dol" and "Kovrovets" returning to Sevastopol -- February 12, 2016

"Zelenyy Dol", a patrol ship capable of firing land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, and sea-going minesweeper "Kovrovets" departed Sevastopol today to join the Russian Navy's Mediterranean Sea Standing Task Group. This marks the first deployment of the patrol ship to the Mediterranean Sea since it joined the Russian Navy in December 2015. Is this simply a "rotation of forces", as the Southern Military District's press release indicates, or will "Zelenyy Dol" launch missiles into Syria?

"Zelenyy Dol" and its sister ship "Serpukhov" arrived in the Black Sea in late July 2015 for sea trials, were handed over to the Ministry of Defense in November, and were commissioned in December. At no time during the sea trials did defense officials announce that "Zelenyy Dol" or "Serpukhov" had fired either the SS-N-27 anti-ship cruise missile or the SS-N-30 land-attack cruise missile. Thus, both ships joined the Russian Navy on a provisional basis. The Syrian crisis now affords Moscow the opportunity to test fire the SS-N-30 from "Zelenyy Dol" and possibly "Serpukhov" in the near future.

Admiral Aleksandr Vitko on board "Zelenyy Dol" -- January 2016

Both ships conducted at-sea combat training in January; Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Aleksandr Vitko was on "Zelenyy Dol" to observe and grade that crew's performance. And both ships participated in this past week's Southern Military District surprise combat readiness inspection.

Area closure for Russian Navy exercise -- February 8-11, 2016

An area closure and flight bans for a "Russian Navy exercise" in the eastern Mediterranean Sea were in effect on February 8-11. As of today, there are no announced area closures or flight bans that would indicate if or when "Zelenyy Dol" will launch missiles into Syria; however, those could be announced at anytime.

Kalibr vs Klub: There's a Difference

Defense News' "Is Caspian Sea Fleet a Game-Changer?" article from October 11 demonstrates a confusion between Russian missile systems that has plagued other articles published following the October 7 launch of long-range land-attack cruise missiles by Russian Navy ships operating in the Caspian Sea. The main thing to remember is that Kalibr is the name assigned to the Russian domestic version of a missile complex that can launch several types of missiles (3M14 [SS-N-30 land-attack cruise missile], 3M54 [SS-N-27 anti-ship cruise missile], and 91R [antisubmarine missile]), while Klub is the name assigned to the export version of the same missile complex.

Other confusing points include:

"The inland sea features naval forces from the four bordering countries — Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan in addition to Russia..."
-- It's actually five, if you include Kazakhstan.

"...the Kalibr long-range version has only recently reached operational status."
-- Relatively recently; it reached operational status when the first launch platform, Gepard-class frigate "Dagestan", was commissioned in November 2012.

"But until now it was not clear that smaller ships, including the Project 21631 Buyan-M corvettes that also took part in the Oct. 7 attacks, could operate the weapon."
-- There should be nothing unclear about this. The first two units of the Sviyazhsk class of guided missile patrol combatants, "Grad Sviyazhsk" and "Uglich", were delivered to the RF Ministry of Defense in December 2013 after sea trials and state testing, which included launches of the SS-N-27 and SS-N-30. The ships were subsequently commissioned into the RF Navy and joined the Caspian Flotilla in July 2014. The third unit, "Velikiy Ustyug" was delivered to the RF Ministry of Defense in November 2014 following a similar sea trials + state testing period; it was commissioned into the RF Navy and joined the Caspian Flotilla the next month.

"This was not a missile seen as being normally carried by the corvettes, which had [shorter-range] Klub missiles as opposed to the land-attack version..."
-- None of the Sviyazhsk ships were ever armed with the Klub missile complex.

"So far, the Vietnamese versions do not seem to be armed with the Kalibr missile."
-- Again, Kalibr = domestic; Klub = export.

"The six Buyan-M corvettes were known to be fitted with an eight-cell vertical launch system mounted amidships, capable of launching the SS-N-27 Klub[1] missile, but this is the first demonstration[2] of their ability to use the longer-range Kalibr."
-- [1] Should be 'Kalibr'; [2] Except for all the launches performed as part of pre-acceptance state testing.

In Putin's Own Words: Why We Launched Kalibr Missiles

Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin - October 2015
(credit: All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcast Company)

Today's broadcast of Voskresnyy Vecher [Sunday Evening] led with an interview with President Vladimir Putin that included a couple interesting items related to Russia's presence in Syria and the October 7 launch of SS-N-30 [3M14] land-attack cruise missiles.

[video time 02:00-04:05]
"I would like to confirm the fact, which is already known, that we warned our partners - our American partners, many other partners, especially those in the region - of our intentions and our plans in advance. There are those who say we did this very late. But I would like to point out that no one ever informs us in advance when they are planning such operations or when such operations begin. But we did... out of good will, out of expediency, and with the hope of showing that we are open to working together. I want to emphasize again that we are operating in full compliance with international law based on a request by official leaders of the Syrian Arab Republic. All other countries that to date have taken part in such actions are doing so illegally because there has been no resolution from the United Nations Security Council to do so, and there has been no official request from Syrian leaders. I would like to remind you that by the time our operation began, 11 countries had already carried out various strikes against Syria, in one way or another. And all this has been going on for more than a year. Understanding and knowing this, we informed our partners and recommended they work with us. The simplest thing would be to join our effort, thereby legalizing their own actions on Syrian territory. Because we have a mandate from official leaders, the simplest thing would be to join us and operate within the framework of this mandate. Unfortunately, we have not yet come to an agreement on this with our partners and colleagues. But we haven't lost hope that this can still be achieved."

[video time 09:49-11:37]
"Kalibr missiles: they have not been in service very long - since 2012. They have a range of 1,500 kilometers, as a matter of fact, which has already been stated. But these are, of course, technologically advanced, high-precision modern weapons. We plan to rearm the entire Russian military not only with these types of missiles, but also with this new generation of land-based hardware and aviation technology. These are truly complex systems, and, as their employment has proven, extremely effective... As you yourself said, [they flew] over the territory of other nations. Along the flight path, they made 147 turns, flew at altitudes of between 80 and 1,300 meters... at a speed comparable to a jet aircraft - everyone knows this. The thing is that this isn't classified information. In principle, all of our partners, at a minimum at the expert level, are aware that Russia has such [high-precision] weapons. It's one thing, at the expert level, to know that Russia supposedly has such weapons. It's another thing to be convinced that: first - they really exist and our defense industrial complex is producing them; second - that they are of high quality; third - that there are well-trained, well-prepared people who can effectively employ them; and fourth - that Russia has the will to use them if it satisfies the national interests of our state and our people."

It won't take long for others to see through Putin's own words that a driving factor for launching land-attack cruise missiles was, in fact, to prove to the rest of the world that Russia can and will carry out such launches if doing so satisfies Russia's interests -- despite the hefty price tag of the missiles.

Combat-Proven: Russia’s SS-N-30 (3M14) Land-Attack Cruise Missile

"Dagestan" frigate launches multiple land-attack cruise missiles against Syrian targets -- October 2015
(courtesy: RF Ministry of Defense)

According to Russian Ministry of Defense reporting, during the nighttime hours between October 6 and October 7, Russian Navy ships positioned in the southwestern Caspian Sea launched 26 long-range land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) against 11 reported Islamic State (ISIL) targets in the Syrian provinces of Al-Raqqah, Aleppo, and Idlib. The targets were characterized as “factories for manufacturing [artillery] shells and explosives, command posts, storage facilities for munitions, armaments, and petroleum-oil-lubricants (POL), as well as terrorist training camps.”

The launch platforms were identified as Gepard-class guided missile frigate “Dagestan” and Sviyazhsk-class guide missile patrol ships “Grad Sviyazhsk”, “Uglich”, and “Velikiy Ustyug”. This constitutes the entire inventory of LACM-armed ships in the Caspian Flotilla. Not mentioned in any of yesterday's reporting was the departure of Astrakhan-class patrol combatant "Makhachkala" (not LACM-armed) and Finik-class hydrographic vessel "Anatoliy Guzhvin", which departed port a few days ago to conduct "scheduled combat service missions." It is possible that these two ships provided some level of support for the strike operation.

Defense minister Sergey Shoygu briefs President Putin on Russian military actions in Syria -- October 7, 2015
(credit: RF Presidential Public Affairs)

The announcement coincided with a meeting between defense minister Sergey Shoygu and Russian President Vladimir Putin in which Shoygu provided an update on Russian military actions in Syria to support the Syrian government.

Simulation of missile flight route over northern Syria
(credit: RF Ministry of Defense)

The computer-generated simulation of the flight route indicates the missiles flew within a dozen or so miles of the southern Turkish border, but within Syrian airspace. It is important to note that the appearance of a TU-160 Blackjack bomber icon at the beginning of the simulation (00:57-00:59) may indicate this was simply a simulation used for mission planning purposes only and not the actual approved mission profile (the MOD made no mention of a TU-160 flying over the Caspian Sea).

Simulation of missile flight route over northern Syria
(credit: RF Ministry of Defense)
Key: ЗПБВ [factories for manufacturing munitions and armaments]; КП [command post]
НВФ [illegal armed formation (group)]; СклБВ [storage facilities for munitions and armaments]

The MOD video also shows that all of the missiles were launched with an interval between launches of less than five seconds, as well as "Dagestan" conducting a five-missile salvo launch. A video uploaded to Twitter reportedly shows two of the missiles in flight. Another video uploaded to YouTube reportedly shows damage caused by one of the missiles striking a target near Aleppo.

General-Colonels Andrey Kartapolov (l) and Viktor Bondarev (r) brief reporters -- October 7, 2015
(credit: RF Ministry of Defense)

Yesterday afternoon, General-Colonel Andrey Kartapolov (Chief, Main Operational Directorate – Russian Federal General Staff) confirmed the details of the LACM strikes. He also stated that intelligence information received from Iran, Iraq, and Syria is being used to target strike locations.

«Все объекты для поражения нами тщательно изучаются, при этом используются данные космической и радиоэлектронной разведки, съёмки с беспилотных летательных аппаратов, информация, полученная по данным радиоперехвата. Мы также используем данные сирийской, иранской и иракской разведок, в том числе из агентурных источников» , — подчеркнул Андрей Картаполов в беседе с журналистами.

“All strike locations are carefully studied; additionally, data from space and radio-electronic reconnaissance, footage from unmanned aerial vehicles, and information received through communications intercepts, are used. We also use data from Syrian, Iranian, and Iraqi intelligence, to include from their human sources,” Andrey Kartapolov emphasized in his discussion with reporters.

Indeed, the four nations have established a joint information center in Baghdad for coordinating actions in the fight against ISIL. As the video released by the RF MOD indicates, the missiles flew through Iranian and Iraqi airspace, something that certainly would have been coordinated via the Baghdad center.

If one assumes that a new long-range land-attack cruise missile is an expensive commodity, why would you employ it if there was a cheaper way of striking a target? The Russian defense ministry has been touting the successes that its Syria-deployed air assets have achieved since strikes first began last week. As long as Russian aircraft have unfettered access to the targets from the air, they can use much cheaper ordnance than the SS-N-30.

According to one source, India paid USD 6.5 million per unit for the export version of the missile, but that sounds exceedingly high: a single U.S. Tomahawk LACM only cost USD 1.59 million in FY2014. Despite the possibly overstated cost in the report, it is logical to assume that missiles cost more than air-delivered bombs in Russia, as they would anywhere else.

An analyst at the Institute for the Study of War in Washington says the LACM strike “was specifically done to show bravado... it’s chest-thumping.” Well, that’s at one end of the spectrum. At the other end of the spectrum, some analysts assert that Russia is using this opportunity to prove its latest military weaponry can be employed to solve modern day missions. And still others state that nearly all of the aircraft currently deployed to Syria would be needed to achieve the same level of damage that the 26-missile strike achieved, and that the departure of this large number of aircraft at nearly the same time would have tipped off someone about the operation. Somewhere in the middle is the oft-used “strategic messaging” explanation. And way off in left field is Deputy Prime Minister Dmitriy Rogozin's explanation:

"A gift for ISIL for digging graves"
(credit: Dmitriy Rogozin/Twitter)

Of course, some would argue that the SS-N-30 LACM strike was well-timed to serve as a gift, of sorts, to President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, who celebrated his 63rd birthday on October 7.

Wouldn’t it have been simpler and cheaper to give him a new pony?

The RF Navy vs Your "Critically Important Facilities"

Coming to a theater near you: Kilo-class diesel submarine "Novorossiysk", capable of launching land-attack cruise missiles
[credit: Admiralty Shipyards]

Meanwhile, Russia is progressing toward its goal of deploying long-range, conventionally-armed cruise missiles with ever increasing stand-off launch distances on its heavy bombers, submarines and surface combatants, augmenting the Kremlin's toolkit of flexible deterrent options short of the nuclear threshold. Should these trends continue, over time NORAD will face increased risk in our ability to defend North America against Russian air, maritime, and cruise missile threats. -- Admiral Gortney, March 2015

In his written testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 12, Admiral William Gortney (Commander, U.S. Northern Command and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command) briefly touched upon an issue that will become a real headache for NATO and its allies as early as this year: Russian Navy submarines with conventionally- or nuclear-armed, long-range land-attack cruise missiles. Whereas similarly armed strategic bombers and naval surface combatants are somewhat easy to track, the same cannot be said for their undersea brethren.

"America is worried about the growing missile deterrence capabilities of the RF."
I really sympathize with you. How well I understand you!
[RF Deputy Prime Minister Dmitriy Rogozin responding to Admiral Gortney's written testimony to the SASC]

Both the 2010 and 2014 versions of the Russian Federation Military Doctrine state that the "deployment of strategic non-nuclear precision-guided weapons systems" was and remains a key external military threat to Russia. But the latest version also introduced Russia's own "non-nuclear deterrence system" that includes "non-nuclear means" to prevent aggression against Russia. Paragraph 32.b lists "strategic (nuclear and non-nuclear) deterrence, including the prevention of military conflicts" as a primary mission of Russia's Armed Forces during peacetime.

Whether talking about foreign systems or its own, Russia uses the term "strategic non-nuclear deterrence" to refer to the use of precision-guided munitions. In the Russia Navy, this means sea-launched land-attack cruise missiles (LACM), specifically the new SS-N-30, which is part of the Kalibr family of missiles.

To better understand how Russia views "strategic non-nuclear deterrence" and how Russian submarines would be employed in such a role, a review of a few definitions is in order.

SOKVO
In June 2012, the Serpukhovo Strategic Rocket Forces Military Institute hosted the 31st All-Russia Scientific-Technical Conference - "Problems of the Effectiveness and Security of the Functionality of Complex Technical and Information Systems". One of the topics presented at the conference was Method of Selecting Indicators of the Effectiveness of Defeating Enemy Facilities Using Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons [document apparently removed after recent website reorganization]. In that brief, presenters from the Petr Velikiy Strategic Rocket Forces Military Academy listed four strategic operations, including the Strategic Operation to Defeat the Adversary's Critically Important Facilities (Russian abbreviation: SOKVO). As the authors explained, the goal of this strategic operation is "to disorganize the adversary's governmental and military command and control, to destabilize the socio-political environment, to create conditions for preventing or stopping aggression against the Russian Federation, and to defeat the adversary, to include as [when the adversary is] part of a coalition."

The SOKVO strategic operation may have been formalized sometime over the past decade, but the concept probably received serious research funding as early as the 1990s following the United States' first combat test of its Tomahawk LACM during Operation Desert Storm. In 2010, the Club of Military Leaders of the Russian Federation held a conference titled "Russia in Wars of the 19th and 20th Centuries: Lessons and Conclusions". At the conference, retired General-Colonel Viktor Barynkin briefed on the history of operational strategy as a science in Russia. In the post-WWII years, operational-strategic views were revised with the introduction of nuclear weapons. However, those views have again changed to focus not on destruction of an adversary, but on destruction of its key facilities. This in turn led to Russia's development of its SOKVO strategic operation. "The era of the theory of defensive and offensive fronts, oceanic strategic operations, and wartime districts is over... It has become practical to combine defensive and offensive operations and strategic operations in the oceanic theater of military actions into a single strategic operation."

Critically Important Facilities
This term can find its roots in RF state documents dating back to at least the mid-1990s. The 2012 Russian Security Council directive "Primary Areas of Focus of State Policy in Ensuring the Safety of Automated Control Systems of Critically Important Facilities of Russian Federation Infrastructure Using Industrial and Technological Processes", while primarily addressing information security, does provide a state definition of "critically important facility" as:

critically important facility of Russian Federation infrastructure (herein - critically important facility) - a facility, the destruction (or disabling) of functionality of which leads to the loss of command, collapse of infrastructure, irreversible alteration (or disabling) of the economy of the nation, constituent member of the Russian Federation or administrative-territorial unit, or significant worsening of the security of the livelihood of the populace living in these areas, for a lengthy period

Examples of "critically important facilities" include:

• communications lines
• radio and television systems
• factories
• electric/hydroelectric/nuclear power stations
• oil and gas drilling companies
• transportation activities

Russia classifies the threats of "critically important facilities" as:

• nuclear (nuclear power plants, nuclear weapons complex companies)
• radioactive (locations where liquid radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel are stored)
• chemical (oil/chemical, metallurgic, machine-building, food production, and radio-technical, electro-technical and defense manufacturing companies)
• man-made (large railway nodes, naval ports, airports, large cities, bridges, tunnels, dams, fuel- and energy-related facilities)
• flammable (gas and oil pipes, storage facilities, pumping stations, etc.)
• state command, financial/credit, information and telecommunications (financial institutions, fixed and mobile command stations, telephone/television/radio networks, large public arenas)

It is important to point out that the U.S., too, considers non-nuclear missile strikes as an alternative to strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. According to the Pentagon's June 2013 "Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the United States":

DoD is directed to conduct deliberate planning for non-nuclear strike options to assess what objectives and effects could be achieved through integrated non-nuclear strike options, and to propose possible means to make these objectives and effects achievable. Although they are not a substitute for nuclear weapons, planning for non-nuclear strike options is a central part of reducing the role of nuclear weapons.

New Mission, New Missile
"Critically important facilities" can be defeated or destroyed using a range of tools, including long-range LACMs. Russia's newest naval land-attack missile, the SS-N-30, can hit targets located anywhere from 1,300km (700nm) to 2,600km (1,400nm) away, although sources differ. Caspian Flotilla commander  Rear Admiral Alekminskiy mentioned the 2,600km range during a June 2012 meeting with Dagestan president Magomedsalam Magomedov; however, a range of 3,000km (1,620nm) has been seen in unofficial reporting.

There are at least two variants of the missile: the original designator (3M-14) and a "special" designator (3M-14S), the latter of which may be configured with a nuclear warhead (although a nuclear-armed LACM is outside the boundaries of "strategic non-nuclear deterrence"). The U.S. TLAM-A Block II had two maximum ranges for both conventionally- (1,700km/900nm) and nuclear-armed versions (2,500km/1,350nm). If the Russians have created a LACM with two different ranges that are very similar to the ranges of U.S. TLAMs, those ranges might similarly represent both conventionally- and nuclear-armed missile ranges.

Below are nine maps depicting approximate range rings for an SS-N-30 launch platform (ship or submarine) operating in various areas of the world. The yellow and red rings depict 1,300km/700nm (conventional) and 3,000km/1,620nm (nuclear) ranges, respectively. The launch points chosen are not meant to suggest actual planned launch areas, but simply to provide a sense of LACM coverage.

Southern Norwegian Sea launch point

Central Mediterranean Sea launch point

Northwestern Caspian Sea launch point

Combined European theater launch points

Central Sea of Japan launch point

Central Pacific Ocean launch point

Eastern Pacific Ocean launch point

Western Atlantic Ocean launch point

Combined launch point coverage against North America

In summary, the purpose of strategic non-nuclear SS-N-30 land-attack cruise missiles, as part of a SOKVO, is to defeat or make unusable those things that make life bearable in the modern world: electricity, heating, water, telecommunications, airports, bridges, banks (credit/ATM cards), and, of course, the internet. Russia is currently building several classes of submarines and surface combatants capable of launching the SS-N-30. At the same time, Russia is upgrading some of its older nuclear submarines and surface ships to carry the land-attack cruise missiles in an apparent attempt to achieve some level of parity with the United States and its ubiquitous Tomahawk LACM launchers.

The reader should remember that by early 2016 Moscow will have bombers, surface ships, and submarines at its disposal to launch LACMs. Any strategic operation could include one or a combination of any of the three platforms to inflict the desired amount of damage

If having a large stockpile of LACMs and launch platforms is more than just for show, what would trigger Russia to actually launch LACMs? Would Russia have used them against rebel strongholds in Syria or during last year's crisis in Ukraine? Could there be an instance when Russia and the U.S. are both launching LACMs into the same country to support opposite sides of a conflict?

Which Subs Will Be Upgraded to Carry Kalibr?

In 2014, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, head of the Russian Navy, stated:

"By 2020, 12 multipurpose nuclear-powered submarines are scheduled to undergo deep modernization: Project 949AM – four units, Project 971M – six units, Project 945M – two units. Characteristics of these submarines will not be inferior to foreign equivalents, but rather, in terms of certain criteria, such as strike missile weapon loads, they will be superior to their foreign equivalents."

In this context, "deep modernization" most certainly refers to reconfiguring the submarines to carry the Kalibr family of missiles (SS-N-27 antiship cruise missile, SS-N-30 land-attack cruise missile, and 91R antisubmarine missile) and, in most (if not all) cases, upgrading to the MGK-540M (Kizhuch) sonar system. Based on multiple statements and a review of repair contracts and annual stockholder reports, the following is a list of known candidates that fit Chirkov's "deep modernization" projections:

Class	Name	Age
Akula I	"Bratsk"	27
Akula I	"Leopard"	22
Akula I	"Samara"	19
Akula I	"Volk"	23
Oscar II	"Chelyabinsk"	24
Oscar II	"Irkutsk"	26
Oscar II	"Tver"	22
Sierra I	"Karp"	27
Sierra I	"Kostroma"	24

There certainly are other upgrade candidates, including announced upgrades for specific units, but none of them appear to be in place for an upgrade shipyard period before 2020. Also note that Chirkov's projections do not specify upgrades to old Kilo diesel submarines or Victor III nuclear-powered submarines. Contracts for the ongoing repairs of Sierra II "Pskov" and Victor III "Tambov" provide no indications of Kalibr or major sonar system upgrades. Victor III "Obninsk" completed a repair period in 2014, which was classified by shipyard officials as a "restoration of technical readiness" and not "deep modernization." Thus, the recent launch of a probable land-attack cruise missile by "Obninsk" indicates that submarine is simply being used as a test platform.

The question still remains: can all this really be achieved by 2020? Given Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center's experience and record, it is certainly possible that the six units the shipyard was contracted to upgrade will be finished by 2020. The same cannot be said for Zvezda Far East Shipyard, which has a record of continually delayed repair schedules and a (criminal) history of not actually performing the repairs it was contracted and paid to perform. The MOD currently has at least five cases against Zvezda Far East Shipyard at various levels in the Russian arbitration court system and is seeking to receive over RUB 111.5 million in payments and fines. Factors that will impact both shipyards are continuing Western sanctions, the loss of access to Ukrainian firms that produced parts and components used in Russian submarines, and the ruble crisis.

In 2020 and beyond, the field of candidates for Kalibr/Kizhuch upgrades could include the following:

Class	Name	Age (in 2020)
Akula I	"Kuzbass"	28
Akula I	"Magadan"	31
Akula I	"Nerpa" ("INS Chakra")	9
Akula I	"Pantera"	30
Akula I	"Tigr"	27
Akula II	"Gepard"	19
Akula II	"Vepr"	25
Oscar II	"Omsk"	27
Oscar II	"Orel"	28
Oscar II	"Smolensk"	30
Oscar II	"Tomsk"	24
Oscar II	"Voronezh"	31
Sierra II	"Nizhniy Novgorod"	30
Sierra II	"Pskov"	27

Overhauled Kilo Subs Remain Kalibr-less

Kilo "Vladikavkaz" - September 19, 2014
(Image courtesy of Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center)

Six new (Project 636.3) Kilo-class diesel submarines are being built for the Russian Navy at Admiralty Shipyards in St. Petersburg. All six, which are destined for the Black Sea Fleet, will be armed with the Kalibr-family of missiles: the SS-N-27 Sizzler anti-ship cruise missile, the SS-N-30 land-attack cruise missile, and the 91R ASW missile. But will happen with the older Kilos?

Two 25-year-old Northern Fleet Kilos have undergone overhauls at Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center in Severodvinsk, but the overhauls apparently do not include backfitting them with the Kalibr system.

"Kaluga" arrived at the shipyard in 2002 for repairs, but without a decision on whether to repair or scrap the submarine, it remained idle for about six years. In 2008, Onega Scientific Research Technological Design Bureau drafted documentation for "medium repairs" (i.e., overhaul, which gives the submarine another 10 years of service) of the submarine, but only in 2010 was "Kaluga" finally moved into a repair hall. The submarine was rolled back out in May 2012. In 2013, the shipyard made it clear that "Kaluga" was not backfitted with the Kalibr system.

"Kaluga" was inactive so long that the crew it had in 2002 had been nearly disbanded, reduced to just a few crew members. As such, the crew of another Kilo, "Yaroslavl" (commanded by Captain 2nd Rank Oleg Mikholap), manned "Kaluga" throughout its post-overhaul sea trials (2012-2013) and transfer back to Polyarnyy (July 2013). In 2013, Mikholap was replaced by his executive officer, Captain 3rd Rank Yuriy Gusarov, as the "Yaroslavl" commanding officer; however, as "Yaroslavl" was non-operational, Gusarov's crew remained on "Kaluga". In October-November 2013, just three months after returning from the shipyard, "Kaluga" (under Gusarov's command) conducted a month-long deployment (area unknown). Gusarov and his crew remained on "Kaluga" as late as June 2014 and could still be on board.

The second Kilo to be overhauled at Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center, "Vladikavkaz", was transferred to Severodvinsk in 2008. Due to a similar "indecision-making" process, a contract for the submarine's "medium repairs" was not signed until 2011. The submarine was rolled into the repair hall in late 2011 for a nearly two-year overhaul period. The submarine rolled out of the repair hall on September 19 of this year and will be returned to the Russian Navy in late 2015.

Although neither Kilo was backfitted with the Kalibr missile system, they did receive the MGK-400V.1 sonar system, which provides improved sonar capabilities. Other upgrades were made to navigation and weapons-related components.

Next up: either "Magnitogorsk" or "Yaroslavl". "Magnitogorsk" has been performing duties in the Baltic Fleet since late 2013 (it did a similar Baltic Fleet deployment in 2012). Its return to the Northern Fleet may have been delayed until one of the Baltic Fleet's own Kilos, "Vyborg", returns to service following lengthy repairs. "Yaroslavl" has been inactive for at least two years. As with "Kaluga" and "Vladikavkaz", none of these old Kilos are expected to receive Kalibr upgrades.