Expansion of RF Navy Logistics Facility in Tartus

Tartus, Syria (October 25, 2014)
(credit: Google Earth)

On October 10 of last year, RF Deputy Minister of Defense Nikolay Pankov stated that documents had been prepared for establishing a "naval base, on a permanent basis, in Tartus." On December 23, RF President Putin signed Directive 424-rp, ordering the Ministry of Defense to work with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordinating and signing an agreement with Syria on expanding the existing RF naval logistics support facility in Tartus. That agreement, which was signed in Damascus on January 18, allows Russia to expand the facility and remain there until at least 2066. But missing from Putin's directive and the final agreement is the term "naval base."

"The Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic on Expansion of the Territory of the Russian Federation Navy Logistics Support Facility in the Port of Tartus and Entry of Russian Federation Military Ships into the Territorial Sea, Internal Waters and Ports of the Syrian Arab Republic" has several interesting provisions:

• Article 2 states that Syria concurs with Russia with regards to the "development and modernization of [the facility's] infrastructure for conducting repairs, resupply, and crew rest."
• Article 5 permits "the simultaneous presence of 11 ships, including ships with nuclear power plants, at the facility."
• Article 6 covers the port entry/departure notification process. At least 12 hours notice is required for ships to enter Tartus; if operationally necessary, 6 hours notice is authorized. For departures, 3 hours notice (1 hour if operationally necessary) is required.
• Article 7 specifies some of the work RF can undertake (using its own funds) at the facility: capital repairs; installation of floating piers; dredging work; the catch-all "placement of necessary equipment to support the operations of RF military ships within the territory and water space of the logistics support facility"; use of required communications resources; conducting underwater work and permitting divers to dive from RF military ships.
• Article 16 states that contents of annexes to this agreement may not be shared with a third party without prior written concurrence. Additionally, both sides "will refrain from official publication of annexes to this Agreement."
• Article 17 indicates that if Syria requests, RF may (a) provide "maritime surface and underwater, airborne, and weather status reports for the Mediterranean Sea"; (b) "provide hydrographic support in the territorial sea, internal waters and ports of the Syrian Arab Republic"; (c) "provide support in organizing and conducting anti-swimmer support in the water space of the port of Tartus"; (d) "provide support in organizing and conducting search and rescue support in the territorial sea and internal waters of the Syrian Arab Republic"; (e) "provide support in organizing and conducting air defense of the port of Tartus"; (f) send RF representatives to provide support in restoring the technical readiness of Syria's military ships.
• Article 25 specifies that this agreement is valid for 49 years and will automatically extend for 25-year periods unless one of the parties - within one year of the agreement's expiration - informs the other party of its intention to withdraw from the agreement.

As any annexes to the agreement will remain confidential (Article 16), it is difficult to fully assess the extent to which the facility will be expanded. For example, the specifics of infrastructure upgrades supporting ship repairs (Article 2) are not stated, but could include a number of options, such as the basing of a floating dry dock at the facility. Such a move would require additional waterfront space and/or upgrades to the existing territory.

But why there is no mention of a naval base in the agreement?

According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta reporter Vladimir Mukhin, Iran has expressed concerns about the increased role of Russia in the Middle East, Russia and Turkey teaming up to settle the Syrian conflict, and Russia's intent to work with the U.S. and other countries as part of a coalition. Reading between the lines, Iran's concerns could have led to a change in the wording of the agreement - from the establishment of a naval base to a simpler, friendlier expansion of the existing logistics support facility.

Follow-Up 2: Drafting Commercial Ships into the Russian Navy

"Kazan-60" heading southbound through Turkish Straits - March 9, 2016

(credit: Yörük Işık)

The current status of known transport vessels ferrying between Russia and Syria:

• "Dvinitsa-50" -- operational
• "Kazan-60" -- non-operational; to undergo repairs - possibly until this fall - following a machinery room fire in late March
• "Kyzyl-60" -- non-operational
• "Vologda-50" -- operational
• "Aleksandr Tkachenko" -- non-operational; after conducting roundtrip missions in February and March, vessel pulled into Feodosiya in mid-March where it probably remains today
• "Yauza" -- returning to Murmansk

Track of "Yauza" as it heads back to Murmansk (March 30-April 23, 2016)

Previous reporting:

http://7fbtk.blogspot.com/2015/10/drafting-commercial-ships-into-russian.html
http://7fbtk.blogspot.com/2016/01/follow-up-drafting-commercial-ships.html

"Yauza" Probably Completes Syrian Express Support

AIS tracking of "Yauza" heading west from Tartus (March 31-April 3, 2016)

After six months of ferrying materiel and personnel between Russia and Syria,  the Northern Fleet's transport vessel "Yauza" appears to be heading home. "Yauza" departed Tartus, Syria, on March 30 and has continued a westerly transit through today. According to AIS data, the vessel may call in Valletta, Malta, before continuing to its homeport of Murmansk.

"Yauza" departed Severomorsk on September 10, 2015, and arrived in Novorossiysk on October 1. During its half-year deployment to the Black Sea, the naval transport vessel completed six trips between Novorossiysk and Tartus.

Dates	Route
Oct 14-Oct 19	Novorossiysk to Tartus
Oct 25-Nov 2	Tartus to Novorossiysk
Nov 17-Nov 22	Novorossiysk to Tartus
Nov 26-Dec 2	Tartus to Novorossiysk
Jan 15-Jan 21	Novorossiysk to Tartus
Jan 26-Jan 31	Tartus to Sevastopol
Feb 1-Feb 2	Sevastopol to Novorossiysk
Feb 17-Feb 24	Novorossiysk to Tartus
Feb 28-Mar 3	Tartus to Sevastopol
Mar 4-Mar 5	Sevastopol to Novorossiysk
Mar 18-Mar 23	Novorossiysk to Tartus
Mar 30-present	Tartus to Malta

"Yauza" in Novorossiysk (March 14, 2016)

With the departure of "Yauza" and the disappearance of the commercial transport "Aleksandr Tkachenko" (last noted near Feodosiya on March 13), it appears the "Syrian Express" currently is relying exclusively on Russian Navy landing ships and a few formerly commercial ships to ferry cargo between Russia and Syria.

Follow-Up: Kalibr Missile Shooter Heading to Mediterranean Sea

Flight ban and flight route closures for "Russian Navy exercise" -- February 24-29, 2016

Two NOTAM warnings have been issued for Russian Navy "rocket test firings" that may occur in the eastern Mediterranean Sea next week:

A0126/16 -
RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE (ROCKET TEST FIRINGS) WILL TAKE PLACE IN AREA:
344400N0345800E
351300N0345800E
351300N0353300E
344400N0353300E
THE AREA INCLUDES BUFFER ZONE. SFC - FL660, 0500-1500, 24 FEB 05:00 2016 UNTIL 29 FEB 15:00 2016. CREATED: 18 FEB 13:45 2016 

A0127/16 - DUE TO RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE AS REFFERRED IN NOTAM A0126/16 THE FOLLOWING AIRWAYS WILL BE CLOSED:
1. W/UW17 (BALMAS-NIKAS)
2. R/UR78, M/UM978 (ALSUS-NIKAS)
SFC-FL660. 0500-1500, 24 FEB 05:00 2016 UNTIL 29 FEB 15:00 2016. CREATED: 18 FEB 13:55 2016

The flight ban and flight route closures are identical to those announced for "Russian Navy exercises" in the past.

"Zelenyy Dol" transiting the Turkish Straits -- February 14, 2016
(credit: Yörük Işık)

Three Russian Navy combatants are currently operating in the eastern Mediterranean: the missile cruiser "Varyag", the destroyer "Vitse-Admiral Kulakov", and the missile ship "Zelenyy Dol". The latter arrived in Tartus, Syria, on February 17. While there is growing suspicion that "Zelenyy Dol" may launch land-attack cruise missiles into Syria during its current deployment, different flight bans and route closures were used when Kilo-class submarine "Rostov-na-Donu" launched four land-attack cruise missiles into Syria in December 2015.

Kalibr Missile Shooter Heading to Mediterranean Sea

"Zelenyy Dol" and "Kovrovets" returning to Sevastopol -- February 12, 2016

"Zelenyy Dol", a patrol ship capable of firing land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, and sea-going minesweeper "Kovrovets" departed Sevastopol today to join the Russian Navy's Mediterranean Sea Standing Task Group. This marks the first deployment of the patrol ship to the Mediterranean Sea since it joined the Russian Navy in December 2015. Is this simply a "rotation of forces", as the Southern Military District's press release indicates, or will "Zelenyy Dol" launch missiles into Syria?

"Zelenyy Dol" and its sister ship "Serpukhov" arrived in the Black Sea in late July 2015 for sea trials, were handed over to the Ministry of Defense in November, and were commissioned in December. At no time during the sea trials did defense officials announce that "Zelenyy Dol" or "Serpukhov" had fired either the SS-N-27 anti-ship cruise missile or the SS-N-30 land-attack cruise missile. Thus, both ships joined the Russian Navy on a provisional basis. The Syrian crisis now affords Moscow the opportunity to test fire the SS-N-30 from "Zelenyy Dol" and possibly "Serpukhov" in the near future.

Admiral Aleksandr Vitko on board "Zelenyy Dol" -- January 2016

Both ships conducted at-sea combat training in January; Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Aleksandr Vitko was on "Zelenyy Dol" to observe and grade that crew's performance. And both ships participated in this past week's Southern Military District surprise combat readiness inspection.

Area closure for Russian Navy exercise -- February 8-11, 2016

An area closure and flight bans for a "Russian Navy exercise" in the eastern Mediterranean Sea were in effect on February 8-11. As of today, there are no announced area closures or flight bans that would indicate if or when "Zelenyy Dol" will launch missiles into Syria; however, those could be announced at anytime.

Follow-Up: Drafting Commercial Ships into the Russian Navy

"Kazan-60" in Sevastopol --- January 12, 2016
(credit: Andrey Brichevskiy)

Four commercial ships that were commissioned into the Russian Navy three months ago have made several trips between Russia and Syria. But a few of them have already required repairs since joining the fleet. Here is a brief update on their condition:

• "Dvinitsa-50" has completed at least two missions to Syria and appears to be operational. It was noted loading cargo earlier this month probably in preparation for another trip to Tartus, Syria.


• "Kazan-60", has never been noted by Turkish shipspotters transiting the Turkish Straits since joining the Russian Navy. On January 12, this vessel was photographed at the 13th Shipyard.


• On December 24, "Kyzyl-60", which was returning from its first mission to Syria, was photographed being towed by Black Sea Fleet tug "MB-31" northbound through the Turkish Straits. The vessel was towed to the 13th Shipyard in Sevastopol, where it remains today, to undergo unspecified repairs.


• "Vologda-50" has completed at least three missions and also appears to be operational.

"Aleksandr Tkachenko" undergoing dock repairs in Sevastopol
(credit: United Shipbuilding Corporation)

While not part of the Russian Navy, the cargo vessel "Aleksandr Tkachenko", which also has ferried cargo between Russia and Syria, recently completed dock repairs at Sevastopol Shipyard. Following post-repair sea trials on January 16-17, the ship began an easterly transit towards Novorossiysk.

"Aleksandr Tkachev" at-sea activities --- January 16-18, 2016

While a recent decrease in known ferrying activities may have been associated with the winter holiday season, it also may have been linked to the condition of some of the vessels tasked to perform such missions.

Follow-Up 1: Why Did "Rostov-na-Donu" Return to the Baltic Sea?

It has become much clearer over the past three weeks why Kilo-class submarine "Rostov-na-Donu" made its mysterious port call in Kronshtadt. And it's bad news for ISIS/ISIL, FSA, or whomever Russian forces are targeting in Syria these days. As one blog reader opined, "Don't you think that stories about its malfunction was just a rumor, and in reality the submarine came for specific items that later can be [launched] from warmer waters?"

As a recap, "Rostov-na-Donu" pulled into Kronshtadt on October 29 - the 14th day of its inter-fleet transit from Polyarnyy to Novorossiysk. Claims by both official and anonymous sources covered everything from "topping off supplies of all types to required norms" to repairing broken equipment. It seems the official sources were correct.

Based on drone video, "Rostov-na-Donu" tied up at this pier in Kronshtadt

While in Kronshtadt, heightened security was put into place, limiting access to the submarine's location. However, a few adventurous photographers and one amateur drone did record enough evidence showing that missiles were handled during the submarine's visit. Given the high level of security, one might conclude that it was more likely that missiles were loaded than offloaded.

Circles indicate cylindrical objects and open torpedo tubes/loading device on "Rostov-na-Donu"

The above two images, taken from a drone flying nearby, show a floating crane ("PK-175") positioned on the opposite side of the pier where "Rostov-na-Donu" had tied up in Kronshtadt. The floating crane, assisted by three harbor tugs, transferred from Admiralty Shipyards to Kronshtadt on October 28 - the day before the submarine's arrival. Multiple long, cylindrical objects are visible on the deck of the floating crane, and the submarine's torpedo tubes are open with a possible weapons loading device attached.

Circles indicate cylindrical objects on deck of floating crane

Clearer images taken on November 4, the day the submarine departed Kronshtadt, show the cylindrical objects were visible on the deck of the floating crane. Also visible on the submarine was the flag of an embarked senior naval officer. Looking back at all the photos taken of the first Kalibr-capable Kilo submarine to transfer to the Black Sea Fleet, "Novorossiysk", it is evident that this flag was never flown at any point during its departure from Polyarnyy, during its port calls in Ceuta, Spain, and Oran, Algeria, or during its arrival in Novorossiysk and subsequent transfer to Sevastopol. The flag appears to have one star, indicating a "commander of a formation" (командир соединения) is on board. The 4th Independent Submarine Brigade, which stood up in December 2014 as the new parent command for the Black Sea Fleet's submarines, qualifies as a "formation" (соединение). Thus, it is possible that the brigade's commander, Captain 1st Rank Magaram Yagishevich Adigyuzelov, or his designated representative may have embarked in Kronshtadt for the submarine's transit.

The RF Ministry of Defense did not report on the submarine's departure until November 5. It did state, however, that "Rostov-na-Donu" would now arrive in Novorossiysk by the end of November. This differs from the MOD's earlier reporting that the submarine would arrive in Novorossiysk in early December. Thus, despite the time it took to divert from its previous transit route (~1,000nm from the North Sea to Kronshtadt + ~1,000nm back) plus the seven days it spent in Kronshtadt, the new arrival time is now one-two weeks sooner than first reported. In order to transfer from Kronshtadt to Novorossiysk by November 30, the submarine would have to travel ~5,250nm in 26 days, which equates to a speed of 8.4 knots - not an unreasonable speed. It also suggests, however, that there is no time provided for any foreign port calls as they would increase the overall speed needed to complete the transit by the end of the month. Of course, the time frame provided for completion of the transit simply could have been misstated.

The Dutch Navy keeping an eye on "Rostov-na-Donu"

Two weeks later, on November 17, Russian business news agency RosBiznesKonsalting erroneously reported that "Rostov-na-Donu" had launched land-attack cruise missiles from the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The article was reproduced by some notable media outlets, such as Delovoy Peterburg, Gazeta.ru, Kommersant, and Rosbalt.ru. If this were true, the submarine would have had to travel at an overall speed of nearly 16 knots for 13 straight days direct from Kronshtadt in order to launch missiles from the eastern Mediterranean Sea. However, the submarine was being monitored by Dutch naval ships as it transited south through the English Channel near the Netherlands on November 11. Thus, "Rostov-na-Donu" would have had to travel in excess of 19 knots for six straight days from the North Sea in order to reach the eastern Mediterranean Sea by November 17. Finally, the RF MOD has never reported that the submarine launched land-attack cruise missiles, something it most certainly would have done. Despite the improbability of "Rostov-na-Donu" launching missiles from the eastern Mediterranean Sea on or before November 17, RBK has neither edited nor retracted its article.

Flight bans and flight route restrictions

Earlier this month, flight bans and flight route restrictions were announced for Russian Navy exercise being held in the eastern Mediterranean Sea:

A1459/15 - RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE (ROCKET TEST FIRINGS) WILL TAKE PLACE IN AREA:
344400N0345800E
351300N0345800E
351300N0353300E
344400N0353300E
THE AREA INCLUDES BUFFER ZONE. SFC - FL660, 14-16 AND 21-23 0500-1500, 14 NOV 05:00 2015 UNTIL 23 NOV 15:00 2015. CREATED: 09 NOV 10:37 2015

A1460/15 - DUE TO RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE AS REFERED IN NOTAM LCCC A1459/15 THE FOLLOWING AIRWAYS WILL BE CLOSED BETWEEN SFC-FL660:
1.W/UW17(BALMA-NIKAS)
2.R/UR78, M/UM978 (ALSUS-NIKAS. 14-16 AND 21-23 0500-1500, 14 NOV 05:00 2015 UNTIL 23 NOV 15:00 2015. CREATED: 09 NOV 10:41 2015

A1499/15 - RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE (ROCKET TEST FIRINGS) WILL TAKE PLACE IN AREA:
344400N0345800E
351300N0345800E
351300N0353300E
344400N0353300E
THE AREA INCLUDES BUFFER ZONE. SFC - FL660, 0500-1500, 24 NOV 05:00 2015 UNTIL 26 NOV 15:00 2015. CREATED: 19 NOV 09:20 2015

A1500/15 - DUE TO RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE AS REFERED IN NOTAM LCCC A1499/15 THE FOLLOWING AIRWAYS WILL BE CLOSED BETWEEN SFC-FL660:
1.W/UW17(BALMA-NIKAS)
2.R/UR78, M/UM978 (ALSUS-NIKAS. 0500-1500, 24 NOV 05:00 2015 UNTIL 26 NOV 15:00 2015. CREATED: 19 NOV 09:34 2015

A1510/15 - RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE WILL TAKE PLACE IN AREA BOUNDED BY
353200N0353200E
341600N0340000E
334410N0343606E
THEN FOLLOWING THE FIR BOUNDARY TO 353200N0353200E
THE AREA INCLUDES BUFFER ZONE. SFC - FL660, 21 NOV 00:01 2015 UNTIL 23 NOV 23:59 2015. CREATED: 20 NOV 15:37 2015

A1511/15 - DUE TO RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE AS REFERRED IN NOTAM LCCC A1510/15, THE FOLLOWING AIRWAYS WILL BE CLOSED:
W/UW17(BALMA-NIKAS)
R/UR78,M/UM978(ALSUS-NIKAS)
W/UW10,L/UL619(VESAR-NIKAS)
B/UB15,L/UL620(ALSUS-BALMA)
R/UR18(VELOX-ALSUS)
R/UR19(LCA-KUKLA)
R/UR655,M/UM601(LCA-BALMA)
P/UP42(DESPO-MERVA)
G/UG2(VELOX-ELIKA)
SFC-FL660. 21 NOV 00:01 2015 UNTIL 23 NOV 23:59 2015. CREATED: 20 NOV 16:34 2015

Flight ban areas defined in A1459/15 and A1499/15 are identical to those previously announced for similar Russian Navy exercises. Flight ban area A1510/15 is of interest as it is not known to have been used before for Russian Navy exercises. And while all of these bans expire on or before November 26, there is no reason to believe they would not be reannounced, if needed.

Of course, it would be easy to draw a direct correlation between the flight bans (those already announced and those that could be announced in the near future) and the unusual "Rostov-na-Donu" story. But...

• Would Moscow really announce to the world the launch location and missile flight path of a future land-attack cruise missile strike?
• Does the geography of the Mediterranean Sea, coupled with large number of international air and maritime traffic routes, necessitate the announcement of flight bans and route restrictions for land-attack cruise missiles strikes?
• Could these flight bans serve to distract potential foreign observers away from the true launch location?

Drafting Commercial Ships into the Russian Navy

"Alican Deval" (aka "Dvinitsa-50") underway in Novorossiysk - October 10, 2015
(credit: Oleg Sushkov)

Moscow apparently has figured out that landing ships are not the most effective way to move large numbers of vehicles and other military hardware to Syria. According to a blog linked to the Center for the Analysis of Strategy and Technology, as many as eight commercial vessels were recently purchased for use by the Russian Navy. The ships will be manned by a mix of military and civilian sailors. As many have noted, military ships, which include the newly acquired commercial vessels flying the Russian Navy flag, are not subject to at-sea inspections.

Last AIS position broadcast for "Alican Deval" -- October 11, 2015

The first newly acquired cargo vessel, "Alican Deval", arrived in Novorossiysk on October 7 and was last noted transmitting AIS from the same location at 13:58 UTC on October 11. The last position placed it at the Novorossiysk Trans-Shipping Transportation/Expeditionary Company (NUTEP, for short) [Новороссийское Узловое Транспортно-Экспедиционное Предприятие - НУТЭП]. On October 14, the vessel, now renamed "Dvinitsa-50", was photographed heading south through the Turkish Straits by Alper Boler (@alperboler) and Yörük Işık (@YorukIsik). To date, there have been no known AIS transmissions from a vessel named "Dvinitsa-50".

"Dvinitsa-50" (formerly "Alican Deval") heading south through the Turkish Straits -- October 14, 2015
(credit: Yörük Işık)

"Dvinitsa-50" (formerly "Alican Deval") heading south through the Turkish Straits -- October 14, 2015
(credit: Alper Boler)

A second vessel, which arrived in Novorossiysk by October 10, has been renamed "Kyzyl-60". On October 18, it transferred from NUTEP to the neighboring Novorossiysk Naval Base and could depart port at any time to begin its first cargo transfer mission to Syria. And a third vessel bearing the new name "Kazan-60" also appeared in Novorossiysk by October 18. As with "Dvinitsa-50", neither of these two new additions to the Russian Navy are broadcasting via AIS.

Formation of crews to man these new naval auxiliary ships only recently began. However, not all prospective crew members are satisfied with conditions on board the former commercial vessels. On October 9, a boiler plant technician on the Russian Black Sea Fleet's cable ship "Setun" was ordered to report to Novorossiysk to serve as Third Engineer on "Dvinitsa-50". After a brief inspection he determined that only two of the ship's three diesel generators worked, but both of them also had problems. Having discovered other material issues, the sailor complained up the chain of command, where his complaints were met with profanity and accusations of him being a coward and a traitor. On October 10, he signed a resignation letter that effectively ended his civilian naval career. He has since appealed to the Black Sea Fleet Prosecutor's Office to look into the incident.

In Putin's Own Words: Why We Launched Kalibr Missiles

Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin - October 2015
(credit: All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcast Company)

Today's broadcast of Voskresnyy Vecher [Sunday Evening] led with an interview with President Vladimir Putin that included a couple interesting items related to Russia's presence in Syria and the October 7 launch of SS-N-30 [3M14] land-attack cruise missiles.

[video time 02:00-04:05]
"I would like to confirm the fact, which is already known, that we warned our partners - our American partners, many other partners, especially those in the region - of our intentions and our plans in advance. There are those who say we did this very late. But I would like to point out that no one ever informs us in advance when they are planning such operations or when such operations begin. But we did... out of good will, out of expediency, and with the hope of showing that we are open to working together. I want to emphasize again that we are operating in full compliance with international law based on a request by official leaders of the Syrian Arab Republic. All other countries that to date have taken part in such actions are doing so illegally because there has been no resolution from the United Nations Security Council to do so, and there has been no official request from Syrian leaders. I would like to remind you that by the time our operation began, 11 countries had already carried out various strikes against Syria, in one way or another. And all this has been going on for more than a year. Understanding and knowing this, we informed our partners and recommended they work with us. The simplest thing would be to join our effort, thereby legalizing their own actions on Syrian territory. Because we have a mandate from official leaders, the simplest thing would be to join us and operate within the framework of this mandate. Unfortunately, we have not yet come to an agreement on this with our partners and colleagues. But we haven't lost hope that this can still be achieved."

[video time 09:49-11:37]
"Kalibr missiles: they have not been in service very long - since 2012. They have a range of 1,500 kilometers, as a matter of fact, which has already been stated. But these are, of course, technologically advanced, high-precision modern weapons. We plan to rearm the entire Russian military not only with these types of missiles, but also with this new generation of land-based hardware and aviation technology. These are truly complex systems, and, as their employment has proven, extremely effective... As you yourself said, [they flew] over the territory of other nations. Along the flight path, they made 147 turns, flew at altitudes of between 80 and 1,300 meters... at a speed comparable to a jet aircraft - everyone knows this. The thing is that this isn't classified information. In principle, all of our partners, at a minimum at the expert level, are aware that Russia has such [high-precision] weapons. It's one thing, at the expert level, to know that Russia supposedly has such weapons. It's another thing to be convinced that: first - they really exist and our defense industrial complex is producing them; second - that they are of high quality; third - that there are well-trained, well-prepared people who can effectively employ them; and fourth - that Russia has the will to use them if it satisfies the national interests of our state and our people."

It won't take long for others to see through Putin's own words that a driving factor for launching land-attack cruise missiles was, in fact, to prove to the rest of the world that Russia can and will carry out such launches if doing so satisfies Russia's interests -- despite the hefty price tag of the missiles.

Combat-Proven: Russia’s SS-N-30 (3M14) Land-Attack Cruise Missile

"Dagestan" frigate launches multiple land-attack cruise missiles against Syrian targets -- October 2015
(courtesy: RF Ministry of Defense)

According to Russian Ministry of Defense reporting, during the nighttime hours between October 6 and October 7, Russian Navy ships positioned in the southwestern Caspian Sea launched 26 long-range land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) against 11 reported Islamic State (ISIL) targets in the Syrian provinces of Al-Raqqah, Aleppo, and Idlib. The targets were characterized as “factories for manufacturing [artillery] shells and explosives, command posts, storage facilities for munitions, armaments, and petroleum-oil-lubricants (POL), as well as terrorist training camps.”

The launch platforms were identified as Gepard-class guided missile frigate “Dagestan” and Sviyazhsk-class guide missile patrol ships “Grad Sviyazhsk”, “Uglich”, and “Velikiy Ustyug”. This constitutes the entire inventory of LACM-armed ships in the Caspian Flotilla. Not mentioned in any of yesterday's reporting was the departure of Astrakhan-class patrol combatant "Makhachkala" (not LACM-armed) and Finik-class hydrographic vessel "Anatoliy Guzhvin", which departed port a few days ago to conduct "scheduled combat service missions." It is possible that these two ships provided some level of support for the strike operation.

Defense minister Sergey Shoygu briefs President Putin on Russian military actions in Syria -- October 7, 2015
(credit: RF Presidential Public Affairs)

The announcement coincided with a meeting between defense minister Sergey Shoygu and Russian President Vladimir Putin in which Shoygu provided an update on Russian military actions in Syria to support the Syrian government.

Simulation of missile flight route over northern Syria
(credit: RF Ministry of Defense)

The computer-generated simulation of the flight route indicates the missiles flew within a dozen or so miles of the southern Turkish border, but within Syrian airspace. It is important to note that the appearance of a TU-160 Blackjack bomber icon at the beginning of the simulation (00:57-00:59) may indicate this was simply a simulation used for mission planning purposes only and not the actual approved mission profile (the MOD made no mention of a TU-160 flying over the Caspian Sea).

Simulation of missile flight route over northern Syria
(credit: RF Ministry of Defense)
Key: ЗПБВ [factories for manufacturing munitions and armaments]; КП [command post]
НВФ [illegal armed formation (group)]; СклБВ [storage facilities for munitions and armaments]

The MOD video also shows that all of the missiles were launched with an interval between launches of less than five seconds, as well as "Dagestan" conducting a five-missile salvo launch. A video uploaded to Twitter reportedly shows two of the missiles in flight. Another video uploaded to YouTube reportedly shows damage caused by one of the missiles striking a target near Aleppo.

General-Colonels Andrey Kartapolov (l) and Viktor Bondarev (r) brief reporters -- October 7, 2015
(credit: RF Ministry of Defense)

Yesterday afternoon, General-Colonel Andrey Kartapolov (Chief, Main Operational Directorate – Russian Federal General Staff) confirmed the details of the LACM strikes. He also stated that intelligence information received from Iran, Iraq, and Syria is being used to target strike locations.

«Все объекты для поражения нами тщательно изучаются, при этом используются данные космической и радиоэлектронной разведки, съёмки с беспилотных летательных аппаратов, информация, полученная по данным радиоперехвата. Мы также используем данные сирийской, иранской и иракской разведок, в том числе из агентурных источников» , — подчеркнул Андрей Картаполов в беседе с журналистами.

“All strike locations are carefully studied; additionally, data from space and radio-electronic reconnaissance, footage from unmanned aerial vehicles, and information received through communications intercepts, are used. We also use data from Syrian, Iranian, and Iraqi intelligence, to include from their human sources,” Andrey Kartapolov emphasized in his discussion with reporters.

Indeed, the four nations have established a joint information center in Baghdad for coordinating actions in the fight against ISIL. As the video released by the RF MOD indicates, the missiles flew through Iranian and Iraqi airspace, something that certainly would have been coordinated via the Baghdad center.

If one assumes that a new long-range land-attack cruise missile is an expensive commodity, why would you employ it if there was a cheaper way of striking a target? The Russian defense ministry has been touting the successes that its Syria-deployed air assets have achieved since strikes first began last week. As long as Russian aircraft have unfettered access to the targets from the air, they can use much cheaper ordnance than the SS-N-30.

According to one source, India paid USD 6.5 million per unit for the export version of the missile, but that sounds exceedingly high: a single U.S. Tomahawk LACM only cost USD 1.59 million in FY2014. Despite the possibly overstated cost in the report, it is logical to assume that missiles cost more than air-delivered bombs in Russia, as they would anywhere else.

An analyst at the Institute for the Study of War in Washington says the LACM strike “was specifically done to show bravado... it’s chest-thumping.” Well, that’s at one end of the spectrum. At the other end of the spectrum, some analysts assert that Russia is using this opportunity to prove its latest military weaponry can be employed to solve modern day missions. And still others state that nearly all of the aircraft currently deployed to Syria would be needed to achieve the same level of damage that the 26-missile strike achieved, and that the departure of this large number of aircraft at nearly the same time would have tipped off someone about the operation. Somewhere in the middle is the oft-used “strategic messaging” explanation. And way off in left field is Deputy Prime Minister Dmitriy Rogozin's explanation:

"A gift for ISIL for digging graves"
(credit: Dmitriy Rogozin/Twitter)

Of course, some would argue that the SS-N-30 LACM strike was well-timed to serve as a gift, of sorts, to President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, who celebrated his 63rd birthday on October 7.

Wouldn’t it have been simpler and cheaper to give him a new pony?

UPDATE 2: The Curious Case of Alaed

A couple days after my previous update, the Alaed story grew new wings.  First, the Russian MOD informed the world that Northern Fleet Udaloy II-class destroyer Admiral Chabanenko, three landing ships and two auxiliary vessels had departed port bound for the Atlantic Ocean, where they will be met by Baltic Fleet Neustrashimyy-class frigate Yaroslav Mudryy and a tanker... Sound familiar?

While Rosoboroneksport has officially denied any of the MI-25 helicopters are being transported to Syria by the landing ships, it did not deny reporting that other cargo (munitions, missiles, and the like) is, in fact, being transported to Syria by means of the Northern Fleet landing ships.

And, so, Alaed continues its southerly transit of the Norwegian Sea en route to the Baltic Sea.  The vessel, which was last located near 69-39N 014-24E (heading 228 degrees, speed 13.3 knots) at 1017 GMT on July 12, is reportedly heading for Baltiysk.  It remains to be seen whether the helicopters will be offloaded there or in St. Petersburg.

UPDATE 1: The Curious Case of Alaed

Not much news has been forthcoming regarding the status of Alaed since it arrived in Murmansk last month. Over the past week, however, internet chatter seemed to indicate that Moscow has found a work-around for shipping the weapons and military hardware to Syria using Russian Navy ships.

Laying out all of the internet chatter, it appears that three Northern Fleet landing ships, accompanied by Udaloy II-class destroyer Admiral Chabanenko and a few auxiliary vessels, will depart Severomorsk soon for the Mediterranean Sea and then the Black Sea for participation in the operational-strategic command-staff exercise Kavkaz-2012, which will be held in September.  The Baltic Fleet's Neustrashimyy-class frigates Neustrashimyy and Yaroslav Mudryy, as well as Uda-class oiler Lena, will rendezvous with the Northern Fleet task group  in the Atlantic Ocean as it heads for the Mediterranean Sea (and possibly to the Black Sea).

But the most interesting part of the story is how this relates to Alaed.  According to one source, one or more of the Northern Fleet landing ships will be carrying at least a portion of Alaed's "contraband" to Syria, presumably along the way to the Black Sea.  Indeed, a crewmember of one of the Northern Fleet's landing ships recently confirmed his ship would be heading to Syria soon.  If this scenario plays out as it appears, then there is very little the EU or NATO will be able to do to stop the shipment from reaching Syria.

The Curious Case of Alaed

Russia is now playing "hide the weapons" with the rest of the world.  Moscow hired FEMCO, which leased the Netherlands/Antilles-flagged merchant vessel Alaed, to transport weapons (to include MI-25 helicopters and munitions) to Syria:

• June 5: Alaed arrives in St. Petersburg
• June 8:  Alaed departs St. Petersburg
• June 10: Alaed arrives in Baltiysk (near Kaliningrad, where the MI-25 helicopters are believed to have undergone repairs)
• June 12: Alaed departs Baltiysk, heading west towards the Atlantic Ocean; U.S. Secretary of State Clinton announces that Russia is shipping attack helicopters to Syria
• June 15: London-based insurer Standard P&I Club is informed that Alaed, which the company has insured, may be carrying attack helicopters and munitions to Syria
• June 18: At 0137 GMT, Alaed was at 59-17N 006-18W, steaming at 12.5 knots on a course of 229 degrees; FEMCO announces on its website that Copenhagen-based United Nordic Shipping (UNS) has canceled a contract with FEMCO for commercial management of Alaed after UNS learns of Alaed's military cargo

So, what's next for Alaed? Continue its transit to Syria without insurance (making it difficult to make port calls) or a commercial manager? Attempt a name/flag change at sea? Return to Russia, and let Moscow try another route?

UPDATE -- June 23: Moscow has decided to send Alaed to Murmansk to be reflagged (and renamed?) before continuing to Syria. ALAED was last near 71-46N 028-18E at 1621 GMT on June 22, steaming on course 125 degrees at a speed of 13.9 knots.

UPDATE -- June 24: FEMCO announces on its website that Alaed arrived in Murmansk at 0400 GMT (0800 local) on June 24.  In its release, FEMCO confirms that the vessel will be reflagged as Russian before continuing its journey.  The company also indirectly blames foreign intelligence services for the predicament without denying the fact that it was carrying weapons (missiles, helicopters, or whatever) to Syria.