Showing posts with label vitse-admiral kulakov. Show all posts
Showing posts with label vitse-admiral kulakov. Show all posts

Friday, February 19, 2016

Follow-Up: Kalibr Missile Shooter Heading to Mediterranean Sea

Flight ban and flight route closures for "Russian Navy exercise" -- February 24-29, 2016

Two NOTAM warnings have been issued for Russian Navy "rocket test firings" that may occur in the eastern Mediterranean Sea next week:

A0126/16 -
RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE (ROCKET TEST FIRINGS) WILL TAKE PLACE IN AREA:
344400N0345800E
351300N0345800E
351300N0353300E
344400N0353300E
THE AREA INCLUDES BUFFER ZONE. SFC - FL660, 0500-1500, 24 FEB 05:00 2016 UNTIL 29 FEB 15:00 2016. CREATED: 18 FEB 13:45 2016
 
A0127/16 - DUE TO RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE AS REFFERRED IN NOTAM A0126/16 THE FOLLOWING AIRWAYS WILL BE CLOSED:
1. W/UW17 (BALMAS-NIKAS)
2. R/UR78, M/UM978 (ALSUS-NIKAS)
SFC-FL660. 0500-1500, 24 FEB 05:00 2016 UNTIL 29 FEB 15:00 2016. CREATED: 18 FEB 13:55 2016


The flight ban and flight route closures are identical to those announced for "Russian Navy exercises" in the past.

"Zelenyy Dol" transiting the Turkish Straits -- February 14, 2016
(credit: Yörük Işık)

Three Russian Navy combatants are currently operating in the eastern Mediterranean: the missile cruiser "Varyag", the destroyer "Vitse-Admiral Kulakov", and the missile ship "Zelenyy Dol". The latter arrived in Tartus, Syria, on February 17. While there is growing suspicion that "Zelenyy Dol" may launch land-attack cruise missiles into Syria during its current deployment, different flight bans and route closures were used when Kilo-class submarine "Rostov-na-Donu" launched four land-attack cruise missiles into Syria in December 2015.

Sunday, February 7, 2016

Russian Navy Exercise in Eastern Mediterranean Sea

Flight ban (yellow) and flight route restrictions (red) for Russian Navy combat drills -- January 8-11, 2016

In late January, flight bans and route restrictions were announced for a Russian Navy exercise:

A0037/16 - RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE (ROCKET TEST FIRINGS) WILL TAKE PLACE IN AREA BOUNDED BY:
344400N0345800E
351300N0345800E
351300N0353300E
344400N0353300E
THE AREA INCLUDES BUFFER ZONE. SFC - FL660, 0500-1500, 08 FEB 05:00 2016 UNTIL 11 FEB 15:00 2016.


A0039/16 - DUE TO RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE AS REFERED IN NOTAM A0037/16 THE FOLLOWING AIRWAYS WILL BE CLOSED:
W/UW17 (BALMA-NIKAS)
R/UR78, M/UM978 (ALSUS-NIKAS)
BTN SFC-FL660. 0500-1500, 08 FEB 05:00 2016 UNTIL 11 FEB 15:00 2016.


The flight ban and flight route restrictions are identical to those used before by the Russian Navy.

While there has been no official statement by military public affairs representatives about the exercise, there are two naval combatants operating in the eastern Mediterranean Sea that could utilize the area: Slava-class cruiser "Varyag" (Pacific Fleet) and Udaloy I-class destroyer "Vitse-Admiral Kulakov" (Northern Fleet). Last month, the destroyer conducted anti-air warfare training that included simulated surface-to-air missile and gunnery drills.

Wednesday, February 4, 2015

Salyut Beats MOD in “Vitse-Admiral Kulakov” Case

On April 12, 2002, the Russian MOD (Naval Directorate of the Chief of Shipbuilding, Weapons, and Weapons Maintenance) signed a contract (#713/03/28/KN/0321-02) with Salyut Scientific Production Enterprise under which Salyut was to complete experimental design work “Rybets”. On September 25, 2010, the sides signed a Supplementary Agreement (#704/28/3/REV/D018/0115-10) which further defined certain stages and sub-stages of the state contract, to include:

Stage 9 – confirmation of the working design documentation in order to set up serial production of the 5N-30N; cost of this stage: RUB 1,672,654; work commencement: November 6, 2010; work conclusion: November 25, 2010

Stage 16 – confirmation of the working design documentation in order to set up serial production of the UN-30112; cost of this stage: RUB 1,670,858; work commencement: November 6, 2010; work conclusion: November 25, 2010

Stage 17 – confirmation of the working design documentation in order to set up serial production of the 511-3011; cost of this stage: RUB 1,170,858; work commencement: November 6, 2010; work conclusion: November 25, 2010

Prototypes of the 5P-30N (Fregat-N) and 5P-30N2 (Fregat-N2) radars, as well as the 5P-30P radar data processing system, were originally scheduled to be tested on Udaloy I-class destroyer “Vitse-Admiral Kulakov” in March-April 2010; however, due to an unanticipated issue with the ship’s hull that required dock repairs, the testing was delayed until November 25, 2010. Initial testing was completed on October 15, 2010, and the prototypes were handed over to the MOD for state testing on the same date. However, according to RF Navy Commander-in-Chief Decision #721/ОНК/5538  - “Preparing Project 1155 Large ASW Ship “Vitse-Admiral Kulakov” to Join the Permanent Ready Forces and Transfer to Its Homeport” (dated September 22, 2010), the destroyer was accepted before state testing and acceptance of the 5P-30N, 5P-30N2, and 5P-30P could be completed.

Both sides signed a joint decision on January 31, 2011, that reiterated that initial testing of the prototype equipment had been completed, but due to the destroyer’s transfer from the Baltic Fleet to the Northern Fleet, state testing could not be completed earlier than 2011. According to the decision, state testing would be finished during the second quarter of 2011, and all actions related to preparing the prototypes for serial production would be completed in October 2011. Based on Northern Fleet leadership input, a decision was made by the state acceptance committee to conduct state testing of the prototype equipment by September 30, 2011.

The end date was further pushed back until December 1, 2011, due to the requirement for the destroyer to undergo a 41-day shipyard repair period between October 1 and November 10. The at-sea test date was set for November 16. After several more delays, the destroyer finally got underway for testing – but without any industry personnel on board, thus preventing the completion of state testing. Salyut complained to the Northern Fleet commander, who in turn ordered the ship back to sea on December 6 to perform the state testing. Several fleet aircraft (IL-20 Coot A, IL-38 May, and KA-27 Helix) provided support for that day’s testing. Based on the first day's results, everyone agreed the prototype equipment was ready for a live missile launch against a P-120RM target missile the next day. However, on December 7, the ship’s 3R-95/Kinzhal (SA-N-9/Gauntlet) surface-to-air missile suffered a malfunction that the crew could not fix. Since, without the SA-N-9, the ship would be unable to protect itself in the event the P-120RM target missile veered off course, a decision was made to suspend state testing and return to port. The ship returned to port on December 8, and fleet personnel began removing the ship’s weapons on December 9 in advance of placing the destroyer in a dry dock. The Northern Fleet agreed that the next time the ship would be available to perform state testing of the prototype equipment would be February 2012.

On November 27, 2013, the MOD filed a suit against Salyut for failure to full its contractual obligations by the stated deadline. In its suit, the MOD sought RUB 1,561,589 in fines for non-fulfillment of the contract.

On February 20, 2014, the Arbitration Court of Moscow issued a ruling in the case (#A40-169577/2013) in favor of Salyut, stating that Salyut could not be blamed for the MOD’s inability to provide the proper equipment (i.e., operable destroyer with operable SA-N-9) within the stated time frame.

Not satisfied with the verdict, the MOD filed an appeal with the 9th Arbitration Appellate Court on April 29, 2014. The court upheld the lower court’s decision on June 11.

On August 14, the MOD filed a final appeal with the Arbitration Court of the Moscow District, which similarly dismissed the case in line with the two previous decisions.

Tuesday, September 2, 2014

Is Mediterranean Sea Dangerous for Russian Navy Destroyers?

The Russian Navy Northern Fleet's Udaloy-class destroyer "Vitse-Admiral Kulakov" is currently undergoing repairs in Sevastopol following a collision with an unknown tanker in the Mediterranean Sea last month, according to internet chatter. This follows two other incidents with Udaloy destroyers having to enter the Black Sea for repairs during their Mediterranean Sea deployments. In May-June 2013, the Northern Fleet's Udaloy-class destroyer "Admiral Levchenko" underwent repairs, to include work on its bow-mounted sonar. And between June and September 2013, the Pacific Fleet's Udaloy-class destroyer "Admiral Panteleyev" underwent some type of repairs in Novorossiysk. It is noteworthy that no other major combatant from the Mediterranean Task Force has had to enter the Black Sea for repairs.

Naval officials' claims that these were "routine" repairs are dishonest. Ships already complete lengthy shipyard periods before departing on lengthy deployments. Therefore, there should be nothing "routine" about theses destroyers having to break from the task group and head for Sevastopol or Novorossiysk.

The impact? The Black Sea Fleet's Slava-class cruiser "Moskva" now has to spend "more than two months" in the Mediterranean Sea, according to an unnamed Navy Main Staff source. According to one internet source, the cruiser will depart on 2 or 3 September for a deployment that will last "2-3 months at a minimum."

Monday, September 16, 2013

UPDATE: Is Russia's Surface Fleet Being Stretched to the Limit?

In a brief update to my previous blog entry:

  • Admiral Panteleyev finally returned to the Mediterranean Sea last week following possible repairs of unknown equipment that broke down some time in July.
  • Russia had to use a Tarantul III-class patrol combatant to escort another "Syrian Express" landing ship to the Mediterranean Sea and back in mid-August.
  • Rumors abound that Udaloy I-class destroyer Vitse-Admiral Kulakov suffered some type of propulsion problem in early-August shortly after its Havana, Cuba, port call. The ship failed to meet its previously scheduled port calls despite Moscow's insistence that the destroyer has been tagging along with Slava-class cruiser Moskva the entire time. Instead of bringing the ship home early, naval officials apparently decided it was better to keep the destroyer out of sight and tow it back to the Barents Sea on/about its scheduled return date. Given that no immediate tow service was required, it's possible the destroyer is as least partially operational, which means it has enough power to limp into port while TV cameras are rolling. As soon as the sailors hit the shore, we'll learn more... According to some internet chatter, Sorum-class oceangoing tug MB-304 may be towing the destroyer northeast in the Atlantic Ocean, and both units may rendezvous with Baklazhan-class salvage and rescue tug Nikolay Chiker, which has been hanging around the United Kingdom for several weeks -- most recently southeast of Cork, Ireland.

Monday, April 16, 2012

UPDATE: Smetlivyy - Russia's "Clever" Destroyer

Update to

As I suggested in my previous post, the Russian Navy may have decided to implement a "constant presence" near the Syrian coastline.  In an April 13 news article, RIA Novosti cited a "highly-placed MOD representative," who stated:
"A decision has been made regarding the constant presence of Russian Navy ships near the Syrian coast. Another Black Sea Fleet ship will arrive in May to replace Smetlivyy... This could be the escort ship Pytlivyy or a large landing ship. A group of Black Sea Fleet ships and vessels could also be sent to this area."
A couple linguistic items to note. First, the term "constant" (постоянный) does not denote a continuous, back-to-back deployment of forces, but rather a near-continuous presence. "Constant" is one step above "periodic," but one step below "continuous." Thus, there could be days or weeks when there are no naval combatants operating near the Syrian coast. And secondly, if the unnamed defense official used the term "ship" (корабль) correctly, he meant naval combatant vice the term reserved for non-combatant auxiliary vessels (судно). Thus, the presence of an auxiliary vessel in Tartus does not qualify as a "constant presence" of "ships" near the Syria coast. Western reporters will inevitably get this wrong.

According to earlier internet chatter, the Black Sea Fleet's Krivak I-class frigate Pytlivyy was supposed to relieve Kashin-class destroyer Smetlivyy off the coast of Syria next month. Fleet officials, however, apparently have decided the frigate requires dock repairs after it experienced some technical issues while chasing the high-speed, wave-piercing catamaran HSV-2 Swift (chartered by the U.S. Military Sealift Command) across the Black Sea during its recent operations there.

Thus, in order to maintain a "constant" presence off the Syrian Coast, the deployment of Kashin-class destroyer Smetlivyy could be extended until a suitable Black Sea Fleet replacement is identified. Internet chatter in February suggested Ropucha I-class landing ship Azov was preparing to deploy to the Mediterranean Sea. Alternatively, Northern Fleet Udaloy I-class destroyer Vitse-Admiral Kulakov, which departed Severomorsk on April 6 en route to a Horn of Africa counter-piracy patrol, could be redirected to replace (temporarily) Smetlivyy. If the latter option is chosen, it would result in an ever larger gap in the Russian Navy's counter-piracy operations. Pacific Fleet Udaloy I-class destroyer Admiral Tributs concluded Russia's last counter-piracy patrol in late-March.

On a related note, Chilikin-class replenishment oiler Ivan Bubnov (and possibly a tug) departed Sevastopol on April 14 en route to the Mediterranean Sea to rendezvous with Vitse-Admiral Kulakov.

Saturday, March 31, 2012

Smetlivyy - Russia's "Clever" Destroyer

When the Russian Navy’s last remaining Kashin-class destroyer, Smetlivyy, departs Sevastopol on April 1, how will military officials characterize the purpose of the ship’s 45-day deployment?  Combat training, of course.  But what will the true purpose be?

Timeline
- Early-January:  Russian Northern Fleet combatant ships conduct two-day port call in Tartus, Syria, in early-January.  Ships conduct a typical working port call:  moor, take on supplies, leave.  Nothing more, nothing less.  But neither the Russian nor Syrian press machines could forgo mentioning the tour given to high-level Syrian officials aboard the Russian Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza N.G. Kuznetsov.  Moscow downplayed the visit, while Damascus proclaimed the visit was a sign of deep military cooperation between the two nations and support for the al-Assad regime.

- Early-February:  Internet chatter indicates the Russian Black Sea Fleet is preparing to send Ropucha II-class landing ship Azov to Syria, possibly to evacuate non-combatants from the crisis-plagued nation.  The ship never departed the Black Sea and, instead, has been involved in annual certifications, to include taking part in a command-post exercise this past week.

- Mid-February:  Internet chatter indicates Smetlivyy is preparing to deploy to the Mediterranean.

- Early-March:  Internet chatter indicates some Black Sea Fleet naval infantry personnel will depart in mid-March to participate in two month-long counter-terrorism training in Italy.  The personnel will return to Russia aboard Smetlivyy.  Later, the training in Italy later is postponed or canceled.

- Mid-March:  Internet chatter indicates Smetlivyy begins weapons and stores onloads on/about March 16 in preparation for subsequent at-sea certifications and deployment.  Smetlivyy departs Sevastopol on March 19 en route to Novorossiysk to complete its annual combat certifications.

- Late-March:  Internet chatter indicates Smetlivyy will depart Sevastopol on April 1 for its nearly two-month deployment.

So, What’s Up?
Were Moscow truly concerned about openly supporting the Syrian regime, one would expect much more military cooperation, to include a continuous or near-continuous naval combatant presence in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.  And perhaps that is exactly what Moscow is doing.  Earlier this month, Moscow defense officials had to negate media reports that Russian naval combatant ships were operating near Syria’s shores.  And the statement appears to have been true on that date.  Officials did add, however, that two Black Sea Fleet auxiliary vessels – Olekma-class oiler Iman and Moma-class intelligence collection vessel Ekvator – were either in-port Tartus or operating near Syria’s coastline.  Two days after the first statement, an unnamed naval official told Interfax that Moma-class Kildin would soon replace Ekvator, which has only been deployed for about three weeks.  And now internet chatter suggests Amur-class repair ship PM-138 may soon get underway, presumably to replace Iman (deployed since February 26) in Tartus.

So, what will Smetlivyy’s mission be?  Continued Russian Navy presence in or near Syria?  Internet chatter indicates the ship will visit Tartus twice during this deployment – at the beginning and end of April. What it will do in between remains a mystery, but it could simply conduct “training” operations in the eastern and central Mediterranean.  Perhaps a nice port call in Malta, Italy, and/or Turkey is on the schedule.  In any case, Smetlivyy’s presence in the Mediterranean Sea coupled with the continued presence of intelligence collection ships near Syria certainly will be an interesting issue for the U.S. 6th Fleet, U.S. European Command, and NATO over the coming weeks.

Just wait until Russian Northern Fleet Udaloy I-class destroyer Vitse-Admiral Kulakov shows up in the Mediterranean Sea in a few weeks on its way to conduct a counter-piracy patrol near Somalia.  And when Black Sea Fleet Slava-class cruiser Moskva deploys to the Mediterranean (and beyond) in June...