Liar, Liar… Pants on Fire

As if Russia didn’t have enough end-of-year excitement, two nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines were involved in separate mishaps during the last week of December.  On December 28, a floating drydock was pushed by very high winds into the stern section of Aleksandr Nevskiy, the second hull of the new Dolgorukiy class of SSBNs.  The submarine, launched in 2011, is still undergoing pre-acceptance testing.  The incident occurred at the Northern Machine-building Enterprise (shortened in Russian to Sevmash), located in the White Sea port of Severodvinsk.   It is unclear how serious the damage is, but one report indicates the submarine now has a hole measuring 0.7 by 0.2 meters in its outer hull.  This incident has not been officially acknowledged yet.

The very next day, a fire broke out aboard Yekaterinburg, the second hull of the Delta IV class of SSBNs – the backbone of the Russian naval strategic nuclear forces.  The fire began at about 4PM local time as the submarine was undergoing dock repairs in a floating drydock at the 82nd Ship Repair Facility in the port of Roslyakovo (near Murmansk).  Sparks from ongoing hull-cutting operations apparently ignited either oily residue or trash lubricants floating in the free-flood space between the outer and inner (pressure) hulls.  This space, which contains the submarine's cylindrical sonar array, is flooded when the submarine is afloat, but it is supposed to be drained when placed in drydock.  In this instance, openings located under the sonar dome were welded shut, thus preventing the space from being fully drained.  The presence of water in the space should have been obvious to shipyard workers, especially given that the submarine was placed in the drydock three weeks earlier on December 8.  Contributing to the incident was a series of safety violations, to include the absence of a safety observer during the hull-cutting operation and the failure to draft a written order for the operation in the first place (apparently only a verbal order was given).

About thirty minutes after the fire ignited, the rubber material within the free-flood space began to burn.  The flames then spread outside the space and onto the outer hull.  Subsequently the submarine’s anechoic tiles, which are made of rubber and used to reduce the amount of noise emanating from inside the submarine, began to burn, as did the adjacent wooden scaffolding.  The Russian media erroneously reported – and continue to report – the fire was initiated when sparks created during welding work ignited the scaffolding.  While investigators now know the truth, officials apparently have decided the original false reporting serves their purposes for the time being.

Adding to the seriousness of the accident is the fact that at least ten SS-N-23 Skiff ballistic missiles and four combat torpedoes were loaded aboard the submarine.  As this repair period was “unscheduled,” naval officials decided not to fully offload the submarine’s weapons.  For “scheduled” repairs, all weapons are offloaded before repair work begins.  The immediate danger of the fire was to the four torpedoes, which were amazingly still loaded into torpedo tubes that are located in a separate, confined space above the free-flood space containing the cylindrical sonar array.  Crewmembers were able to pull three torpedoes from their tubes, but the fourth torpedo was wedged inside the torpedo tube.  News video from December 30 clearly shows water being sprayed directly into at least one of the starboard torpedo tubes.

By 3PM local on December 30, shipyard workers had flooded the drydock in order to lower the submarine into the water.  This allowed seawater to flood the free-flood space between the outer and inner hulls, thereby dousing all flames and rapidly lowering the temperature within the space.  Shortly afterwards, the fire was reported to be completely extinguished.

Another indication of the gravity of the situation was the number of high-level government and military officials who flew from Moscow to Roslyakovo:  General Nikolay Makarov (Chief of the General Staff), Admirals Vladimir Vysotskiy and Aleksandr Tatarinov (Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff, respectively), Denis Manturov (acting Minister of Industry and Trade), and Roman Trotsenko (head of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, the parent company of the 82nd Ship Repair Facility).

Now that most of Russia is enjoying a week-long New Year’s holiday break, investigators and military officials will be able to better craft a story for the public while simultaneously trying to figure out who’s to blame.  The more things change, the more they stay the same.

Break Out the Champagne!

After much trial and tribulation, Dolgorukiy-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine Yuriy Dolgorukiy conducted a salvo launch of the SS-NX-32 Bulava SLBM on December 23.  Despite previous media coverage of the submarine's return to port, this time there have been no images or video released of the submarine tying up to the pier or of the crew receiving the traditional roasted pig for a successful mission.  Despite there being no image of a sickly-looking piglet, Russia's Channel 1 (Первый Канал) released footage this evening that it claims to be of the salvo launch.  Between 0:10 and 0:19, you can see two distinct contrails, along with a wonderful light show in the clouds.  Between 0:20 and 0:22, you can see two small, moving specks that would represent the two missiles in flight.  It will take some time (a month or more - especially given the upcoming nine-day holiday period that starts on January 1) until the results of the flight test are finalized and approved.  Only then will the Russian Ministry of Defense forward its recommendation to the Russian government to either accept the Bulava into the Russian Navy inventory or to continue testing.  On December 27, however, President Medvedev told senior military officers gathered in the Kremlin that the flight testing portion of the overall Bulava test program had concluded and that the missile would now enter into service... pending a favorable MOD recommendation, of course.

The Lone Carrier

It's amazing how excited the Russian and Western press get when the Russian's Navy sole aircraft carrier ("heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser" (тяжелый авианесущий крейсер), in Russian parlance) steams beyond local waters.  Both sides are attaching undue significance to the deployment of the ship and its two (soon to be three) combatant escorts.  Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Admiral Kuznetsov (Admiral Kuznetsov herein) is on a training mission -- not unlike training deployments carried out by other maritime nations' navies.  The Russian aircraft carrier has performed such deployments a handful of times over the past decade.  And where is the best location to carry out at-sea carrier-based fighter training during the winter?  The Mediterranean Sea, naturally.

The Mediterranean Sea is home to much of the world's recent upheavals.  Libya, Egypt, and Syria are but a few of the countries engulfed in the Arab Spring that sprang last December.  According to Wikipedia, Syrian citizens jumped on the Arab Spring Express in March 2011.

March is four months into the Russian military training year.  And training year plans are laid out well before the new training year begins.  Thus, the Admiral Kuznetsov deployment was scheduled before the first Arab Spring demonstrations and protests even began.

So why are Russian and non-Russian news outlets so interested in this routine deployment?  The tagline that sells, it seems, is that Russia is racing to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to support the failing Syrian regime.  Really?  How exactly?

• Showing the flag?  That mission could have been performed any time this past year by sending naval combatant ships and intelligence collection vessels from Russia's Black Sea Fleet to sit off the Syrian coast.  Russia's Black Sea Fleet has been to the Mediterranean Sea several times this year, and the only thing that came near Syria was the Amur-class floating repair vessel PM-56, which has been deployed to the Syrian port of Tartus for several few months.  It's not there to support the Syrian regime, but rather to provide support (if needed) for Russian Navy ships operating in the Mediterranean Sea.
  
• Gunboat diplomacy?  Despite its original specifications, Admiral Kuznetsov is no longer capable of firing SS-N-19 Shipwreck cruise missiles, the only surface-to-surface missile it was designed to carry; however, it is armed with surface-to-air missiles.  The accompanying combatants (Admiral Chabanenko, Yaroslav Mudryy, and (soon) Ladnyy) are armed with various surface-to-surface missiles (SS-N-22 Sunburn and SS-N-25 Switchblade), surface-to-air missiles, and heavy artillery.  If you plan to sink some enemy ships, then you have the right missiles.  If you plan to conduct precision attacks on key enemy strongholds well inside Syrian borders, you're out of luck.

So, to the reporters and other bloggers who are trying to create something from nothing:  while it's the season of miracles, a Russian Navy carrier strike group providing direct support to the failing Syrian regime is one present you won't find under your Christmas tree this year.

Now, if you really want to find something of interest to report, why not look at what will happen at the tail-end of the deployment... that will be something to see!