Russia Sending Subs to Black Sea?

In early-February, Rear Admiral Aleksandr Fedotenkov, Commander of the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet, told a RIA Novosti reporter that the fleet expects to receive six Kilo-class diesel submarines by 2017.  His statement requires a little dissection in order to understand the likelihood of this happening and reasoning behind such plans.

1.  Wording.  Given the propensity of Russian news outlets to paraphrase what an interviewee actually says, let’s look at what Fedotenkov was quoted as saying:

“Подводные лодки проекта 636 в серии из шести кораблей, которые уже заложены на судостроительном заводе "Адмиралтейские верфи" в Санкт-Петербурге, придут на флот до 2017 года. Первые три корпуса мы получим в 2014 году, одну - в 2015 году и две - в 2016 году . Эти лодки станут основой для формирования полноценной бригады подводных лодок Черноморского флота. К тому времени в боевом составе флота останется фактически единственная подлодка "Алроса" проекта 877. На основе опыта подводной службы моряков-подводников Черноморского флота будет сформирована бригада подплава флота из кораблей 636 проекта.”

“A series of six Project 636 [Kilo] submarines, which have already been laid down at Admiralty Shipyards in St. Petersburg, will arrive in the fleet before 2017.  We will receive the first three hulls in 2014, one in 2015, and two in 2016.  These submarines will be the basis for establishing a complete brigade of Black Sea Fleet submarines.  At that time, the sole Project 877 [Kilo] submarine Alrosa will still be in the fleet’s combat inventory.  Based on the experience of submarine service by Black Sea Fleet submariners, a brigade of Project 636 [Kilo] submarines will be established.”

The phrase “already laid down” is an overstatement, at best.  What Fedotenkov could have said - or meant to say - was the metal bending may have started for six new Kilo (Project 06363 (636.3)) units, but not that the keels had been laid down.  Not having the luxury of hearing an audio recording of his statement, it’s hard to know if Fedotenkov misspoke or if the RIA Novosti reporter (Sergey Safronov) paraphrased what the admiral said.  The first two units of the new Kilo design to be laid down are named after Russian cities in the Black Sea area (Novorossiysk and Rostov-na-Donu), which strongly suggests these two likely will end up in the Black Sea.

2.  Basing.  Can the Black Sea Fleet provide support for six additional submarines?  Let’s remember that the Russian Black Sea Fleet was left with seven submarines in 1997:

• Beluga [Project 01710] SS-533
• Bravo [Project 690] SS-226, SS-256, SS-310
• Foxtrot [Project 641] B-9
• Kilo [Project 877] Alrosa
• Tango [Project 641B] B-380

The Beluga, Bravo, and Foxtrot units have been stricken.  This only allows for five (not six) new units to be based in Sevastopol.  Note that the Mod-Romeo [Project 633RV] floating recharging station PZS-50, based in Sevastopol’s Yuzhnaya Bukhta, is not listed in the 1997 agreement that divided the forces between Ukraine and Russia.  The submarine still flies the Russian Navy flag and supports Russian Navy operations in Sevastopol.  It is unclear to me what status this unit has.  But if rumors are true, PZS-50 will be scrapped soon, and B-380 will become the new floating charging station.  And if PZS-50 was not counted against Russia’s inventory of seven submarines, then B-380 would not.  Thus, if B-380 is scrapped or converted, then the final number of six “new” units can be reached.  Fedotenkov’s statement that the submarines would be based both in Novorossiysk and Sevastopol suggests the Russians eventually will get serious about upgrading the port of Novorossiysk to support at least a few submarines.

3.  Construction.  It is feasible that six new Kilos could be built by 2017.  Two are currently under construction at Admiralty Shipyards.  It is rumored that SevMash will begin construction of a third unit next month.  And there are more rumors that Krasnoye Sormovo in Nizhniy Novgorod soon could get back in the submarine construction business.

4.  Why the Black Sea?  According to a September 2009 document uncovered by the WikiLeaks project, Admiral Mark Fitzgerald (Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe) informed the Spanish Ministry of Defense of its European Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA) to Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD).  Admiral Fitzgerald “noted the extensive plans and requirements for ship-based ballistic missile defense in the Black Sea region.”  Fitzgerald told reporters in April 2010 the BMD ships probably would need to patrol the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and Black Sea.

The Russians can read WikiLeaks and Navy Times, too.  And so it is no surprise that Russia now views any Aegis-capable ship (equipped with either AN/SPY-1A or AN/SPY-1B) operating in the Black Sea as something worthy of taking a closer look.  In 2011, Ticonderoga-class cruisers USS ANZIO (CG 68), USS MONTEREY (CG 61) and USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CG 58) conducted operations in the Black Sea.  In January 2012, Ticonderoga USS VELLA GULF (CG 72) also operated in the Black Sea region.  Obviously, the U.S. Navy has both an interest and the will to operate in the Black Sea despite Russia’s negative perceptions of the United States’ plans to deploy BMD assets in its backyard.

Having seven Kilo submarines in its arsenal would allow Russia to counter U.S./NATO forces operating in the Black Sea should tensions worsen in the region.  Given that the new Project 06363-type Kilo will be armed with the Kalibr missile system, capable of launching the 3M54/SS-N-27 antiship cruise missile and the 3M14/SS-N-30 long-range (in excess of 1,000 kilometers) land-attack cruise missile, U.S./NATO forces will have fun trying to keep track of how many LACMs actually are deployed at sea and at which facilities those missiles are targeted.

Liar, Liar… Pants on Fire

As if Russia didn’t have enough end-of-year excitement, two nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines were involved in separate mishaps during the last week of December.  On December 28, a floating drydock was pushed by very high winds into the stern section of Aleksandr Nevskiy, the second hull of the new Dolgorukiy class of SSBNs.  The submarine, launched in 2011, is still undergoing pre-acceptance testing.  The incident occurred at the Northern Machine-building Enterprise (shortened in Russian to Sevmash), located in the White Sea port of Severodvinsk.   It is unclear how serious the damage is, but one report indicates the submarine now has a hole measuring 0.7 by 0.2 meters in its outer hull.  This incident has not been officially acknowledged yet.

The very next day, a fire broke out aboard Yekaterinburg, the second hull of the Delta IV class of SSBNs – the backbone of the Russian naval strategic nuclear forces.  The fire began at about 4PM local time as the submarine was undergoing dock repairs in a floating drydock at the 82nd Ship Repair Facility in the port of Roslyakovo (near Murmansk).  Sparks from ongoing hull-cutting operations apparently ignited either oily residue or trash lubricants floating in the free-flood space between the outer and inner (pressure) hulls.  This space, which contains the submarine's cylindrical sonar array, is flooded when the submarine is afloat, but it is supposed to be drained when placed in drydock.  In this instance, openings located under the sonar dome were welded shut, thus preventing the space from being fully drained.  The presence of water in the space should have been obvious to shipyard workers, especially given that the submarine was placed in the drydock three weeks earlier on December 8.  Contributing to the incident was a series of safety violations, to include the absence of a safety observer during the hull-cutting operation and the failure to draft a written order for the operation in the first place (apparently only a verbal order was given).

About thirty minutes after the fire ignited, the rubber material within the free-flood space began to burn.  The flames then spread outside the space and onto the outer hull.  Subsequently the submarine’s anechoic tiles, which are made of rubber and used to reduce the amount of noise emanating from inside the submarine, began to burn, as did the adjacent wooden scaffolding.  The Russian media erroneously reported – and continue to report – the fire was initiated when sparks created during welding work ignited the scaffolding.  While investigators now know the truth, officials apparently have decided the original false reporting serves their purposes for the time being.

Adding to the seriousness of the accident is the fact that at least ten SS-N-23 Skiff ballistic missiles and four combat torpedoes were loaded aboard the submarine.  As this repair period was “unscheduled,” naval officials decided not to fully offload the submarine’s weapons.  For “scheduled” repairs, all weapons are offloaded before repair work begins.  The immediate danger of the fire was to the four torpedoes, which were amazingly still loaded into torpedo tubes that are located in a separate, confined space above the free-flood space containing the cylindrical sonar array.  Crewmembers were able to pull three torpedoes from their tubes, but the fourth torpedo was wedged inside the torpedo tube.  News video from December 30 clearly shows water being sprayed directly into at least one of the starboard torpedo tubes.

By 3PM local on December 30, shipyard workers had flooded the drydock in order to lower the submarine into the water.  This allowed seawater to flood the free-flood space between the outer and inner hulls, thereby dousing all flames and rapidly lowering the temperature within the space.  Shortly afterwards, the fire was reported to be completely extinguished.

Another indication of the gravity of the situation was the number of high-level government and military officials who flew from Moscow to Roslyakovo:  General Nikolay Makarov (Chief of the General Staff), Admirals Vladimir Vysotskiy and Aleksandr Tatarinov (Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff, respectively), Denis Manturov (acting Minister of Industry and Trade), and Roman Trotsenko (head of the United Shipbuilding Corporation, the parent company of the 82nd Ship Repair Facility).

Now that most of Russia is enjoying a week-long New Year’s holiday break, investigators and military officials will be able to better craft a story for the public while simultaneously trying to figure out who’s to blame.  The more things change, the more they stay the same.

Break Out the Champagne!

After much trial and tribulation, Dolgorukiy-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine Yuriy Dolgorukiy conducted a salvo launch of the SS-NX-32 Bulava SLBM on December 23.  Despite previous media coverage of the submarine's return to port, this time there have been no images or video released of the submarine tying up to the pier or of the crew receiving the traditional roasted pig for a successful mission.  Despite there being no image of a sickly-looking piglet, Russia's Channel 1 (Первый Канал) released footage this evening that it claims to be of the salvo launch.  Between 0:10 and 0:19, you can see two distinct contrails, along with a wonderful light show in the clouds.  Between 0:20 and 0:22, you can see two small, moving specks that would represent the two missiles in flight.  It will take some time (a month or more - especially given the upcoming nine-day holiday period that starts on January 1) until the results of the flight test are finalized and approved.  Only then will the Russian Ministry of Defense forward its recommendation to the Russian government to either accept the Bulava into the Russian Navy inventory or to continue testing.  On December 27, however, President Medvedev told senior military officers gathered in the Kremlin that the flight testing portion of the overall Bulava test program had concluded and that the missile would now enter into service... pending a favorable MOD recommendation, of course.

The Lone Carrier

It's amazing how excited the Russian and Western press get when the Russian's Navy sole aircraft carrier ("heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser" (тяжелый авианесущий крейсер), in Russian parlance) steams beyond local waters.  Both sides are attaching undue significance to the deployment of the ship and its two (soon to be three) combatant escorts.  Fleet Admiral of the Soviet Union Admiral Kuznetsov (Admiral Kuznetsov herein) is on a training mission -- not unlike training deployments carried out by other maritime nations' navies.  The Russian aircraft carrier has performed such deployments a handful of times over the past decade.  And where is the best location to carry out at-sea carrier-based fighter training during the winter?  The Mediterranean Sea, naturally.

The Mediterranean Sea is home to much of the world's recent upheavals.  Libya, Egypt, and Syria are but a few of the countries engulfed in the Arab Spring that sprang last December.  According to Wikipedia, Syrian citizens jumped on the Arab Spring Express in March 2011.

March is four months into the Russian military training year.  And training year plans are laid out well before the new training year begins.  Thus, the Admiral Kuznetsov deployment was scheduled before the first Arab Spring demonstrations and protests even began.

So why are Russian and non-Russian news outlets so interested in this routine deployment?  The tagline that sells, it seems, is that Russia is racing to the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to support the failing Syrian regime.  Really?  How exactly?

• Showing the flag?  That mission could have been performed any time this past year by sending naval combatant ships and intelligence collection vessels from Russia's Black Sea Fleet to sit off the Syrian coast.  Russia's Black Sea Fleet has been to the Mediterranean Sea several times this year, and the only thing that came near Syria was the Amur-class floating repair vessel PM-56, which has been deployed to the Syrian port of Tartus for several few months.  It's not there to support the Syrian regime, but rather to provide support (if needed) for Russian Navy ships operating in the Mediterranean Sea.
  
• Gunboat diplomacy?  Despite its original specifications, Admiral Kuznetsov is no longer capable of firing SS-N-19 Shipwreck cruise missiles, the only surface-to-surface missile it was designed to carry; however, it is armed with surface-to-air missiles.  The accompanying combatants (Admiral Chabanenko, Yaroslav Mudryy, and (soon) Ladnyy) are armed with various surface-to-surface missiles (SS-N-22 Sunburn and SS-N-25 Switchblade), surface-to-air missiles, and heavy artillery.  If you plan to sink some enemy ships, then you have the right missiles.  If you plan to conduct precision attacks on key enemy strongholds well inside Syrian borders, you're out of luck.

So, to the reporters and other bloggers who are trying to create something from nothing:  while it's the season of miracles, a Russian Navy carrier strike group providing direct support to the failing Syrian regime is one present you won't find under your Christmas tree this year.

Now, if you really want to find something of interest to report, why not look at what will happen at the tail-end of the deployment... that will be something to see!