Saturday, June 13, 2015

Where in the World is "Admiral Panteleyev"?

Udaloy I destroyer "Admiral Panteleyev" - undated

On February 4, a Russian Navy Pacific Fleet surface action group led by Udaloy I-class destroyer "Admiral Panteleyev" departed Vladivostok for what was supposed to be a three-month deployment. That deployment has now stretched into its fifth month, and no one knows for sure when it will return to its home port.

The group, which also includes two auxiliary vessels (Dubna tanker "Pechenga" and Goryn rescue tug "SB-522"), was reported to be conducting training in the South China Sea a week later. The group was supposed to arrive in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, but that port call never happened due to changes in operational plans, according to an anonymous source.

Following a short port call in Sattahip, Thailand, in early March, a six-day port call in Langkawa, Malaysia, in mid-March, and a brief port call in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in late march, "Admiral Panteleyev" and its support vessels headed into the Indian Ocean. The official story ends when the ships departed Colombo on April 1.

The reason the Russian MOD has not released any new information on the group's whereabouts may be connected to the mission it is currently performing. On April 12, the MOD announced that Black Sea Fleet Vishnya intelligence collection ship SSV-201 "Priazovye" was involved in evacuating combat zone refuges from Yemen to Djibouti, even though the spy ship's participation began at least two weeks earlier. If the "Admiral Panteleyev" group were some how involved in an ongoing humanitary mission, one might expect the MOD to publicly tout the destroyer's efforts. But there has only been silence.

Social media, on the other hand, has provided a few clues. In early May, the destroyer was reportedly anchored near Africa, but not in a port. In early June, "Pechenga" made a port call in Salalah, Oman, to take on supplies before returning to the destroyer's location. It seems the destroyer hadn't moved from the same anchorage at which it arrived in May. While the exact whereabouts remain a mystery, according to one source, the ship is supposed to conduct a port call - somewhere - in the coming days. As for when it might return to Vladivostok, one source indicated mid-August as a likely time frame.

What is "Admiral Panteleyev" doing that is so secret?

MOD vs Zvezdochka Shipyard: Oscar II "Orel"

Oscar II submarine "Orel" undergoing dock repairs at 82nd Shipyard (Roslyakovo) - March 31, 2012
credit: avsky
On December 30, 2010, the Russian Ministry of Defense signed state contract R/1/2/0137/GK-11-DGOZ with Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center for service maintenance and repairs of Northern Fleet ships and submarines, to include Oscar II submarine "Orel", Sierra II submarine "Pskov", and Victor III submarines "Obninsk" and "Tambov". Costs included in the table of work to be performed on "Orel" totaled RUB 10,529,136. While the contract was signed in December 2010, the specific repairs for "Orel" were not approved by the MOD until May 22, 2012 - nearly 17 months after the contract was signed. According to the contract, all work under the contract was to be completed by December 31, 2012.

On December 25, 2014, the MOD filed papers with the Arbitration Court of Moscow seeking RUB 3,042,920 in compensation for the shipyard's failure to complete the agreed to work on "Orel" by the specified deadline. According to its complaint, the MOD stated that some elements of the submarine's repairs were not completed as of October 16, 2013, or 289 days after the contract deadline.

The court determined that nearly all contract line items for the "Orel" repairs were completed by the deadline. Two line items, totaling RUB 7,260,831, were completed by May 13, 2013. However, this delay was caused in part by the MOD's failure to finalize the specifics of the submarine's repairs as they related to those two line items until May 2012.

On April 2, 2015, the court issued its decision (A40-217314/2014) in which it found Zvezdochka was not authorized to unilaterally stop work under the contract, as it violated Articles 309 and 310 of the Russian State Code. The court, however, dismissed the MOD's claim that a contract having multiple line items can only be considered complete when all line items have been completed. Since the shipyard did complete all but two of the line items within the stated deadline, the court limited the shipyard's compensation to the MOD to RUB 500,000 (about 16% of what the MOD was seeking), plus another RUB 13,000 in court fees.

Within a few days, both sides filed appeals with the 9th Arbitration Appeals Court, which is scheduled to begin reviewing the case on July 7.

Sunday, June 7, 2015

Upgrading Barents Sea Undersea Surveillance

Sierra II nuclear-powered submarine "Kostroma" after collision with "USS Baton Rouge" in 1992
The Russian Ministry of Defense is planning to install a new, modernized MGK-608M fixed undersea surveillance system in the Barents Sea by the end of 2016. The announced contract covers the installation, set-up, and calibration of the system, but not the production of the system – which suggests that the system has already been produced. The contract also covers training of operators at the Northern Fleet’s Experimental Sonar Facility in Severomorsk. The total cost of the MOD contract is RUB 216,349,700.

Based on the contract (RA/1/04/Р/0347/2015), at-sea installation of the MGK-608M will be performed by a Northern Fleet cable ship. This most likely will be the fleet’s only operational Klasma-class cable ship – “Inguri”. The contract also contains other interesting details:

  • this MGK-608M will replace a prototype MGK-608M system installed some time earlier
  • there are passive and active elements of the system
  • the current passive section will be lengthened by 105 kilometers
  • the system will be connected to an Alevrit “functional surveillance control system” [procurement and installation of the Alevrit system is covered under state contract RA/1/04/Р/0346/2015]
  • the cable ship will spend 218 days in port and 50 days at sea loading, checking, installing, and calibrating elements of the system

An earlier version of the undersea surveillance system, MGK-608, has been in operation since the mid-1990s. Contracts for repairs of the MGK-608 in 2007-2008 indicate that the older system was still functional at that time.

Annual stockholder reports (2011-2013) for the Special Draft Design Bureau of Control Systems showed that the company was working on software improvements for MGK-608 systems under a State Defense Order for the “Severyanin” program; its efforts were to continue into 2015. Additionally, the reports indicated that the company has been working on a component of a Scientific Research Project (OKR) called “Silda” under state contract 253/10/8/К/0028-07 (signed September 28, 2007). The contract stipulated that work on OKR “Silda” was to occur between September 2007 and March 2015. Thus, while there appears to be a link between MGK-608, the “Severyanin” project, and OKR “Silda”, the link between these efforts and either the prototype or newer MGK-608M is not yet clear.

MGK-608E undersea surveillance system offered for export
(credit: Atoll Scientific Research Institute)

The MGK-608 has been offered for export (MGK-608E) by the Atoll Scientific Research Institute. According to the company’s website:

The MGK-608E fixed passive sonar system is made up of a number of linear phased antenna arrays, consisting of receiving elements (hydrophones), which are installed on the seabed and can be extended to a range of dozens or hundreds of kilometers from the shoreline.

The system, which has a reported 90% accuracy rate in detecting submarines, can be installed at a depth of up to 1,000 meters, with the hydrophones extending up to 200 kilometers from shore.

Locations of 1992-1993 submarine collisions in the Barents Sea
(credit: Wikipedia)

With claims of multiple detections of foreign submarines operating in the Barents Sea dating back as far as the 1960s, Russia views the presence of NATO submarines in the Barents Sea as a constant irritant. Submarine collisions in 1986, 1992, and 1993 have added to Moscow’s concerns that NATO boats regularly operate in their back yard with impunity. In August 2014, Russian submarines detected what they believed to be a Virginia-class submarine conducting operations in the Barents Sea. This February, Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer published an article written by Rear Admiral (retired) Sergey Zhandarov in which he stipulated that the U.S. Navy Virginia-class submarine “New Hampshire” operated in the Barents Sea for some period between February 11 and August 13, 2014, likely referring to the same submarine detection reported above.

Daily Operations Center at the National Defense Command Center - 2015
(credit: RF Ministry of Defense)

While installation of the newer MGK-608M undersea surveillance system may provide local officials improved warning of the presence of foreign submarines in the Barents Sea, it will also keep decision-makers at the new National Defense Command Center apprised of ongoing activity in the area as part of the growing Common State Maritime and Undersea Surveillance System (Rus: ЕГСОНПО). The MGK-608M, along with other sensors and data sources, will provide Moscow with a common operating picture of activities occurring in and around Russia. Not only will duty officers in Moscow be informed in near-real time when the fleet has detected a foreign submarine, they will be able to monitor the fleet's response to the intruder, as well.

Monday, June 1, 2015

Russia’s Anonymous Sources Try to Sink U.S. Destroyer

"USS Ross" conducting northbound transit of Turkish Straits – May 23, 2015
[credit: Yörük Işık]
Russian news outlets were overly active this weekend recycling and enhancing a story that originated from two anonymous sources who want you to believe that a U.S. destroyer operated in, or extremely close to, Russia’s territorial waters until it was chased away by fighter-bombers – all while the U.S. Secretary of Defense and Russian Deputy Minister of Defense were both in Singapore discussing security in the Asia-Pacific region.

The U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyer “USS Ross” (DDG 71) entered the Black Sea on May 23 to “work closely with [U.S.] allies and partners to enhance maritime security, readiness, and naval capability, and to promote peace and stability in the region.” The U.S. destroyer is the latest in a long series of naval ships from the U.S. and other foreign nations to regularly operate in international waters in the Black Sea much to the dismay of Russia. Moscow considers naval operations by non-Black Sea littoral countries – more specifically by NATO countries – in the Black Sea to be provocative.

After completing drills with Romanian naval forces on May 28, the destroyer continued independent operations in the Black Sea, apparently in the vicinity of the Crimean Peninsula. On May 30, RIA Novosti (aka MIA Russia Today) published a news article in which an unnamed “source in a Crimean power structure” reported that Black Sea Fleet SU-24 Fencer fighter-bombers were scrambled and successfully “forced” the U.S. destroyer, which was operating in a “provocative and aggressive” manner, “to depart for neutral waters in the eastern portion of the Black Sea.”

As the source never said “USS Ross” was operating within Russia’s territorial waters, this story could be characterized as routine activity for the two nations’ navies as viewed by an excitable RIA Novosti anonymous source. But then the source loses all credibility when he says that the “Americans have not forgotten the incident in April 2014 when one SU-24 actually ‘shut down’ all of the instruments on the new American destroyer ‘USS Donald Cook’, which has ballistic missile defense elements.” Even the Russian Ministry of Defense had to chuckle at that version of the April event.

Seeing an opportunity to prove it’s still relevant, Pravda.ru, masquerading as Politonline.ru, published its own amazing details in an article titled ‘SU-24s Almost Sink NATO Destroyer in Black Sea’. According to its article, the U.S. destroyer was “lit up by a ‘Bastion’ system from a Black Sea Fleet missile ship.” That’s a mistake – Bastion is a coastal defense cruise missile, not a sea-based weapon. The article goes on to say, citing an unnamed “highly-placed” MOD source, that “USS Ross” was within 50 meters of the “border” – presumably Russia’s territorial waters.

What’s strange is that both anonymously-sourced reports would have you remember, but then forget, that one or more Russian naval ships, armed with guns and anti-ship cruise missiles, were trailing the U.S. destroyer at the time. This raises several obvious questions:

  • Why did the escorts not operate between Crimea and the destroyer to prevent the latter from entering or coming that close to Russian territorial waters?
  • Why were SU-24s scrambled to deal with the incursion? Where the escorts incapable of dealing with that mission?
  • Why would the destroyer even attempt such a dangerous undertaking knowing that the Crimean-based SSC-5 Stooge and SSC-6 Sennight coastal defense cruise missiles, as well as the escort ships and land-based fighter-bombers, could and likely would respond to an incursion?

If this incident occurred on Friday or Saturday, then it would have coincided with the Shangri-La Dialogue security summit in Singapore, which was attended by U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Anatoliy Antonov. And Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s introduction of former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili as governor of the Odessa region.

Did SU-24s fly near “USS Ross” as it operated in the Black Sea? Yes, as the U.S. 6th Fleet confirmed on Sunday. No official statement has yet been made by either side as to exactly when and where this activity occurred. The RF Ministry of Defense and Ministry for Foreign Affairs have been silent about the “incident” all weekend – probably because no serious “incident” actually occurred. The official websites for both agencies were open for business and publishing news over the weekend, but not a single mention of any "incident."

RF Ministry for Foreign Affairs silent on Black Sea "incident"

But “non-incidents” don’t sell newspapers, nor do they generate advertising money. So, expect both Russian and non-Russian media outlets alike to rehash the event on Monday as they bring in “experts” (with no reliable access to the details of the event) who will state unequivocally that Russia or the U.S. or NATO (depending on which country you’re in) is destabilizing regional security in the Black Sea. Expect flashy, nonsensical headlines, like “NATO-Russia Cold War Stand-Off in Black Sea” or “Did Putin Order Strike on U.S. Destroyer?”

It would be interesting to attend the next INCSEA [English] [Russian] talks to hear what either side has to say about the most recent event... if anything.

Monday, May 25, 2015

If a Target Sinks Before You Strike It, Does It Make a Noise?

*** updated on May 26 to provide additional details of launch location ***

"PM-140" sinking before being used as a CDCM target -- May 22, 2015

On May 16, an area closure in the Sea of Japan was announced for May 20-23 and was designated for missile firings.

HYDROPAC 1618/15

SEA OF JAPAN.
RUSSIA.
MISSILES.
DNC 23, DNC 24.
1. HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS 2200Z TO 1000Z
COMMENCING DAILY 20 THRU 22 MAY
IN AREA BOUND BY
41-38.5N 132-43.6E, 42-32.0N 132-51.0E,
42-41.0N 133-02.2E, 42-39.4N 133-19.0E,
42-01.3N 134-11.5E, 41-40.0N 133-32.0E.
2. CANCEL THIS MSG 231100Z MAY 15.//

Authority: NAVAREA XI 350/15 161746Z MAY 15.

Date: 161748Z May 15
Cancel: 23110000 May 15

Missile launch area closure -- May 20-23, 2015

Given that the area closure covers land, it was logical to assume it would be used for the launch of a coastal defense cruise missile (CDCM). The range between the two farthest points measures approximately 120 kilometers (65 nautical miles). The last Russian CDCM launch in the Sea of Japan occurred on April 28, when at least one SSC-6 Sennight (Russian: 3K60 Bal) was launched from a position adjacent to the Shepalovo recreational facility - about 21 kilometers (11.5 nautical miles) southeast of Nakhodka. The area closure for the April launch was longer - nearly 170 kilometers (92 nautical miles) between the farthest points - and narrower than this month's area closure.

Pictures posted to the internet on May 26, but dated May 21, show an SSC-6 being deployed to the vicinity of Cape Povorotnyy.

SSC-6 Sennight deployed near Cape Povorotnyy -- May 21, 2015
SSC-6 Sennight deployed near Cape Povorotnyy -- May 21, 2015
Using the towers as visual clues, we can easily find them within the announced area closure and can project the general launch position.

Northernmost portion of SSC-6 Sennight area closure
Cape Povorotnyy radar/communications towers
Cape Povorotnyy radar/communications towers
Cape Povorotnyy radar/communications towers, reoriented towards the sea to match the SSC-6 launcher images above

Cape Povorotnyy has been a popular site for earlier CDCM launches, as these photos from 1992 and 1994 show..

CDCM launch from Cape Povorotnyy -- 1992
CDCM launch from Cape Povorotnyy -- 1994

Despite the differences in size and configuration, it's evident that another CDCM launch was planned. Had another SSC-6 launch occurred, one would have expected naval officials to tout the second successful launch of the missile. Yet there have been no reports from the Russian Navy about any CDCM launch this past week.

The mystery behind the silence may be the premature sinking of the target ship for the exercise, retired Amur-class floating workshop "PM-140".

According to a video uploaded to YouTube on May 23, the target ship sank while being towed by Sorum-class oceangoing tug "MB-37". Subsequent internet chatter indicated the launch of an SSC-6 was scheduled for May 22, but the loss of "PM-140" forced fleet officials to quickly find a replacement target ship and try again on the next day, which, according to one source, most likely occurred.



Since retiring, "PM-140" had served as a target ship during multiple anti-ship cruise missile and artillery events. Since all strikes occurred well above the waterline, the ship was able to be towed back to port and reused during subsequent exercises.

"PM-140" used as target ship during "Vostok-2010" exercise -- June 26, 2010
"PM-140" waiting for its last missile exercise -- April 7, 2015

What was the replacement target? And why hasn't the Pacific Fleet issued a press release about the latest launch of its newest CDCM - if, in fact, there was a launch on May 23?

Friday, May 22, 2015

"Admiral Kuznetsov" Taking a Long Nap

"Admiral Kuznetsov" being loaded into 82nd Shipyard floating dry dock (May 14, 2015)

On May 13, the Russian Navy's sole aircraft carrier, "Admiral Kuznetsov", was towed to the 82nd Shipyard in Roslyakovo for out-of-water maintenance. The next day, the Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier was placed in the shipyard's PD-50 floating dock.

The question on everyone's mind is: how long will repairs last? Fleet officials would only say that workers needed to complete a survey of the ship before they could determine the full scope of work and finalize work orders.

Today, the first 13 contracts for the aircraft carrier's repairs were released. Based on a review of the contracts, it appears "Admiral Kuznetsov" will be out of business until at least December 2016. The combined total cost of the initial contracts: RUB 1,308,808,984. Below is a breakdown of the contractual information.

Time Costs (RUB) Description
May 2015        607,360 survey of Svetlana-2N and Svetlana-23N.5 systems
May 2015     2,845,300 repairs of piping and sea chests
May 2015        986,000 repairs of 3D12AL main engine
Jun 2015     7,663,811 repairs of gas turbine generators
Aug 2015   93,768,131 repairs of Svetlana-2N system
Aug 2015     2,974,414 repairs of heating and separation systems of bilge water separators
Sep 2015   99,963,064 repairs of coolant machinery
May 2016 675,578,027 repairs of environmental systems
Nov 2016 167,394,664 repairs of navigation systems and equipment
Nov 2016   16,443,429 repairs of self-degaussing equipment
Dec 2016   31,403,960 repairs of Compartment 7 equipment
Dec 2016   97,180,824 repairs of radar and sonar systems
Dec 2016 112,000,000 repairs of NTsV pumps

Saturday, May 9, 2015

Baltic Fleet Tries to Forget the "Steregushchiy" Fire

"Steregushchiy" undergoing routine dock repairs, early 2015
credit: RF Baltic Fleet
What was supposed to be a somewhat routine exercise in mid-April turned into a real emergency for one of the Baltic Fleet's newest combatants.

Prior to the exercise, Steregushchiy-class frigate "Steregushchiy" had completed a routine 59-day out-of-water repair period at the Yantar Baltic Shipyard in Kaliningrad before returning to Baltiysk Naval Base on March 21. According to the March 21 edition of the fleet's newspaper, Strazh Baltiki (released the same day as the frigate's return to Baltiysk), shipyard work included repairs to hull fittings, propellers, the main engine, and diesel engines, as well as a fresh coat of paint. The ship's commanding officer, Captain 3rd Rank Aleskey Suslov, told the newspaper that "Steregushchiy" was to complete all combat certifications by the end of April.

On April 17, 2015, the Western Military District press service issued a press statement regarding a recently held anti-air and antisubmarine warfare exercise involving all four of the Baltic Fleet's Steregushchiy-class frigates: "Boykiy", Soobrazitelnyy", "Stoykiy", and "Steregushchiy". Also included in the list of participants were two firefighting vessels, an AN-26 Curl fixed-wing transport, and a KA-27 Helix helicopter. The inclusion of firefighting vessels in live-fire exercises seemed odd until you reached the end of the article in which the press release stated that the ships also practiced "rendering assistance to one of the ships, which was simulating a casualty."

It should be no surprise that even before the press release was broadcast by the major Russian news outlets, hints of a true emergency on board "Steregushchiy" began to leak out. According to one source, "Steregushchiy" was supposed to be underway for four days, but the frigate was forced to return within six hours of getting underway due to a fire. Two weeks later, a different source indicated the fire may have started after fuel somehow entered the frigate's exhaust funnel. That source also indicated there were some injuries, although the exact nature of the injuries and the number of injured personnel were not provided.

It is not known whether the AN-26 and KA-27 were part of the exercise, part of the response to the fire on "Steregushchiy", or both.

Thus, the Western Military District's inclusion of firefighting vessels and the rescue drill in its press release appears to be an attempt to cover up a response to an actual at-sea emergency. With NATO's Baltic partners keeping a vigilant eye on Russian military activity in the region, the Russian military press officers have to quickly devise explanations for any unusual military activity, such as an accident. Sometimes, however, their explanations fail.