Russian Navy Exercise in Eastern Mediterranean Sea

Flight ban (yellow) and flight route restrictions (red) for Russian Navy combat drills -- January 8-11, 2016

In late January, flight bans and route restrictions were announced for a Russian Navy exercise:

A0037/16 - RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE (ROCKET TEST FIRINGS) WILL TAKE PLACE IN AREA BOUNDED BY:
344400N0345800E
351300N0345800E
351300N0353300E
344400N0353300E
THE AREA INCLUDES BUFFER ZONE. SFC - FL660, 0500-1500, 08 FEB 05:00 2016 UNTIL 11 FEB 15:00 2016.

A0039/16 - DUE TO RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE AS REFERED IN NOTAM A0037/16 THE FOLLOWING AIRWAYS WILL BE CLOSED:
W/UW17 (BALMA-NIKAS)
R/UR78, M/UM978 (ALSUS-NIKAS)
BTN SFC-FL660. 0500-1500, 08 FEB 05:00 2016 UNTIL 11 FEB 15:00 2016.

The flight ban and flight route restrictions are identical to those used before by the Russian Navy.

While there has been no official statement by military public affairs representatives about the exercise, there are two naval combatants operating in the eastern Mediterranean Sea that could utilize the area: Slava-class cruiser "Varyag" (Pacific Fleet) and Udaloy I-class destroyer "Vitse-Admiral Kulakov" (Northern Fleet). Last month, the destroyer conducted anti-air warfare training that included simulated surface-to-air missile and gunnery drills.

Follow-Up: Drafting Commercial Ships into the Russian Navy

"Kazan-60" in Sevastopol --- January 12, 2016
(credit: Andrey Brichevskiy)

Four commercial ships that were commissioned into the Russian Navy three months ago have made several trips between Russia and Syria. But a few of them have already required repairs since joining the fleet. Here is a brief update on their condition:

• "Dvinitsa-50" has completed at least two missions to Syria and appears to be operational. It was noted loading cargo earlier this month probably in preparation for another trip to Tartus, Syria.


• "Kazan-60", has never been noted by Turkish shipspotters transiting the Turkish Straits since joining the Russian Navy. On January 12, this vessel was photographed at the 13th Shipyard.


• On December 24, "Kyzyl-60", which was returning from its first mission to Syria, was photographed being towed by Black Sea Fleet tug "MB-31" northbound through the Turkish Straits. The vessel was towed to the 13th Shipyard in Sevastopol, where it remains today, to undergo unspecified repairs.


• "Vologda-50" has completed at least three missions and also appears to be operational.

"Aleksandr Tkachenko" undergoing dock repairs in Sevastopol
(credit: United Shipbuilding Corporation)

While not part of the Russian Navy, the cargo vessel "Aleksandr Tkachenko", which also has ferried cargo between Russia and Syria, recently completed dock repairs at Sevastopol Shipyard. Following post-repair sea trials on January 16-17, the ship began an easterly transit towards Novorossiysk.

"Aleksandr Tkachev" at-sea activities --- January 16-18, 2016

While a recent decrease in known ferrying activities may have been associated with the winter holiday season, it also may have been linked to the condition of some of the vessels tasked to perform such missions.

RF Navy Will Soon Receive Sixth-Gen Communications Systems

Aleksandr Sergeyevich Yakunin - General Director, United Instrument-Building Corporation

[translation of select portions of RIA Novosti article: Aleksandr Yakunin: Within a Year and a Half, We Will Be Ready to Fully Transition to Sixth Generation Technologies]

...

Many of our developments are on the cusp of the fifth and sixth generations. Within a year to year and a half, we will be ready to fully transition to sixth generation technologies. First and foremost, these will be software-defined radio (SDR) technologies, where communications quality will be achieved through software, and not by a device's internals. Software will allow communications characteristics, such as multi-mode, multi-spectrum, and security against intercept by an adversary, to be implemented at a new level.

The first prototypes of such radio stations have already been produced for the Ground Troops. If we're talking about concrete deliveries, then in 2016 the Russian Navy will receive the first advanced communications systems for upgrading existing ships. In 2018, deliveries will begin of sixth generation communications systems for advanced Navy submarines and ships currently under development. At about this time, a new sixth generation system will be ready for the Aerospace Defense Forces, specifically for the Advanced Long-Range Aviation Aircraft Complex (PAK DA). Because of the new device, an aircraft will be able to operate in concealed modes and remain undetected by enemy radars.

Due to a high level of automation and "smart" software, such technology makes operator errors unlikely. It is more powerful, works farther, and provides faster, protected communications. It has unlimited options for upgrading without altering the design - through software improvements alone.

...

The United Instrument-Building Corporation has developed a concept for configuration of a Common Information Space in the Arctic. This is a set of measures for developing a communications infrastructure and various types of monitoring. Using them, Russia will be able to monitor the movements of seaborne, airborne, and space targets in real time, and to track foreign nation activities in the air, on the sea and under the sea, from a near-earth orbit. It is an intelligent system, which will be able to provide necessary recommendations and automatically control various monitoring resources. If needed, it will be capable of targeting and passing guidance data to various weapons systems.

[Are these just plans, or are there already real projects?]

Concrete steps are already being made. Specifically, we have already produced the necessary framework for a radio-electronic surveillance and signals intelligence system in the Arctic. Monitoring resources on various platforms can be used for these purposes - ships, submarines, UAVs, aerostats, aircraft, and satellites. We will be able to reliably determine the types of transiting ships (military or commercial), the weapons on board these ships, radio-electronic tracking devices, etc.

Additionally, a large project is being implemented for the Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command. Under this project, in 2016 the Rodnik satellite communications system will begin to be combined with shore-based communications resources to control aircraft, ships and submarines in the Arctic zone. We also are preparing a design for a Northern Fleet Joint Strategic Command automated communications control system for Russia's Arctic grouping of troops. Under this design, all governmental and corporate communications and control systems in the Arctic region will be combined into a Common Information Space.

...

In 2016, we will be begin creating a cluster in St. Petersburg, which will comprise eight companies. It will primarily specialize in manufacturing devices for the Navy, shore-based communications stations (including communications with deep-water equipment), radio-electronic intelligence and monitoring systems, automated communications control systems, and telecommunications technologies. More than RUB 3.5 billion has been invested in its development. As a result, the range of products being manufactured will increase 150%, and the quantity of items being produced will increase 200%.

Follow-Up 1: Why Did "Rostov-na-Donu" Return to the Baltic Sea?

It has become much clearer over the past three weeks why Kilo-class submarine "Rostov-na-Donu" made its mysterious port call in Kronshtadt. And it's bad news for ISIS/ISIL, FSA, or whomever Russian forces are targeting in Syria these days. As one blog reader opined, "Don't you think that stories about its malfunction was just a rumor, and in reality the submarine came for specific items that later can be [launched] from warmer waters?"

As a recap, "Rostov-na-Donu" pulled into Kronshtadt on October 29 - the 14th day of its inter-fleet transit from Polyarnyy to Novorossiysk. Claims by both official and anonymous sources covered everything from "topping off supplies of all types to required norms" to repairing broken equipment. It seems the official sources were correct.

Based on drone video, "Rostov-na-Donu" tied up at this pier in Kronshtadt

While in Kronshtadt, heightened security was put into place, limiting access to the submarine's location. However, a few adventurous photographers and one amateur drone did record enough evidence showing that missiles were handled during the submarine's visit. Given the high level of security, one might conclude that it was more likely that missiles were loaded than offloaded.

Circles indicate cylindrical objects and open torpedo tubes/loading device on "Rostov-na-Donu"

The above two images, taken from a drone flying nearby, show a floating crane ("PK-175") positioned on the opposite side of the pier where "Rostov-na-Donu" had tied up in Kronshtadt. The floating crane, assisted by three harbor tugs, transferred from Admiralty Shipyards to Kronshtadt on October 28 - the day before the submarine's arrival. Multiple long, cylindrical objects are visible on the deck of the floating crane, and the submarine's torpedo tubes are open with a possible weapons loading device attached.

Circles indicate cylindrical objects on deck of floating crane

Clearer images taken on November 4, the day the submarine departed Kronshtadt, show the cylindrical objects were visible on the deck of the floating crane. Also visible on the submarine was the flag of an embarked senior naval officer. Looking back at all the photos taken of the first Kalibr-capable Kilo submarine to transfer to the Black Sea Fleet, "Novorossiysk", it is evident that this flag was never flown at any point during its departure from Polyarnyy, during its port calls in Ceuta, Spain, and Oran, Algeria, or during its arrival in Novorossiysk and subsequent transfer to Sevastopol. The flag appears to have one star, indicating a "commander of a formation" (командир соединения) is on board. The 4th Independent Submarine Brigade, which stood up in December 2014 as the new parent command for the Black Sea Fleet's submarines, qualifies as a "formation" (соединение). Thus, it is possible that the brigade's commander, Captain 1st Rank Magaram Yagishevich Adigyuzelov, or his designated representative may have embarked in Kronshtadt for the submarine's transit.

The RF Ministry of Defense did not report on the submarine's departure until November 5. It did state, however, that "Rostov-na-Donu" would now arrive in Novorossiysk by the end of November. This differs from the MOD's earlier reporting that the submarine would arrive in Novorossiysk in early December. Thus, despite the time it took to divert from its previous transit route (~1,000nm from the North Sea to Kronshtadt + ~1,000nm back) plus the seven days it spent in Kronshtadt, the new arrival time is now one-two weeks sooner than first reported. In order to transfer from Kronshtadt to Novorossiysk by November 30, the submarine would have to travel ~5,250nm in 26 days, which equates to a speed of 8.4 knots - not an unreasonable speed. It also suggests, however, that there is no time provided for any foreign port calls as they would increase the overall speed needed to complete the transit by the end of the month. Of course, the time frame provided for completion of the transit simply could have been misstated.

The Dutch Navy keeping an eye on "Rostov-na-Donu"

Two weeks later, on November 17, Russian business news agency RosBiznesKonsalting erroneously reported that "Rostov-na-Donu" had launched land-attack cruise missiles from the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The article was reproduced by some notable media outlets, such as Delovoy Peterburg, Gazeta.ru, Kommersant, and Rosbalt.ru. If this were true, the submarine would have had to travel at an overall speed of nearly 16 knots for 13 straight days direct from Kronshtadt in order to launch missiles from the eastern Mediterranean Sea. However, the submarine was being monitored by Dutch naval ships as it transited south through the English Channel near the Netherlands on November 11. Thus, "Rostov-na-Donu" would have had to travel in excess of 19 knots for six straight days from the North Sea in order to reach the eastern Mediterranean Sea by November 17. Finally, the RF MOD has never reported that the submarine launched land-attack cruise missiles, something it most certainly would have done. Despite the improbability of "Rostov-na-Donu" launching missiles from the eastern Mediterranean Sea on or before November 17, RBK has neither edited nor retracted its article.

Flight bans and flight route restrictions

Earlier this month, flight bans and flight route restrictions were announced for Russian Navy exercise being held in the eastern Mediterranean Sea:

A1459/15 - RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE (ROCKET TEST FIRINGS) WILL TAKE PLACE IN AREA:
344400N0345800E
351300N0345800E
351300N0353300E
344400N0353300E
THE AREA INCLUDES BUFFER ZONE. SFC - FL660, 14-16 AND 21-23 0500-1500, 14 NOV 05:00 2015 UNTIL 23 NOV 15:00 2015. CREATED: 09 NOV 10:37 2015

A1460/15 - DUE TO RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE AS REFERED IN NOTAM LCCC A1459/15 THE FOLLOWING AIRWAYS WILL BE CLOSED BETWEEN SFC-FL660:
1.W/UW17(BALMA-NIKAS)
2.R/UR78, M/UM978 (ALSUS-NIKAS. 14-16 AND 21-23 0500-1500, 14 NOV 05:00 2015 UNTIL 23 NOV 15:00 2015. CREATED: 09 NOV 10:41 2015

A1499/15 - RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE (ROCKET TEST FIRINGS) WILL TAKE PLACE IN AREA:
344400N0345800E
351300N0345800E
351300N0353300E
344400N0353300E
THE AREA INCLUDES BUFFER ZONE. SFC - FL660, 0500-1500, 24 NOV 05:00 2015 UNTIL 26 NOV 15:00 2015. CREATED: 19 NOV 09:20 2015

A1500/15 - DUE TO RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE AS REFERED IN NOTAM LCCC A1499/15 THE FOLLOWING AIRWAYS WILL BE CLOSED BETWEEN SFC-FL660:
1.W/UW17(BALMA-NIKAS)
2.R/UR78, M/UM978 (ALSUS-NIKAS. 0500-1500, 24 NOV 05:00 2015 UNTIL 26 NOV 15:00 2015. CREATED: 19 NOV 09:34 2015

A1510/15 - RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE WILL TAKE PLACE IN AREA BOUNDED BY
353200N0353200E
341600N0340000E
334410N0343606E
THEN FOLLOWING THE FIR BOUNDARY TO 353200N0353200E
THE AREA INCLUDES BUFFER ZONE. SFC - FL660, 21 NOV 00:01 2015 UNTIL 23 NOV 23:59 2015. CREATED: 20 NOV 15:37 2015

A1511/15 - DUE TO RUSSIAN NAVY EXERCISE AS REFERRED IN NOTAM LCCC A1510/15, THE FOLLOWING AIRWAYS WILL BE CLOSED:
W/UW17(BALMA-NIKAS)
R/UR78,M/UM978(ALSUS-NIKAS)
W/UW10,L/UL619(VESAR-NIKAS)
B/UB15,L/UL620(ALSUS-BALMA)
R/UR18(VELOX-ALSUS)
R/UR19(LCA-KUKLA)
R/UR655,M/UM601(LCA-BALMA)
P/UP42(DESPO-MERVA)
G/UG2(VELOX-ELIKA)
SFC-FL660. 21 NOV 00:01 2015 UNTIL 23 NOV 23:59 2015. CREATED: 20 NOV 16:34 2015

Flight ban areas defined in A1459/15 and A1499/15 are identical to those previously announced for similar Russian Navy exercises. Flight ban area A1510/15 is of interest as it is not known to have been used before for Russian Navy exercises. And while all of these bans expire on or before November 26, there is no reason to believe they would not be reannounced, if needed.

Of course, it would be easy to draw a direct correlation between the flight bans (those already announced and those that could be announced in the near future) and the unusual "Rostov-na-Donu" story. But...

• Would Moscow really announce to the world the launch location and missile flight path of a future land-attack cruise missile strike?
• Does the geography of the Mediterranean Sea, coupled with large number of international air and maritime traffic routes, necessitate the announcement of flight bans and route restrictions for land-attack cruise missiles strikes?
• Could these flight bans serve to distract potential foreign observers away from the true launch location?

Why Did "Rostov-na-Donu" Return to the Baltic Sea?

Screenshot of Ilya Kurganov blog posting -- October 29, 2015

Very early this morning, St. Petersburg blogger Ilya Kurganov (citing unnamed "navy officials") reported that Kilo-class submarine "Rostov-na-Donu" had arrived in Kronshtadt for unscheduled repairs of its electrical plant. According to the blogger:

"...it began its scheduled transfer to its home port of Novorossiysk on October 16, 2015, but within literally a few days it was necessary to call for a rescue tug, with which it headed to a location where unscheduled repairs will be performed by technicians from Admiralty Shipyards, where the submarine was built."

Interfax, citing an unknown source in the shipbuilding industry, confirmed that the submarine is in the Baltic Sea, but the source would only say that "it was forced to return to the Baltic for technical reasons." Finally, Admiralty Shipyards denied that any Russian Navy officials had contacted the shipyard to provide any technical assistance to the submarine.

Taking a closer look at the Ilya's blog post, we see:

• The submarine was not in Kronshtadt when the blog posting was published. "Rostov-na-Donu" and the rescue tug, "SB-406", did not arrive in Kronshtadt until 11:50 this morning (local time), nearly 11 hours after the blog posting was published.
• It was towed to Kronshtadt instead of Admiralty Shipyards, which is located less than 20 miles from Kronshtadt. Why would shipyard technicians have to travel to Kronshtadt to repair the submarine when the submarine could be repaired more easily at the shipyard where it was built? Vietnamese Navy Kilo submarine "Da Nang" left the shipyard yesterday, so there is plenty of room to accommodate "Rostov-na-Donu".
• If this happened "within literally a few days" of its October 16 departure from Polyarnyy, why was it not towed back to Polyarnyy vice towing it to Kronshtadt - and, again, not even the shipyard that built it? Why risk any other mechanical failures over the course of another week or so of transit time?

In summary, Ilya's reporting doesn't add up, and it's hard to tell who's to blame: Ilya, his sources, or both.

Minutes before the submarine and tug moored in Kronshtadt, a Ministry of Defense official told Interfax that the purpose of the submarine's visit to Kronshtadt was to take on supplies. That makes little sense as the first Kilo submarine to transfer to the Black Sea this year, "Novorossiysk", was able to make it all the way from Polyarnyy to Ceuta, Spain, before having to take on fresh supplies.

This has all the appearance of a public affairs failure that has been noted before. Earlier this year, the Western Military District press service tried, but failed to cover up an actual emergency on board Steregushchiy-class frigate "Steregushchiy" during at-sea training. And military officials have yet to officially discuss what happened on board Delta IV-class ballistic missile submarine "Bryansk" in July 2015 when a crew member drowned in the submarine's sail.

Drafting Commercial Ships into the Russian Navy

"Alican Deval" (aka "Dvinitsa-50") underway in Novorossiysk - October 10, 2015
(credit: Oleg Sushkov)

Moscow apparently has figured out that landing ships are not the most effective way to move large numbers of vehicles and other military hardware to Syria. According to a blog linked to the Center for the Analysis of Strategy and Technology, as many as eight commercial vessels were recently purchased for use by the Russian Navy. The ships will be manned by a mix of military and civilian sailors. As many have noted, military ships, which include the newly acquired commercial vessels flying the Russian Navy flag, are not subject to at-sea inspections.

Last AIS position broadcast for "Alican Deval" -- October 11, 2015

The first newly acquired cargo vessel, "Alican Deval", arrived in Novorossiysk on October 7 and was last noted transmitting AIS from the same location at 13:58 UTC on October 11. The last position placed it at the Novorossiysk Trans-Shipping Transportation/Expeditionary Company (NUTEP, for short) [Новороссийское Узловое Транспортно-Экспедиционное Предприятие - НУТЭП]. On October 14, the vessel, now renamed "Dvinitsa-50", was photographed heading south through the Turkish Straits by Alper Boler (@alperboler) and Yörük Işık (@YorukIsik). To date, there have been no known AIS transmissions from a vessel named "Dvinitsa-50".

"Dvinitsa-50" (formerly "Alican Deval") heading south through the Turkish Straits -- October 14, 2015
(credit: Yörük Işık)

"Dvinitsa-50" (formerly "Alican Deval") heading south through the Turkish Straits -- October 14, 2015
(credit: Alper Boler)

A second vessel, which arrived in Novorossiysk by October 10, has been renamed "Kyzyl-60". On October 18, it transferred from NUTEP to the neighboring Novorossiysk Naval Base and could depart port at any time to begin its first cargo transfer mission to Syria. And a third vessel bearing the new name "Kazan-60" also appeared in Novorossiysk by October 18. As with "Dvinitsa-50", neither of these two new additions to the Russian Navy are broadcasting via AIS.

Formation of crews to man these new naval auxiliary ships only recently began. However, not all prospective crew members are satisfied with conditions on board the former commercial vessels. On October 9, a boiler plant technician on the Russian Black Sea Fleet's cable ship "Setun" was ordered to report to Novorossiysk to serve as Third Engineer on "Dvinitsa-50". After a brief inspection he determined that only two of the ship's three diesel generators worked, but both of them also had problems. Having discovered other material issues, the sailor complained up the chain of command, where his complaints were met with profanity and accusations of him being a coward and a traitor. On October 10, he signed a resignation letter that effectively ended his civilian naval career. He has since appealed to the Black Sea Fleet Prosecutor's Office to look into the incident.

Kalibr vs Klub: There's a Difference

Defense News' "Is Caspian Sea Fleet a Game-Changer?" article from October 11 demonstrates a confusion between Russian missile systems that has plagued other articles published following the October 7 launch of long-range land-attack cruise missiles by Russian Navy ships operating in the Caspian Sea. The main thing to remember is that Kalibr is the name assigned to the Russian domestic version of a missile complex that can launch several types of missiles (3M14 [SS-N-30 land-attack cruise missile], 3M54 [SS-N-27 anti-ship cruise missile], and 91R [antisubmarine missile]), while Klub is the name assigned to the export version of the same missile complex.

Other confusing points include:

"The inland sea features naval forces from the four bordering countries — Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkmenistan in addition to Russia..."
-- It's actually five, if you include Kazakhstan.

"...the Kalibr long-range version has only recently reached operational status."
-- Relatively recently; it reached operational status when the first launch platform, Gepard-class frigate "Dagestan", was commissioned in November 2012.

"But until now it was not clear that smaller ships, including the Project 21631 Buyan-M corvettes that also took part in the Oct. 7 attacks, could operate the weapon."
-- There should be nothing unclear about this. The first two units of the Sviyazhsk class of guided missile patrol combatants, "Grad Sviyazhsk" and "Uglich", were delivered to the RF Ministry of Defense in December 2013 after sea trials and state testing, which included launches of the SS-N-27 and SS-N-30. The ships were subsequently commissioned into the RF Navy and joined the Caspian Flotilla in July 2014. The third unit, "Velikiy Ustyug" was delivered to the RF Ministry of Defense in November 2014 following a similar sea trials + state testing period; it was commissioned into the RF Navy and joined the Caspian Flotilla the next month.

"This was not a missile seen as being normally carried by the corvettes, which had [shorter-range] Klub missiles as opposed to the land-attack version..."
-- None of the Sviyazhsk ships were ever armed with the Klub missile complex.

"So far, the Vietnamese versions do not seem to be armed with the Kalibr missile."
-- Again, Kalibr = domestic; Klub = export.

"The six Buyan-M corvettes were known to be fitted with an eight-cell vertical launch system mounted amidships, capable of launching the SS-N-27 Klub[1] missile, but this is the first demonstration[2] of their ability to use the longer-range Kalibr."
-- [1] Should be 'Kalibr'; [2] Except for all the launches performed as part of pre-acceptance state testing.