Thursday, January 29, 2015

XLT+: Could Engine Fire on "Admiral Gorshkov" Impact "Admiral Kasatonov" Delivery?

Gorshkov frigate "Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov" at Northern Shipyard - January 23, 2015
(credit: Curious)
                                                   [translation of FlotProm news article]

ENGINE ON "ADMIRAL GORSHKOV" FRIGATE DESTROYED BY FIRE DUE TO CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE
January 28, 2015
http://flotprom.ru/2015/181758/

The Central Naval Portal (CNP) has learned that an accident involving an engine on the new frigate "Admiral Flota Gorshkov", built at Northern Shipyard for the Russian Navy, was caused by the failure of a control system.

A CNP journalist learned from the Saturn Scientific Production Association, which is performing a survey and subsequent repairs of the engine, that the primary theory behind the failure was abnormal performance of the control system which led to the engine being flooded with fuel, after which it caught fire.

The fact that the engine on the Russian Project 22350 frigate "Admiral Gorshkov" required repairs was reported on December 29, 2014. On December 17, Northern Shipyard announced it was accepting bids for a 24-million-ruble contract for disassembling and surveying the ship's gas turbine engine.

According to a Saturn official, an assessment of the loss and inspection of the damaged engine pieces will last until March 2015 as company workers are not familiar with the engine's design. It is too early to announce when repairs will be completed and when fully operational engine pieces will be available.

The accident theory has been confirmed by another CNP source within the shipbuilding industry who has information about the accident. "The fuel pump did not shut off in time. There was a surge, and blades in the engine were damaged by the fire. The turbine has been removed and shipped to Rybinsk (location of Saturn Scientific Production Association - ed.) for repairs," the source said, noting that this occurred in September 2014.

Additionally, similar information has been reported by yet another knowledgeable shipbuilding industry source. He said that the control system failure could have been the result of a design error. "The turbine needs to undergo capital repairs; the blades were damaged by the fire. The problem was with the control system's performance. It was, most likely, a design error," he explained.

This opinion is shared by a Northern Shipyard employee. "The control system malfunctioned even though it functioned normally prior to this," the company specialist noted.

The design of the frigate engine's control system is Avrora Scientific Production Association Concern. Avrora informed CNP that the customer has not contacted the company regarding any complaints resulting from the mishap and pointed out that talking about the causes of the mishap can only be done after an official conclusion is made by experts.

Northern Shipyard's press office claims that there have been and currently are no problems with the ship or its equipment. "Our position is very simple. 'Gorshkov' completed the first phase of testing. And that's our position," stated the press office, adding that during the sea trials, the ship demonstrated specified numbers in accordance with technical specifications.

The fire-damaged M90FR gas turbine engine was developed and built at Saturn Scientific Production Association in cooperation with the Ukrainian company Zorya-MashProyekt. The Ukrainian company's press office told CNP that it had not heard about any problem with the Russian ship's engine and that no one had consulted the company regarding repairs.

Afterwards, CNP learned that the frigate's damaged engine was replaced with a duplicate engine from another ship of the same class - "Admiral Flota Kasatonov", which is also being built at Northern Shipyard. This was done in order to not delay factory sea trials of "Gorshkov".

                                                                      - - - - - - - - - -
Gorshkov frigate "Admiral Flota Kasatonov" at Northern Shipyard - January 23, 2015
(credit: Curious)

  • If the September 2014 timeframe is correct, then the incident occurred during pierside testing - before factory sea trials even began. "Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov" completed 30 days of factory sea trials between November 18 and December 26 last year. It has not been underway since.

  • "Admiral Flota Kasatonov" was launched at Northern Shipyard on December 12 (without a gas turbine engine, if you believe the above report).

Tuesday, January 27, 2015

Status of Kilo Transfers to Black Sea Fleet

Despite official claims that new Kilo-class (Project 636.3) submarines would begin arriving in the Black Sea Fleet in May-June 2015, the readiness of the first hull, named "Novorossiysk", is in question. According to one source, there may be problems with the submarine as evidenced by the lack of reporting of any activity by the submarine since it transferred to Polyarnyy in November 2014. The source indicated "something serious" occurred on the submarine before the New Year that will require its return to Admiralty Shipyards in the Baltic Sea this spring before it heads for the Black Sea.

The second unit of the new class, "Rostov-na-Donu", was commissioned into the Russian Navy on December 30. On January 8, a navy spokesman told reporters that the submarine crew was preparing to transfer to the Northern Fleet for deep-water testing of equipment and weapons. The submarine remains at Admiralty Shipyards as of today.

When President Putin visited Novorossiysk Naval Base in September 2014, he was informed by Black Sea Fleet commander Admiral Vitko that construction projects at the base to support new ships [and submarines] would not be completed until late 2016. And that date has been pushed back to sometime in 2017, according to a Southern Military District press release this month. A review of contracts announced in 2014 indicates a lot of work has yet to be completed. Seven contracts specifically linked to submarine basing in Novorossiysk have reported completion deadlines of between May 2015 and February 2016, with the majority of them being completed in August or later.

Description Cost Deadline
high-pressure air stations RUB 265,636,262 May 20, 2015
high-pressure air station RUB 275,241,985 August 15, 2015
transformer substations RUB 36,241,590 August 15, 2015
battery recharging station RUB 251,979,920 October 15, 2015
battery storage facility RUB 41,477,946 October 30, 2015
barracks for submarine crews RUB 190,983,303 December 1, 2015
battery workshop RUB 375,464,251 February 28, 2016



TOTAL RUB 1,437,025,257

Despite this construction timeline, the first two new submarines can be temporarily based in Sevastopol, if needed. With regards to submarine battery recharging requirements, the converted Romeo-class submarine "PZS-50" (PZS = floating charging station) could be transferred to Novorossiysk on a temporary basis. "PZS-50" normally supports the fleet's sole Kilo submarine, "Alrosa"; however, that submarine's ongoing repairs will last through October 2015. This means "PZS-50" is free to support submarine basing requirements in Novorossiysk until that base's recharging station is completed in October, after which "PZS-50" would return to Sevastopol.

Thursday, January 22, 2015

This Week in Contracts: December 22-31, 2014

23rd State Naval Design Institute/23 Gosudarstvennyy Morskoy Proyektnyy Institut (St. Petersburg)
  • Number: 31401863241
  • Contractor: Federal Natural Resources Management Service for the Primorye Kray (Vladivostok)
  • Description: State environmental review of design documentation for basing of Mistral landing ships in Bukhta Uliss
  • Time frame: not specified
  • Contract value: RUB 400,365

  • Number: 31401863943
  • Contractor: Kamchatka Kray Center for Hygiene and Epidemiology (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy)
  • Description: Soil and water sampling at Pacific Fleet naval bases in Kamchatka Kray
  • Time frame: before December 31, 2014
  • Contract value: not specified

  • Number: 31401866634
  • Contractor: Eskort-Tsentr (Moscow)
  • Description: Development of design documentation "Engineering Complex of Technical Protection Resources" for Gadzhiyevo missile handling facility/Pier 6 (Site 931)
  • Time frame: not specified
  • Contract value: RUB 2,030,000

  • Number: 31401871827
  • Contractor: Central Directorate for Commercial Fishing Assessments and Standards for the Preservation and Development Marine Resources and Acclimatization (Moscow)
  • Description: Consultation services to review environmental impact of basing Mistral landing ships in Bukhta Uliss
  • Time frame: within 15 days of receiving design documentation
  • Contract value: RUB 199,734

  • Number: 31401875776
  • Contractor: Central Directorate for Commercial Fishing Assessments and Standards for the Preservation and Development Marine Resources and Acclimatization (Moscow)
  • Description: Environmental impact survey of Mys Kazak missile loading facility/Pier 1 (Site 3002PV)
  • Time frame: within 15 days of receiving design documentation
  • Contract value: RUB 159,641

  • Number: 31401889106
  • Contractor: Institute of Computational Technology - Siberian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Novosibirsk)
  • Description: Calculation of impact of tsunami waves near Site 583/7 (Bukhta Bogatyrevka)
  • Time frame: within three months of contract signing
  • Contract value: RUB 500,000

33rd Shipyard/33 Sudoremontnyy Zavod (Baltiysk)
  • Number: 31401867155
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Repairs of multiple systems on Steregushchiy frigate "Steregushchiy"
  • Time frame: February 2015
  • Contract value: not specified

35th Shipyard/35 Sudoremontnyy Zavod (Murmansk)
  • Number: 31401850514
  • Contractor: Kompensator Scientific Production Enterprise (St. Petersburg)
  • Description: Delivery of compensators (x34) for Udaloy II destroyer "Admiral Chabanenko"
  • Time frame: within 90 days of contract signing
  • Contract value: RUB 2,497,942

  • Number: 31401863712
  • Contractor: no bids submitted
  • Description: Delivery of TShMS-0.66K-I-0.5 transformers (x29) for Udaloy II destroyer "Admiral Chabanenko"
  • Time frame: within 90 days of payment
  • Contract value: RUB 1,570,000

  • Number: 31401864047
  • Contractor: no bids submitted
  • Description: Delivery of 20NKBN-25UZ battery cells (x10) for Udaloy II destroyer "Admiral Chabanenko"
  • Time frame: within 90 days of payment
  • Contract value: RUB 2,140,000

  • Number: 31401877531
  • Contractor: no bids submitted
  • Description: Automatic cut-off switches (x35) for Udaloy II destroyer "Admiral Chabanenko"
  • Time frame: 120-170 days after receipt of first payment
  • Contract value: RUB 30,500,000

  • Number: 31401879727
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Delivery of 5NK-55P battery cells (x42) for Udaloy II destroyer "Admiral Chabanenko"
  • Time frame: within 45 days of first payment
  • Contract value: RUB 260,000

51st Central Technology and Design Institute of Ship Repairs/51 Tsentralnyy Konstruktorsko-Tekhnologicheskiy Institut Sudoremonta (Lomonosov)

  • Number: 31401860443
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Laboratory studies to determine status of cable devices on Smolnyy training ship "Perekop"
  • Time frame: not specified
  • Contract value: RUB 2,000,000

  • Number: 31401860570
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Laboratory studies to determine condition of hull structures on Smolnyy training ship "Perekop"
  • Time frame: not specified
  • Contract value: RUB 2,000,000

Admiralty Shipyards/Admiralteyskiye Verfi (St. Petersburg)
  • Number: 31401875241
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Delivery of MGS-30M emergency signaling system for Petersburg submarine "Kronshtadt"
  • Time frame: 3Q2015
  • Contract value: not specified

  • Number: 31401875330
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Delivery of gas analyzers (x19) for Petersburg submarine "Kronshtadt"
  • Time frame: 2Q2015
  • Contract value: not specified

  • Number: 31401875534
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Delivery of valves for Belousov submarine rescue ship "Igor Belousov"
  • Time frame: 1Q2015
  • Contract value: not specified

  • Number: 31401875602
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Delivery of valves (x54) for Petersburg submarine "Kronshtadt"
  • Time frame: 1Q2015
  • Contract value: not specified

  • Number: 31401875681
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Delivery of electrical-related items (1,016 items) for Kilo (Project 636.3) submarine(s)
  • Time frame: 4Q2014 - 1Q2015
  • Contract value: not specified

  • Number: 31401875794
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Delivery of water desalination plant for Petersburg submarine "Kronshtadt"
  • Time frame: 2Q2015
  • Contract value: not specified

Almaz Central Naval Design Bureau/Tsentralnoye Morskoye Konstruktorskoye Byuro Almaz (St. Petersburg)

  • Number: 31401861477
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Adjustments to drawings for equipment tie downs for Project 20181 naval weapons transport vessel
  • Time frame: no later than May 29, 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 8,900,000

Amur Shipyard/Amurskiy Sudostroitelnyy Zavod (Komsomolsk-na-Amure)

  • Number: 31401883688
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Temporary additional manpower (115,920 man-hours) for assembly and welding work on shipyard construction projects
  • Time frame: January 1, 2015 - December 31, 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 67,813,200

  • Number: 31401883846
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Temporary additional manpower (198,720 man-hours) for assembly and welding work on shipyard construction projects
  • Time frame: January 1, 2015 - December 31, 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 116,251,200

  • Number: 31401883848
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Temporary additional manpower (99,360 man-hours) for electrical installation work on shipyard construction projects
  • Time frame: January 1, 2015 - December 31, 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 67,862,880

Astrakhan Shipyard/Astrakhanskiy Sudoremontnyy Zavod (Astrakhan)

  • Number: 31401857421
  • Contractor: Burevestnik Factory (Gatchina)
  • Description: Delivery of clamps for Project 705B harbor tug (Factory #004)
  • Time frame: within 60 days of first payment
  • Contract value: RUB 22,795

  • Number: 31401857572
  • Contractor: Ryazan Radio Factory (Ryazan)
  • Description: Delivery of radio sets for Project 22870 salvage and rescue tugs (Factory #007-#008)
  • Time frame: March 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 369,176

  • Number: 31401857693
  • Contractor: Shipboard Electro-Technical System Scientific Production Center (St. Petersburg)
  • Description: Delivery of electric equipment for combined electrical power system with shaft electric plant for Project 22870 salvage and rescue tug
  • Time frame: November 2014 - November 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 241,505,626

  • Number: 31401858575
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Delivery of electric ventilators for Project 705B harbor tug (Factory #004) and Project 22870 salvage and rescue tugs (Factory #007-#008)
  • Time frame: within 90 days of first payment
  • Contract value: RUB 20,143,739

  • Number: 31401870368
  • Contractor: ENA (Shchelkovo)
  • Description: Delivery of pump equipment for Project 705B harbor tug (Factory #004)
  • Time frame: within 120 days of contract signing
  • Contract value: RUB 2,146,688

  • Number: 31401870538
  • Contractor: All-Russia Scientific Research Institute of Relay Manufacturing-PROGRESS (Cheboksary)
  • Description: Delivery of electrical distribution equipment and integrated technical equipment control system for Project 705B harbor tug (Factory #004)
  • Time frame: no later than June 30, 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 16,531,800

  • Number: 31401870683
  • Contractor: Manometr (Engels)
  • Description: Delivery of manometers for Project 705B harbor tug (Factory #004)
  • Time frame: within 60-90 days of contract signing
  • Contract value: RUB 55,790

  • Number: 31401870749
  • Contractor: Manometr (Engels)
  • Description: Delivery of manometers for Project 22870 salvage and rescue tugs (Factory #007-#008)
  • Time frame: within 60-90 days of contract signing
  • Contract value: RUB 924,577

  • Number: 31401871269
  • Contractor: Kompressor Scientific Production Association (St. Petersburg)
  • Description: Delivery of Compressor Equipment for Project 705B harbor tug (Factory #004)
  • Time frame: within 90 days of contract signing
  • Contract value: RUB 5,115,446

  • Number: 31401871338
  • Contractor: Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center (Severodvinsk)
  • Description: Delivery of screw shafts for Project 705B harbor tug (Factory #004)
  • Time frame: within 12 months of contract signing
  • Contract value: RUB 3,143,013

  • Number: 31401877484
  • Contractor: Tranzas Navigator (St. Petersburg)
  • Description: Delivery of lighting, radio, and TV equipment for Project 705B harbor tug (Factory #004)
  • Time frame: within 12 months of contract signing
  • Contract value: EUR 260,000

Khabarovsk Shipyard/Khabarovskiy Sudostroitelnyy Zavod (Khabarovsk)
  • Number: 31401849403
  • Contractor: DalZavod Ship Repair Center (Vladivostok)
  • Description: Dock repairs of Piskunov seagoing tug "Aleksandr Piskunov"
  • Time frame: within 60 days of contract signing
  • Contract value: RUB 2,276,800

Kumertau Aviation Production Enterprise/Kumertauskoye Aviatsionnoye Proizvodstvennoye Predpriyatiye (Kumertau)
  • Number: 31401888347
  • Contractor: Independent Insurance Group (Moscow)
  • Description: Property and personal liability insurance for KA-27 (x2), KA-27M (x8), KA-29 (x5), KA-32 (x4), and KA-226 (x18) test flights in 2015
  • Time frame: for one year after contract signing
  • Contract value: RUB 34,213,234
  • Remarks: stated value of airframes: KA-27/KA-27M/KA-29 = RUB 180,000,000; KA-32 = RUB 250,000,000; KA-226 = RUB 150,000,000

Maritime Information Systems-Agat Concern/Kontsern MorInformSistema-Agat (Moscow)
  • Number: 0473100003814000036
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Delivery of surface ship automatics system software suite for controlling combined use of submersibles and unmanned aerial vehicles during ocean surveys
  • Time frame: not specified
  • Contract value: RUB 6,998,646

  • Number: 0473100003814000037
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Delivery of model of informational view of interoperability of hydrophysical ship control system with control nodes
  • Time frame: not specified
  • Contract value: RUB 2,921,361

Middle Neva Shipyard/Sredne-Nevskiy Sudostroitelnyy Zavod (Pontonnyy)
  • Number: 31401872072
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Temporary additional manpower (10,000 man-hours) for work on Obukhov minesweeper "Aleksandr Obukhov"
  • Time frame: 2015
  • Contract value: not specified

  • Number: 31401878096
  • Contractor: V. A. Degtyarev Factory (Kovrov)
  • Description: Installation and testing of 14.5mm MTPU gun mount and DP-64 grenade launcher on Obukhov minesweeper "Aleksandr Obukhov"
  • Time frame: 1Q2015 - August 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 1,559,896

  • Number: 31401878680
  • Contractor: Radar MMS Scientific Production Enterprise (St. Petersburg)
  • Description: Installation and testing of Syuzhet-KM hydrometeorological support system on Obukhov minesweeper "Aleksandr Obukhov"
  • Time frame: January 2015 - August 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 764,975

  • Number: 31401878921
  • Contractor: Kazan Electro-Technical Factory/Radar Operation-Repair Center (St. Petersburg)
  • Description: Installation and testing of device 6701-3, 6731-5, and KPA-67 on Obukhov minesweeper "Aleksandr Obukhov"
  • Time frame: January 2015 - August 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 5,280,225

  • Number: 31401886778
  • Contractor: Aris (Otradnoye)
  • Description: Shipboard space planning/outfitting (x16 rooms) of Obukhov minesweeper "Aleksandr Obukhov"
  • Time frame: March 25, 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 40,700,000

Nerpa Shipyard/Sudoremontnyy Zavod Nerpa (Snezhnogorsk)
  • Number: 31401881657
  • Contractor: Armalit-1 (St. Petersburg)
  • Description: Delivery of AKPO, AKSS, and APS anti-vibration mounts for Akula II submarine "Vepr"
  • Time frame: December 30, 2014
  • Contract value: RUB 858,075

  • Number: 31401881823
  • Contractor: ElektroRadioAvtomatika - Kola Office (Snezhnogorsk)
  • Description: Electromechanical work on Sierra II submarine "Pskov"
  • Time frame: February 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 3,510,629

  • Number: 31401881839
  • Contractor: ElektroRadioAvtomatika - Kola Office (Snezhnogorsk)
  • Description: Electromechanical work on Sierra II submarine "Pskov"
  • Time frame: February 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 823,931

  • Number: 31401881849
  • Contractor: ElektroRadioAvtomatika - Kola Office (Snezhnogorsk)
  • Description: Compacting of cable sleeves in main ballast tanks #2, #6, #11, and #12 on Victor III submarine "Obninsk"
  • Time frame: December 31, 2014
  • Contract value: RUB 1,517,454

  • Number: 31401881875
  • Contractor: ElektroRadioAvtomatika - Kola Office (Snezhnogorsk)
  • Description: Restoration of the technical readiness of Victor III submarine "Tambov"
  • Time frame: not specified
  • Contract value: RUB 3,311,295

  • Number: 31401881887
  • Contractor: ElektroRadioAvtomatika - Kola Office (Snezhnogorsk)
  • Description: Restoration of the technical readiness of Victor III submarine "Tambov"
  • Time frame: February 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 133,831,210

  • Number: 31401893910
  • Contractor: N. D. Zelinskiy Elektrostal Chemical-Mechanical Factory (Elektrostal)
  • Description: Delivery of KFLO-30 filtration cassettes for Akula II submarine "Vepr"
  • Time frame: March 30, 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 43,851

Northeast Repair Center/Severo-Vostochnyy Remontnyy Tsentr (Vilyuchinsk)
  • Number: 31401890761
  • Contractor: Vyartsilya Vostok (St. Petersburg)
  • Description: Routine maintenance on main engine on Emba II cable ship "Biryusa"
  • Time frame: before December 30, 2014
  • Contract value: RUB 5,939,283

Northern Machine-Building Enterprise/Severnoye Mashinostroitelnoye Predpriyatiye [SevMash] (Severodvinsk)
  • Number: 31401882295
  • Contractor: Bank of Development and International Trade - VneshEkonomBank (Moscow)
  • Description: RUB 9,336,103,000 credit line
  • Time frame: January 15, 2015 - December 31, 2019
  • Contract value: equal to 9% APR of borrowed amount
  • Remarks: to be used for repairs and modernization of Kirov cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov"

  • Number: 31401898181
  • Contractor: Hidrotehnica Scientific Technology Center - subsidiary of Moldovahidromas (Kishinev, Moldova)
  • Description: Delivery of BEhN-226 pumps (x2) for Severodvinsk submarine under construction
  • Time frame: March 31, 2016
  • Contract value: USD 4,740,140

  • Number: 31401904341
  • Contractor: Northern Region Shipbuilding Company (Severodvinsk)
  • Description: Temporary additional manpower (122,400 man-hours) for SevMash construction projects
  • Time frame: January 2015 - June 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 91,555,200

Northern Shipyard/Severnaya Verf (St. Petersburg)
  • Number: 31401863277
  • Contractor: V. A. Degtyarev Factory (Kovrov)
  • Description: Installation and testing of 14.5mm MPTU gun mounts on Ivanov intelligence collection ship "Yuriy Ivanov"
  • Time frame: December 2014
  • Contract value: RUB 1,207,048

  • Number: 31401863355
  • Contractor: Obukhovskoye (St. Petersburg)
  • Description: Installation and testing of LGS-250 hydraulic winch on Ivanov intelligence collection ship "Yuriy Ivanov"
  • Time frame: December 2014
  • Contract value: RUB 663,801

  • Number: 31401879552
  • Contractor: Irtysh Omsk Production Association (Omsk)
  • Description: Delivery of R-610-1 integrated emergency shortwave radio for Gorshkov frigate "Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Admiral Gorshkov"
  • Time frame: within 5 months of first payment
  • Contract value: RUB 2,035,884

  • Number: 31401888379
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Engineering and geodesic surveys of Northern Shipyard property
  • Time frame: not specified
  • Contract value: RUB 3,443,511
  • Remarks: part of larger project titled "Construction of Modern Shipbuilding Complex at Northern Shipyard - Phase 1"

  • Number: 31401904160
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Design survey work
  • Time frame: within 16 months of contract signing
  • Contract value: RUB 549,375,000
  • Remarks: part of larger project titled "Construction of Modern Shipbuilding Complex at Northern Shipyard - Phase 1"; project includes (a) renovation and retooling of existing production facilities, (b) outfitting quay (approx. 520m in length), (c) dry dock + caisson gate, (d) covered slipway, (e) dredging of water area around shipyard, (f) transportation and power supply facilities

  • Number: 31401888379
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Engineering and geodesic surveys of Northern Shipyard property
  • Time frame: not specified
  • Contract value: RUB 3,443,511
  • Remarks: part of larger project titled "Construction of Modern Shipbuilding Complex at Northern Shipyard - Phase 1"

Rubin Central Design Bureau of Naval Technology/Tsentralnoye Konstruktorskoye Byuro Morskoy Tekhniki Rubin (St. Petersburg)
  • Number: 31401892540
  • Contractor: SberBank - Northwest Bank (St. Petersburg)
  • Description: RUB 505,300,000 non-revolving credit line
  • Time frame: through December 31, 2018
  • Contract value: not specified
  • Remarks: to be used for retooling to support production of systems, equipment, and components for Kalina non-nuclear submarine

Vympel Shipyard/Sudostroitelnyy Zavod Vympel/Sudostroitelnyy Zavod Vympel (Rybinsk)
  • Number: 31401882076
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Delivery of MG-757.1 Anapa swimmer detection sonar system for Grachonok diver support vessel (Factory #01221)
  • Time frame: November 2014
  • Contract value: RUB 18,207,313

Yantar Baltic Shipyard/Pribaltiyskiy Sudostroitelnyy Zavod Yantar (Kaliningrad)
  • Number: 31401853941
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Delivery of LG-120-1 LG-120-2 winches for Gren landing ship "Petr Morgunov"
  • Time frame: December 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 11,484,264

  • Number: 31401867511
  • Contractor: not specified
  • Description: Delivery of electrical pump units for Gren landing ship "Petr Morgunov"
  • Time frame: July 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 14,486,058

Zvezda Far East Shipyard/Dalnyevostochnyy Zavod Zvezda (Bolshoy Kamen)
  • Number: 31401868691
  • Contractor: DalZavod (Vladivostok)
  • Description: Repairs of floating dry dock "Pallada"
  • Time frame: October 27, 2014 - November 30, 2014
  • Contract value: RUB 14,077,729

  • Number: 31401874744
  • Contractor: Rubin Central Design Bureau of Naval Technology (St. Petersburg)
  • Description: Development of working design documentation for Oscar II submarines "Chelyabinsk" and "Tver"
  • Time frame: October 10, 2014 - December 31, 2016
  • Contract value: RUB 817,890,587

  • Number: 31401875176
  • Contractor: ElektroPribor Central Scientific Research Institute Concern (St. Petersburg)
  • Description: Delivery of Simfoniya-3.2-949AM navigation system for Oscar II submarine "Irkutsk"
  • Time frame: September 2016
  • Contract value: RUB 707,185,304

  • Number: 31401890786
  • Contractor: All-Russia Bank of Regional Development (Moscow)
  • Description: RUB 291,600,000 credit line
  • Time frame: through December 31, 2014
  • Contract value: RUB 1,454,005

Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center/Tsentr Sudoremonta Zvezdochka (Severodvinsk)
  • Number: 31401859036
  • Contractor: Special Design Bureau of Boiler Manufacturing (St. Petersburg)
  • Description: Set-up of KGV 1.0-0.7 boiler on Sorum seagoing tug "MB-19"
  • Time frame: before September 30, 2014
  • Contract value: RUB 487,715

  • Number: 31401868774
  • Contractor: Manometr (Engels)
  • Description: Delivery of IGP-22007 depth indicator for Delta III submarine "Ryazan"
  • Time frame: not specified
  • Contract value: RUB 1,103,556

  • Number: 31401871164
  • Contractor: Northern Machine-Building Enterprise (Severodvinsk)
  • Description: Temporary additional manpower (15,300 man-hours) for Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center
  • Time frame: 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 203,000,000

  • Number: 31401871214
  • Contractor: Arktika Northern Production Association (Severodvinsk)
  • Description: Temporary additional manpower (2,500 man-hours) for Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center
  • Time frame: 2015
  • Contract value: RUB 2,000,000

  • Number: 31401872082
  • Contractor: Bank of Development and International Trade - VneshEkonomBank (Moscow)
  • Description: RUB 753,000,000 credit line
  • Time frame: through December 31, 2018
  • Contract value: RUB 189,606,000
  • Remarks: to be used for (a) retooling Vega Test Factory (Borovsk) to support serial production of steering/propulsion units (RUB 123,000,000); (b) construction of workshop at Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center to produce new types of propulsion systems (RUB 630,000,000)

  • Number: 31401872232
  • Contractor: Bank of Development and International Trade - VneshEkonomBank (Moscow)
  • Description: RUB 687,400,000 credit line
  • Time frame: through December 31, 2018
  • Contract value: RUB 223,943,000
  • Remarks: to be used for retooling Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center to support medium repairs and modernization of third generation nuclear-powered submarines

  • Number: 3140187243
  • Contractor: Bank of Development and International Trade - VneshEkonomBank (Moscow)
  • Description: RUB 644,000,000 credit line
  • Time frame: through December 31, 2018
  • Contract value: RUB 135,213,200
  • Remarks: to be used for (a) retooling Nerpa Shipyard to support repairs of third generation nuclear- and diesel-powered submarines (RUB 544,000,000); (b) retooling Astrakhan Shipyard (RUB 100,000,000)

  • Number: 31401872576
  • Contractor: Bank of Development and International Trade - VneshEhkonomBank (Moscow)
  • Description: RUB 1,087,700,000 credit line
  • Time frame: through December 31, 2018
  • Contract value: RUB 292,365,800
  • Remarks: to be used for retooling Krasnaya Kuznitsa Shipyard (Arkhangelsk)

Friday, January 16, 2015

XLT: How Patriots are Slashing the Nation's Defensive Capability

                                                            [translation of internet blog entry]

HOW PATRIOTS ARE SLASHING THE NATION'S DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY
January 9, 2015
http://yurnik-br.livejournal.com/10387.html

Foreign analysts looking at the growth of military budgets are concerned about the "Russian bear" for no good reason. No, its claws are not extending out, it's not snarling and showing its menacing teeth. Yea, it might growl a little. But its teeth and claws have been cut off - and not by external, malicious enemies, but by an internal bone infection.

For example, let's take a look at the well-known SevMash - Northern Machine-Building Enterprise Production Association, where construction of the nuclear-powered missile cruiser "Generalissimus Suvorov" began on December 26, 2014.

SevMash needed welders and assembly workers. It would seem you could turn to the State Labor Service and invite specialists from across the nation. Or even prepare your own or get them from your competitors. But, no - SevMash, right before the New Year, on December 31, announces a competitive bidding process for "provision of services to supply personnel." Additionally, this was not an auction, but rather the purchase from a single-source provider.

And who is this single-source provider? Could it be a head-hunting agency? Or at least the State Labor Service? No, the one and only suitable entity was Telekort Pomorskiy LLC, which was registered as a company on September 1, 2014.

And if you look at the contract, which has already been signed by both parties and stamped - there is no date!


At the same time the, sum that the defense firm is paying the young, but unscrupulous company ‒ 610 million 368 thousand rubles.

In Sevastopol, 44 million rubles were stolen for repairs of Black Sea Fleet ships. But that's just kopecks compared to the Severomorsk [sic] siphoning. By the way, the coincidence of the last names of the director of the "single-source provider" and the deputy defense minister, who visited SevMash in 2008 ‒ is that really a coincidence?

P.S.
On the page of Gennadiy Akinfeyev from Severodvinsk - the same name and residence as the owner of Telekort Pormorskiy - is this picture.

"We await the sanctions..."
Me thinks that with patriots such as these, we don't need sanctions ‒ we'll siphon, waste, and destroy everything ourselves.

Thursday, January 15, 2015

Arktika-2012 + "Losharik" = "Drill, Baby, Drill!"

Research into this week’s sighting of the “secret” submarine “Losharik” (actually, the sighting of a photograph probably taken nearly ten years ago) led back to the submarine’s participation in Arktika-2012 – an expedition to determine Russia’s mineral rights in the Arctic. Below are some interesting facts that may be new to readers already familiar with the expedition:
  • The expedition took place between August 10 and September 28 and involved the civilian icebreakers “Dikson” and “Kapitan Dranitsyn”, as well as the Russian Navy’s Delta Stretch nuclear-powered submarine “Orenburg” and deep-submergence nuclear-powered submarine “Losharik”.
  • “Orenburg” and “Losharik” (identified in expedition reports and briefings as “scientific research submarines” NIPL-1 and NIPL-2, respectively) departed port in early September. “Orenburg” (mothership for "Losharik") surfaced near one of the icebreakers on September 8, marking the start of the two submarines’ participation in the expedition. The submarines ended their participation on September 24.
Commemorative certificate from Arktika-2012
[credit: Yevgeniy Gusev]
  • On board “Losharik” was civilian geologist Yevgeniy Anatolyevich Gusev. Following the expedition, Gusev posted to the web a scan of a certificate commemorating his presence on “PL BN-220” (“Submarine Hull Number 220”), which turns out to be the hull number for “Losharik”. Gusev learned very quickly that posting the certificate to the web was a very bad idea, but his attempts to undo this mistake were unsuccessful as the certificate was immediately reposted across dozens of websites, blogs, and forums.
  • The French iXSea GAPS (Global Acoustic Positioning System) was used to coordinate activities between the icebreakers and the submarines. Additionally, an underwater communications (UWC) system was installed on “Kapitan Dranitsyn”. The UWC system allowed for voice communications as well as for passing SMS text messages.
"Orenburg" surfaced near the North Pole following its participation in Arktika-2012 - September 27, 2012
[credit: urban3p]
  • “Orenburg” was used to survey large areas believed to have escarpments (steep slopes) that may be suitable for placement of a GBU-2 seabed drilling unit. Based on those surveys, locations were passed to “Losharik” for more detailed survey work. Upon completion of the secondary survey, “Losharik” communicated back to “Orenburg” one of three commands: "Drill" (site suitable for drilling), "Dredge" (no suitable site, but area contains rock bottom material that can be dredged), and "Empty" (no suitable site and no rock bottom material). Upon receipt of any command, “Orenburg” would then head to the next survey area. When “Losharik” sent a "Drill" command, it would hover over the site while "Kapitan Dranitsyn" maneuvered over the submarine’s location, lowered the GAPS system (which is linked to a GPS system) to determine the exact location of “Losharik” (±10m accuracy). After the submarine’s position was fixed, the icebreaker would order “Losharik” to depart the area so that the GBU-2 could be lowered.
  • Of the ten locations identified as possible drilling sites, only two were identified as suitable. Three sites were identified as not suitable but having rock bottom material. The remaining sites were "empty."
Diagram depicting how activities were coordinated during Arktika-2012 using GAPS, GPS, Iridium,and WiFi
[credit: Andrey Morozov]
  • “Dikson” and “Kapitan Dranitsyn” were able to share seismology and ice data using a WiFi network that had a range of 8 kilometers.

Tuesday, January 13, 2015

Magazine Lassoes a Fictitious Horse in the White Sea

Scan of Top Gear magazine page showing mysterious submarine

One of today's popular military news stories out of Russia was the "accidental" leak of a picture of a rarely seen piece of naval hardware: the "Losharik" nuclear-powered special-purpose submarine. The boat gets its name from a 1971 Soviet stop-motion film bearing the same name. The lead character in the children's film was named Losharik because it was a horse ("loshad") formed from balls ("sharik") used by a circus juggler (watch the 10-minute movie here).

Losharik - the juggling man's horse

Today's story first surfaced last Friday when a scan of page 149 from a past or future edition of the Russian version of Top Gear magazine was posted to the internet. When queried, the poster stated he wasn't sure which edition the page came from, but he had heard that Top Gear's office in Moscow had been visited on Friday by some government officials - possibly from the Ministry of Defense. After the story was picked up by the Russian press today, the source went back and deleted his posts and the original image. But it was too late as more than a hundred Russian and foreign news sites had already republished the picture.

It's not clear when or where the photo was taken. The article's title, "Water Spray of the White [Sea?]," would seem to suggest the White Sea was, in fact, the location. The background does look very similar to other pictures taken from the beach adjacent to Severodvinsk, on the southeastern corner of the White Sea.

Nikolay Ushanov
One of the people in the article is most likely Nikolay Ushanov (identified by the diminutive name "Kolyunya" and "K-U" within the article's text). Ushanov has penned articles for and been on the editorial staff of many car magazines in Russia, such as Car Shop, XXL-Auto, Trend, Top Gear, Car World, and most recently Classic & Sports Car. He lives in Moscow, but has occasion to travel to such hot spots as the White Sea in far northwestern Russia. Before he was a car magazine writer and editor, he served in the Soviet Navy aboard a Yankee-class nuclear-powered submarine. Apparently Ushanov has maintained some naval and shipbuilding industry contacts, as evidenced by his attendance at the roll-out of the third Dolgorukiy-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine "Vladimir Monomakh" in December 2012. The submarine was built at Northern Machine-Building Enterprise in Severodvinsk.

Given his background, the picture really could have been taken at any time over the past decade. A local Severodvinsk photographer believes the photo used in the Top Gear article was taken nine years ago. It's unclear if he knows that to be true, or if he, too, noted Ushanov's work history and guessed it was taken while he was working for Top Gear magazine between 2004 and 2010. One final possible clue to the photo's date is the vehicle being discussed in the article: the Mercedes-Benz GL 450. According to Wikipedia, the GL 450 was not sold until 2006.

It's amazing what the press will pick up on a slow news day.

Sunday, January 11, 2015

RF Navy Acquiring Eight Deep-Water Work Submersibles by 2017

DeepWorker 2000 (forward) and Dual DeepWorker (aft) deep-water work submersibles
[credit: Nuytco Research Ltd]
In a press release today, the RF Ministry of Defense reported that two ARS-600 new-generation manned underwater deep-submergence vehicles would join the RF Navy in 2015. Another two joined the RF Navy in 2014. So, what are these submersibles?

The DeepWorker (DW) single-person and Dual DeepWorker (DDW) two-person submersibles (identified by the Russians as "ARS-600" (autonomous work submersible-600 meters)) allow one pilot (DW) or one pilot + one passenger (DDW) to operate underwater at depths of 1,000-3,000 feet, depending on the model and configuration. The submersibles can remain submerged (tethered or untethered) for up to six hours during normal operations. The submersibles can be used to:

  • search for and examine a submerged object;
  • retrieve submerged objects weighing up to 80 kg;
  • attach lines to objects weighing more than 80 kg, then deliver the line ends to a surface vessel that can then lift the objects;
  • clear the rescue hatch cover of a distressed submarine so that a deep-submergence rescue vehicle (DSRV) can land on the hatch to rescue the submarine crew;
  • attach hoses to provide high-pressure air and ventilation to a distressed submarine;
  • perform other operations.

The RF Navy has been testing the DW/DDW submersibles since at least 2012. Russian Navy head Admiral Chirkov visited the MOD's Scientific Research Institute of Rescue and Undersea Technologies (Lomonosov) in June 2012 to get a first-hand look at the submersibles. Reporting to date indicates the new Belousov-class submarine rescue vessel "Igor Belousov" will be equipped with at least one DW/DDW. Other vessels not permanently equipped to support the DW/DDW, such as Kashtan- and Sura-class heavy-lift vessels, could be quickly configured to serve as temporary Vessels of Opportunity (VOO), as needed.

Civilian research vessel "Heather Sea" - February 8, 2013
[credit: Stanislav Kruglov]
A possible link to Seliger-class research vessel "Seliger" (owned and operated by the Ministry of Defense's Main Directorate for Deep-Water Research, or GUGI) and November 2014 DW/DDW testing suggests it, too, may be temporarily or permanently equipped with the submersibles at some point in the future. For at least five days in November, the Russian-flagged civilian research vessel "Heather Sea" served as a VOO for the testing of two DW/DDW submersibles along the Russian Black Sea coast between Novorossiysk and Sochi. As it was underway and in the immediate vicinity of the "Heather Sea" operations, "Seliger" either played a support role and/or was actually involved in retrieving and launching the submersibles. Click here for a video showing the two vessel's operations between November 13 and November 20.

The November testing was in jeopardy of being delayed due to personnel matters. A month before departing Varna, Bulgaria, the owners of "Heather Sea" were accused of not paying wages to the ship's employees. On November 6, the ship's chief engineer, Albert Andrianov, sent an on-line petition to the State Labor Commission for assistance in getting his company to pay RUB 700,000 in wage arrears (from mid-June through October). Following the commission's intervention, the company paid the engineer's wages through September. A week later, "Heather Sea" was in Anapa, Russia.

Track of "Heather Sea" - January 11, 2015
After the DW/DDW testing in November, "Heather Sea" remained in Novorossiysk until departing port at approximately 07:00 GMT this morning. It is unclear whether "Heather Sea" is performing additional operations with DW/DDW submersibles or some other tasking, but "Seliger" does not appear to be underway.

To date, at least eight DW/DDW submersibles have been ordered for the fleet (excluding the DW/DDW submersible(s) tested in Lomonosov). The first four were to be delivered in 2014, with another two to be delivered to Baltiysk in 2016, and a final pair to be delivered to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy in 2017. It is not clear if the two DW/DDW used in the November 2014 testing were from the first batch of four that were scheduled for delivery in 2014 or the two that were previously delivered to the MOD's Scientific Research Institute of Rescue and Undersea Technologies by 2012.

Thursday, January 8, 2015

XLT: Ukraine, NATO, and Ruble Crisis Blamed for State Defense Order Fulfillment Issues

Deputy Minister of Defense Yuriy Ivanovich Borisov
                                                  [Translation of Izvestiya online news article]

"BY LOWERING THE NUMBER OF WEAPONS TYPES BY 36%, WE'LL SAVE 30 TRILLION RUBLES"
December 30, 2014
http://izvestia.ru/news/581385

In an interview with Izvestiya, Yuriy Borisov, deputy minister of defense and executive secretary of the RF Military-Industrial Committee, talked about challenges in fulfilling the State Defense Order (SDO), deliveries of components from NATO countries, and foreign exchange issues in the defense-industrial complex.

— Yuriy Ivanovich, 2014 was very complicated for the defense military in many areas. How did these difficulties impact the fulfillment of the State Defense Order?

— On average, fulfillment of the State Defense Order this year exceeded last year's figures. In 2014, we were allocated 125% more budgetary funds; in addition, the volume of military products grew 165%. Based on 2014's results, we placed nearly 100% of the orders under the State Defense Order. As for executing the SDO, it can never be 100%. There are thousands of events, and somewhere there are always contract breaks which are most often linked to external circumstances — specifically, import substitution. But, be that as it may, in 2014 we placed nearly 95% of the SDO. At the beginning of the target period (2011), that figure was 82–84%.

— On the one hand breaks in contracts with Ukraine spurred our industries; on the other — they stalled the production of several types of import-dependent armaments and hardware. What's you assessment of the substitution process?

— The say there are several items that affect fulfillment of our obligations. Above all, it's the delivery of helicopter engines from the Ukrainian Motor Sich factory — OAO Klimov was beginning to work on replacing them even be the events in Ukraine. In order to avoid dependence, we had to speed up, to double or triple engine production.

— But there are even more problematic issues...

— Yes, it's deliveries of Ukrainian-produced main power plants for the Navy — primarily for escort ships and frigates, which Yantar Shipyard is building. This very serious item was difficult for us. Saturn Scientific Production Association in Rybinsk is currently undergoing retooling. The company will be ready to replace this item in 2017. We were forced to introduce adjustments in fulfilling the State Armaments Program (SAP) — we will wait for the Russian engines.

This doesn't mean that the Navy has stopped receiving ships; we simply regrouped — we increased orders where there is no dependence [on foreign products], and slowed down here. At Yantar, we have a contract for six escort ships — for three of them, we received the main power plants, but later began the Ukrainian government's bans on deliveries. We found a way out of this situation — this will not affect product manufacturing timelines.

For two types of aviation hardware, two types of ships, and two types of ordnance, timelines for SDO fulfillment have been delayed by 1-1.5 years. The Russian defense industry sector is already prepared to replace other Ukrainian-produced components.

— What issues are being created by the import policies and sanctions of other governments?

— We are particularly concerned about deliveries from NATO countries, since we have received and even now are receiving a proportion of components from them. We are part of a global economy — there will be no iron curtain. Not one country, including America, produces all the products it needs in its own country. For example, a majority of memory chips are not manufactured in America, but rather come from Southeast Asia. Problems with pirated goods and with imported components not meeting the stated specifications exist for all of the world's leading producers of armaments and military hardware – it's just that for us these problems are more prominent.

— Since the 2011-2010 SAP was formalized, and the State Defense Order was planned out for the coming years, the economic situation has radically changed. How is this reverberating in the defense budget and fulfillment of the future SDO?

— We are very concerned with the rise in the dollar exchange rate. We planned SDO price parameters for 2015, 2016, and 2017 in a stable economic situation, laying out purchases of imported components based on the exchange rate from this past summer. Today the situation has changed. We will ask the government about avoiding risks connected to price differences due to the change in exchange rates. If the government does not compensate us for exchange rate losses, we will have to either reduce the number of munitions or forgo certain items. 
But this does not take away our obligations, established by the President under the May decrees, which are connected to levels for arming the military with modern types of armaments.

— What is the main problem in setting prices in the defense industry?

— The problem is with the strategic planning of SAP activities using an incorrect forecast of price parameters for a ten-year period. When we consider the initial price of a product, in accordance with forecast inflation [which the Ministry for Economic Development publishes annually. — Izvestiya], we calculate the cost for each year of the SAP. But the real level of inflation in the defense-industrial complex is higher than forecast, due to, among other things, the fact the forecast is based on civilian industry sectors with no consideration given to the defense sector. Because of this, the State Defense Order is "growing thin." Therefore, we appealed to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to order the Ministry for Economic Development to calculate the level of inflation separately for defense-industrial complex companies, and if the forecast levels aren't consistent with what transpires, then the question of compensation needs to be considered.

The second factor — the escalation of prices by weapons manufacturers. We propose – independently, with the participation of the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service, Federal Tariffs Service, and the relevant ministry – reviewing each instance when companies' prices exceed the level of inflation. We will examine what the root cause is: the willingness of a manufacturer, taking advantage of an opportunity, to make excess profits, or for objective factors – let's say, prices on the world metal exchange. In 2015, considering the situation with the dollar exchange rate, special emphasis needs to be paid to this. There will naturally be a rise in prices, including for imported components. We are prepared to reconsider costs, but that's a struggle for us — the budget isn't increasing, and circumstances aren't changing.

We had no serious conflicts over the past two years in terms of price non-conformity. However, we still have to resolve issues with 2011-2012 contracts, specifically those related to the Navy.

— You're talking about the rescue ship "Igor Belousov", which was scheduled to be accepted this year?

— I'm talking about the entire series of events linked to the underestimation of work related to the outfitting of corvettes, frigates, Borey strategic submarines and Yasen multipurpose nuclear-powered submarines. "Igor Belousov" is a never-ending small part in this set – not least because this ship will undergo factory testing and is scheduled to be delivered to the Navy in 2015.

— Why was the SAP forecast budget for 2016-2015 reduced?

— Between 2011 and 2020 [under the current SAP], the task was to drastically update the Russian military's inventory of weapons and to bring the number of new types of weapons in the inventory up to at least 70%. World practice is such that a military is considered combat-capable if the level of modern types of weapons [in its inventory] reaches 60–80%. The militaries of the U.S., Germany and, to a lower extent, France, Great Britain and China, meet these figures. In 2011, the level by which our military was equipped [with modern equipment] was between 12-13% and 20-25%, depending on the military branch or service - the situation was "beyond critical." The goal of the current SAP was to restore the necessary metrics – to modernize old and deliver new types [of military hardware].

Additionally, the number of weapons types is greatly increasing. If we had ramped up deliveries of advanced types of armaments without paying attention to the reduction of older weapons types, expenses would have steeply risen, since each different type must have its own documentation, specific repair parts and repair teams. Servicing all of this hardware, according to our estimates, would have required up to 55 trillion rubles. Thus, budget expenditures on defense would have grown from today's 2.5-3.5% of the GDP to 4-5% or higher. This would have meant another weapons race, and the country would have ineffectively spent a significant portion of its resources on defense.

Now we understand which number of weapons types will define our armaments up until 2025. Examples include the Armata integrated combat platform that is under development, vessels for the Navy that are being built using a modular concept, the PAK FA advanced aviation system, the Angara space missile system, and others. Calculations have shown that by lowering the number of weapons types by 36%, fewer financial resources are required – in the area of 30 trillion rubles. This figure is huge, but in contrast to the current state program, wrapped up in that figure will be state capital investments for preparing the infrastructure and, very likely, a portion of resources linked to preparing and developing the industrial capacity of companies. Earlier this fell under the Ministry of Industry and Trade and other federal agencies that were responsible for the activities of defense-industrial complex firms. Now a possibility is being considered to include costs for preparing production to perform SAP-related work in the price of products through increased profit margins, which for us means increased prices.

The goal of the next program period will be different — the quantity of new types of weapons no longer needs to be sharply increased. What will need to be done is to maintain a desired level of equipment status and to increase the level of troops' combat-capable hardware, by which I mean repairs and modernization. We are switching over to a system where manufacturers will track equipment across the entire life cycle, all the way to scrapping.

— Speaking of life-cycle contracts — this year dozens of repair factories were removed from Ministry of Defense hierarchy and transferred to the defense-industrial complex. But many of them are in need of considerable modernization...

— The composition of equipment is changing. Repair factories, which were until recently under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense, no longer meet realistic demands based on their technical capabilities, the status of their key equipment, and the qualifications of their employees — they were qualified to repair older generation equipment. We asked our industry colleagues, who manufacture equipment for us, to take on the function of tracking equipment over the course of its entire life cycle. We transferred resources to them for various types of repairs. Of course, repair factories need to modernize their basic assets and to have new personnel policies. But you'd admit that production issues – these are not functions of the Ministry of Defense. We should deal with issues of combat proficiency and how to use this hardware. This is the world trend.

— So, absolutely all functions related to the maintenance and repair of military equipment have been transferred to the defense-industrial complex?

— The situation does not need to be carried to the point of absurdity. We aren't going to send our equipment off for the oil and tires to be changed. For routine repairs and preventive maintenance, repair elements have been established within military units; consumables and repair parts are purchased for them. Repair companies’ economic situations vary. To transfer companies on the verge of bankruptcy to our industry colleagues would do more harm than good. They will start bankrupting them, and then the entire chain linked to fulfillment of the SAP will suffer. Here, as I have already said, sensible cooperation between agencies and companies is important, and "manual control" by integrated structures of the defense-industrial complex can help organize this.

— In October the Russian government's Military-Industrial Committee received presidential status. How have the committee's tasks changed as a result of this?

— Issues of implementing a state policy with regards to the defense-industrial complex, military-technical support and security of the state were raised to the presidential level. First and foremost, the Military-Industrial Committee is analyzing new threats which arise with the development of technology. For example, America is implementing its "Prompt Global Strike" program — using hypersonic delivery platforms, weapons can be delivered within one hour to any point on the globe. Threats of this type emerge in the process of scientific-technical progress. Adequate responses to such threats must be sought out not only by security agencies, but also, first and foremost, in the industrial sector, which develops new technologies.

Additionally, import substitution is one of the most important examples of strategic tasks solved by the military-industrial complex. If we do not consider the risks of non-deliveries of components for producing military hardware based on existing cooperation, then planning will go into disarray, and the goal may not be reached — everything will collapse, like a house of cards. Therefore, this issue demands serious coordination, and the president has taken it under his personal control.

Sunday, January 4, 2015

XLT+: Joint Service Aviation Training in 2015

TU-142 Bear F long-range ASW aircraft departing Kamennyy Ruchey Airbase
[credit: Roman URRT]

                                                          [Translation of TASS news article]

NAVAL AVIATION TO ENHANCE CREW TRAINING TO OPERATE AS PART OF JOINT SERVICE GROUPINGS
January 4, 2015
http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/1684344

In 2015 Russian Naval Aviation will focus its efforts on training crews to perform missions as part of combined groupings and task groups, TASS learned from Igor Dygalo, Navy representative to the Russian Ministry of Defense Press Service Office.

"The main goal of the combat training of Naval Aviation forces in 2015 will be to achieve a higher level of training of aviation units and sub-units to perform their intended missions. Naval aviators will perform these missions both independently and as part of combined (joint service) groupings and task groups," Dygalo quoted Naval aviation chief Igor Kozhin.

According to Dygalo, the main efforts will be focused on crew training and on improving the qualification levels of flight, engineering and technical, and civilian personnel.

Dygalo also reported that Naval Aviation completed more than 100% of the practical training plan in 2014. "As a result of intensifying combat training, naval pilots completed more than 11,000 combat training drills," he concluded.

                                                          -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -

How will this joint training manifest itself?

  • combined Navy and Air Force fighter and fighter-bomber drills
  • use of Navy fighters to escort strategic bombers
  • aerial refueling of Navy TU-142 Bear F ASW aircraft by Air Force IL-78 Midas air tankers
  • other similar training events

As these are drills that have been practiced to varying degrees in the past, Dygalo's statement could merely suggest a higher frequency of joint training and possibly with larger numbers of participants. Joint service aviation training probably will be highlighted in this year's operational strategic exercise.

Saturday, January 3, 2015

RF MOD: Semi-Trusting the Facts

Screen capture of RF MOD press release - January 3, 2015

In today's press release, the MOD reported that in 2014 "crews of Russian Navy nuclear-powered submarine missile cruisers conducted four successful launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles from the Barents and White Seas towards the Kura test range on the Kamchatka Peninsula." The press release claims the launch dates and launch platforms were:

Sep 10 -- Dolgorukiy "Vladimir Monomakh"
Oct 29 -- Dolgorukiy "Yuriy Dolgorukiy"
Nov 5 -- Delta IV "Tula"
Dec 1 -- Dolgorukiy "Aleksandr Nevskiy"

The dates, based on the MOD's earlier press releases and statements, were correct except:

Dec 1 Nov 28 -- Dolgorukiy "Aleksandr Nevskiy" [Source 1, 2, 3, 4]

Why did the press service not even mention the May 8 launches of an SS-N-18 by Delta III "Podolsk" (from the Sea of Okhotsk) and an SS-N-23 by Delta IV "Tula" (from the Barents Sea) [Source 5, 6, 7, 8]?

The absence of the May launches may have been due to a failure to include a specific time frame in the message, as in "during the last quarter of the training year." But the press office still provided the wrong launch date for the Bulava launch by "Aleksandr Nevskiy".

When you consider how deputy defense minister Yuriy Borisov and the MOD statisticians came up with different numbers of new-construction units delivered this year, you have to wonder who's really in charge of fact-checking the MOD's figures.

Thursday, January 1, 2015

Which Subs Will Be Upgraded to Carry Kalibr?

In 2014, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, head of the Russian Navy, stated:

"By 2020, 12 multipurpose nuclear-powered submarines are scheduled to undergo deep modernization: Project 949AM – four units, Project 971M – six units, Project 945M – two units. Characteristics of these submarines will not be inferior to foreign equivalents, but rather, in terms of certain criteria, such as strike missile weapon loads, they will be superior to their foreign equivalents."

In this context, "deep modernization" most certainly refers to reconfiguring the submarines to carry the Kalibr family of missiles (SS-N-27 antiship cruise missile, SS-N-30 land-attack cruise missile, and 91R antisubmarine missile) and, in most (if not all) cases, upgrading to the MGK-540M (Kizhuch) sonar system. Based on multiple statements and a review of repair contracts and annual stockholder reports, the following is a list of known candidates that fit Chirkov's "deep modernization" projections:

Class Name Age
Akula I "Bratsk" 27
Akula I "Leopard" 22
Akula I "Samara" 19
Akula I "Volk" 23
Oscar II "Chelyabinsk" 24
Oscar II "Irkutsk" 26
Oscar II "Tver" 22
Sierra I "Karp" 27
Sierra I "Kostroma" 24

There certainly are other upgrade candidates, including announced upgrades for specific units, but none of them appear to be in place for an upgrade shipyard period before 2020. Also note that Chirkov's projections do not specify upgrades to old Kilo diesel submarines or Victor III nuclear-powered submarines. Contracts for the ongoing repairs of Sierra II "Pskov" and Victor III "Tambov" provide no indications of Kalibr or major sonar system upgrades. Victor III "Obninsk" completed a repair period in 2014, which was classified by shipyard officials as a "restoration of technical readiness" and not "deep modernization." Thus, the recent launch of a probable land-attack cruise missile by "Obninsk" indicates that submarine is simply being used as a test platform.

The question still remains: can all this really be achieved by 2020? Given Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center's experience and record, it is certainly possible that the six units the shipyard was contracted to upgrade will be finished by 2020. The same cannot be said for Zvezda Far East Shipyard, which has a record of continually delayed repair schedules and a (criminal) history of not actually performing the repairs it was contracted and paid to perform. The MOD currently has at least five cases against Zvezda Far East Shipyard at various levels in the Russian arbitration court system and is seeking to receive over RUB 111.5 million in payments and fines. Factors that will impact both shipyards are continuing Western sanctions, the loss of access to Ukrainian firms that produced parts and components used in Russian submarines, and the ruble crisis.

In 2020 and beyond, the field of candidates for Kalibr/Kizhuch upgrades could include the following:

Class Name Age (in 2020)
Akula I "Kuzbass" 28
Akula I "Magadan" 31
Akula I "Nerpa" ("INS Chakra") 9
Akula I "Pantera" 30
Akula I "Tigr" 27
Akula II "Gepard" 19
Akula II "Vepr" 25
Oscar II "Omsk" 27
Oscar II "Orel" 28
Oscar II "Smolensk" 30
Oscar II "Tomsk" 24
Oscar II "Voronezh" 31
Sierra II "Nizhniy Novgorod" 30
Sierra II "Pskov" 27